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Abstract
This thesis contains three studies which provide a complete set of vulnerability as-
sessments in Vietnam.
The first study in the thesis estimates the extent of vulnerability and analyses
who the vulnerable are. In addition, this study investigates the link between dy-
namic poverty and vulnerability, something which has rarely been done. To do this,
the most common definition of vulnerability as ‘Vulnerability as Expected Poverty’
(VEP) is used, along with a data set extracted from three consecutive surveys from
2002 to 2006. The results reveal that, (i) vulnerability estimated using the refer-
ence line is more appropriate than when estimated using the actual poverty line
for poverty prediction in the case of Vietnam; (ii) ex ante vulnerability in previous
periods might translate to ex post poverty in the following periods though both vul-
nerability and the incidence of poverty tend to fall over time; (iii) the vulnerability
of the poor may trap them in poverty; and (iv) the vulnerability of the non-poor
could propel them into poverty.
The second study investigates sources of household vulnerability and responses to
risks in rural Vietnam using data from Vietnam Access to Resources Household Sur-
veys (VARHS). Vulnerability as low utility measure (VEU) is employed to estimate
and distinguish the sources of vulnerability. Next the household’s behavior to cope
with shocks is analyzed; and finally the effectiveness of the insurance mechanism is
evaluated. The main findings are that: (i) the utility of the average household is 71
per cent less than the hypothetical situation without any risk or inequality in con-
sumption, and idiosyncratic shocks contribute 50 per cent of the loss; (ii) households
depend heavily on informal coping strategies such as food consumption reduction,
savings withdrawal, taking children out of school, or capital depletion. The oppor-
tunity to borrow money from formal institutions is limited, while subsidies from
the government or NGOs are available only in cases of natural disaster; and (iii)
household consumption and income exhibit highly correlated variation, implying
that existing informal insurance instruments are less effective than expected.
The third study provides new evidence on the impact of health insurance coverage
on household vulnerability using Vietnam Access to Resources Household Surveys
(VARHS) undertaken during 2010-2012. The outcomes of interest are the probabil-
ity of falling into poverty (VEP) and the magnitude of utility loss (VEU). Since the
iv
data set is not from an intervention program, the propensity score- matching method
is employed to construct treatment and control groups. Risk aversion is calculated
and used as an important explanatory variable for health insurance enrollment. The
implications of the study suggest actions for the government to attain its goal of uni-
versal health insurance coverage. The estimates show that health insurance coverage
helps rural households in Vietnam reduce the idiosyncratic component of utility loss
by 81 per cent and has the added benefit of reducing the probability of being poor by
about 19 per cent. The reverse effect of the risk aversion on health insurance enroll-
ment implies that not only is there a potential ‘rigidity’ effect on health insurance
demand, but also that there are deficiencies in health insurance market.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 A need for vulnerability analysis
Poverty is globally viewed as ‘deprivation in well-being’ (Haughton & Khandker
2009) or as one of the profound ‘characteristics of underdevelopment’ (Deaton 1997).
For these reasons both the World Bank and the United Nations have adopted a
goal of ending extreme poverty by 2030 (Ferreira et al. 2015). Several national
governments, bilateral development agencies and non-governmental organizations
are also attempting to alleviate, and eventually to eliminate, extreme poverty. World
Bank estimates suggest that in 2012 more than 900 million people, or around 12.7
percent of the total population of the world, were living below the international
poverty line (USD1.9 per day). Compared to almost two billion poor people in 1990
(or more than one-third of the world’s population at that time), this number reflects
a significant decrease in poverty.
However, there are still challenges on the road to ‘the end of poverty’ (Sachs 2006).
There are still many people who escape from poverty but then quickly fall below
the poverty line again; and there are many people in chronic poverty who remain
below the poverty line over time, and even across generations. Therefore, trends in
poverty and every aspect of the lives of the poor are topics of great interest to both
researchers and policymakers worldwide1.
1See Lipton & Ravallion (1993) and Kanbur (2008) for a review of poverty literature.
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For policy purposes, it is crucial to identify what poverty is and what causes poverty.
For the first question, the simplest concept of well-being and poverty is income or
consumption. Typically, poverty is measured by comparing individuals’ income or
consumption with some defined threshold below which they are considered poor.
Specific types of consumption goods such as health care, nutrition and education
can also be used to measure poverty. Ultimately, the concept of well-being can
include abstract aspects of life such as a sense of powerlessness, or the absence of
rights such as freedom of speech (Sen 1987) and it is then that poverty becomes a
multidimensional phenomenon2. Regarding the determinants of poverty, it is widely
accepted that poverty is a consequence of some common factors such as low education
attainment, limited access to economic resources, living in an isolated area and
a high percentage of dependents (Fiess & Verner 2004). As in medicine where
diagnosis is often followed by the treatment, these results lead governments and
development agencies to adopt pro-poor policies that ensure the participation of the
poor in economic growth, and to provide basic social services, especially education,
preliminary health care and family planning. These policies must be supplemented
by well-targeted transfer, in order to assist those who may not benefit from these
policies, and by safety nets, in order to give protection to those exposed to negative
shocks (World Bank 1990).
The static poverty estimation focuses on those who were (or are currently) poor and
provides only ex post information on household welfare. Such an approach allows us
to identify whose poverty needs to be alleviated, or to measure the impacts of past
pubic interventions on the extent of poverty. However, the results do not predict the
trend of poverty, and therefore do not reveal whether a poor household will escape
from poverty or will remain poor in the near future. The measure of who are currently
poor is not sufficient for effective forward-looking anti-poverty interventions due to
the fact that households move out of or into poverty from one year to the next.
From the policy perspective, governments and policy makers are more interested in
the impact of their policies in the future. For this reason, it would be valuable to be
able to identify those who are expected to be poor ex ante (that is, in the future).
Such households are considered as vulnerable to poverty.
The concept of vulnerability is interpreted in various ways in different contexts. In
economics, the concept of vulnerability emerges from the concept of poverty. For
2See Kakwani & Silber (2008) for a progress in multidimensional poverty.
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example, from the traditional view of poverty reflected in World Development Re-
port 1990, the notion of poverty consists of material deprivation and low attainment
in education and health (World Bank 1990). Later, the term ‘vulnerability’ is men-
tioned when examining the relationship between poverty and uncertainty of income
(Morduch 1994). Since then, the term ‘vulnerability’ is often used to extend the tra-
ditional concept of poverty. While poverty measurement is based on fixed standards
such as income or expenditure during a short period of time, vulnerability broadens
the poverty notion by including the potential risk of adverse shocks such as income
loss, bad health (idiosyncratic risks) and natural disasters (covariate risks). For ex-
ample, in the work of Glewwe & Hall (1998) and Cunningham & Maloney (2000),
vulnerability is defined as exposure to negative shocks that impact on welfare. It is
also defined as “the probability or risk today of being in poverty or to fall into deeper
poverty in the future” (World Bank 2001) or “the ex-ante risk that a household will,
if currently non-poor, fall below the poverty line, or if currently poor, will remain in
poverty” (Chaudhuri 2003).
There are four major reasons why an analysis of vulnerability to poverty is necessary
and desirable (Chaudhuri 2003). First, vulnerability assessment supports forward-
looking anti-poverty interventions. Along with the static approach to well-being,
vulnerability assessment reveals some potential paths to improve well-being in the
future. Second, a focus on vulnerability to poverty operates as an ex ante poverty
prevention intervention, which differs from ex post poverty alleviation interventions.
Third, vulnerability analysis helps to expose sources and forms of the risks that
household suffer. This, in turn, supports appropriate designs of safety net programs
to lower or alleviate risk, and hence poverty. Finally, yet importantly, risk and uncer-
tainty about the future negatively affect current well-being. Therefore, vulnerability
is an intrinsic aspect of well-being.
Since 1990, when the World Bank started to focus on poverty in developing coun-
tries, there have been a large number of attempts to conceptualize and empirically
investigate vulnerability. Development economists find it hard to ignore the term
‘vulnerability’ when exploring the lives of the poor. Vulnerability is distinguished
from poverty in the sense that there are households who are non-poor but vulnerable,
and those that are poor but non-vulnerable. Moreover, as a measure of well-being,
vulnerability is more appealing since it takes into account not only varying levels of
consumption, but also the flexibility of households to react to covariate and idiosyn-
cratic shocks. Nevertheless, economists have interpreted the concept of vulnerability
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to poverty from different viewpoints. As a result, the empirical studies on the topic
are diverse, and the results are as varied as the approaches adopted. Also, for de-
veloping countries, the precise assessment of vulnerability is more difficult because
of the limited availability of panel data that are necessary to trace the well-being of
households over time.
1.2 Research motivation
My thesis points to the need for designing poverty alleviation policies in Vietnam,
a developing country which has made remarkable progress in reducing poverty and
promoting prosperity over the last two decades (World Bank 2011, 2013). Originat-
ing from a thoroughly political and economic reform (Doi Moi) in 1986, the level
of real GDP per capita in Vietnam has significantly increased from below USD 100
in 1986 to USD 1,130 by the end of 2010. The Vietnamese economy is four times
larger than it was in the early 1990s. As a result, the poverty headcount has fallen
from 58 per cent in the early 1990s to 14.2 per cent in 20103. Similar trends are
discernible using international standards of USD1.25 and USD2 per person per day
and most indicators of welfare, such as education and health, have improved. To
date, Vietnam has achieved, and in some cases surpassed, many of the criteria of the
Millennium Development Goals. However, the task of poverty reduction is far from
complete and the road ahead is challenging in some respects. The poverty line, set in
the 1990s, is very low by international standards and the methods used to monitor
poverty are outdated. Vietnam still has a high proportion of near-poor households
who easily fall back into poverty because of both covariate shocks and idiosyncratic
shocks. The remaining poor are more difficult to reach, especially the ethnic minor-
ity households which still face difficult situations such as isolation, limited assets,
low levels of education, and poor health status.
The same factors that make households slip into poverty also contribute to household
vulnerability. For instance, households in rural areas with their income dependent
on farm activities are most vulnerable. In the Mekong Delta, landless households are
3Based on the new poverty line applied to the 2010 VHLSS (VND 653,000/person/month), the
poverty rate in 2010 is 20.7 per cent. However, using official urban and rural poverty lines (VND
500,000/person/month and VND 400,000/person/month, respectively), the poverty rate is 14.2
per cent. The General Statistical Office and World Bank (GSO-WB) poverty rate is substantially
higher in rural areas, in part due to differences between official poverty lines and the new GSO-WB
poverty line, but also due to differences in the overall methodological approach (World Bank 2013).
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considered to be particularly vulnerable because the demand for day labor is seasonal
and rarely adequate. Physical isolation has a close relationship with vulnerability
because difficult access to markets gives households less incentive to diversify their
livelihood. In addition, households in some regions frequently suffer from droughts,
floods and tropical storms. In urban areas, households who depend heavily on infor-
mal sector work often encounter problems related to unexpected expenditure; and
unsurprisingly, having a regular income is one of the important determinants of well-
being. For this reason a complete set of vulnerability assessments for Vietnam is
necessary. It is time to shift the policy focus from static indicators of poverty to
ones which measure vulnerability and resilience of different groups when preceded
by unexpected shocks and policy changes.
Motivated by this, the first study in the thesis estimates the extent of vulnerability
and analyses who the vulnerable are. In addition, this study investigates the link be-
tween dynamic poverty and vulnerability, something which has rarely been done. To
do this, the most common definition of vulnerability as ‘Vulnerability as Expected
Poverty’ (VEP) is used, along with a data set extracted from three consecutive sur-
veys from 2002 to 2006. Specifically, the reference line proposed by Dutta et al.
(2011) is adopted to improve Chaudhuri’s measure of vulnerability. Then the associ-
ation between household vulnerability and the probability of being poor is examined;
and finally, the role of ex ante vulnerability on movement into and out of poverty
during the sample periods is investigated. To the best of my knowledge, this study
is the first to adopt a reference line in a vulnerability measure with cross-sectional
data. This study also makes improvements to the model specifications that previous
studies have used.
Continuing with vulnerability analysis, it is important to know the effectiveness
of existing coping mechanisms. Unfortunately, the social safety nets in Vietnam
are not adequate. Unemployment insurance commenced since 2009, but few people
have benefited from the legislation because of bureaucratic hurdles. In addition, few
households have access to the formal credit market due to asymmetric information
in the financial markets. Commercial banks favor giving commercial loans over
personal loans. Credit cards are usually for individuals with high, stable income.
Consequently, poor and vulnerable households have to depend mainly on their own
resources to cope with unexpected shocks. Household consumption levels have varied
considerably and, not unexpectedly, low-income households are more likely to fall
into, or stay in, poverty. These facts explain why it is necessary to have studies that
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include both a vulnerability assessment and coping strategies in response to negative
shocks.
Taking advantage of the panel data, this second study investigates sources of house-
hold vulnerability and responses to risks in rural Vietnam using data from Vietnam
Access to Resources Household Surveys (VARHS). Vulnerability as low utility mea-
sure (VEU) is employed to estimate and distinguish the sources of vulnerability.
Next the household’s behavior to cope with shocks is analyzed; and finally the effec-
tiveness of the insurance mechanism is evaluated. As far as I know, this paper is the
first analysis using the data set of Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey
(VARHS) to estimate vulnerability as low expected utility (VEU) in Vietnam. In
addition, this is the first work that combines vulnerability estimation, sources of
vulnerability and response to risks in a single paper.
While decomposing the sources of household vulnerability, one may find that one
of the worst shocks to households is the serious illness of one of its members. This
has a negative and significant effect on consumption and income. Illness raises two
important economic costs: the cost of medical care and income loss due to reduced
labor supply. The unpredictable nature of these two costs makes households unable
to smooth their consumption over periods of major illness. This is particularly true
in developing countries where few individuals have health insurance. In addition,
households in developing countries find it difficult to access the formal credit market.
Therefore, they have to rely on informal coping mechanisms such as drawing on
savings, selling assets, transfers from other families or social support networks. Low-
income households who cannot use these channels to smooth their consumption
are more likely to fall into a poverty trap. In other words, the burden of health
care pushes individuals experiencing illness into poverty or forces them into deeper
poverty. Unfortunately, there is no study in the literature that measures the impact
of health insurance coverage on household vulnerability.
The third study in this thesis attempts to fill this gap in the empirical literature
and is the first to investigate the role of health insurance in mitigating vulnerability.
A panel data set extracted from Vietnam Access to Resources Household Surveys
(VARHS) for 2010-2012 is used in the analysis. The outcomes of interest are the
probability of falling into poverty (VEP) and the magnitude of utility loss (VEU).
Since the data set is not from an intervention program, the propensity score- match-
ing method is employed to construct treatment and control groups. Risk aversion
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is calculated and used as an important explanatory variable for health insurance
enrollment. The implications of the study suggest actions for the government to
attain its goal of universal health insurance coverage.
In short, the thesis provides a complete set of vulnerability assessments as suggested
by Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003b) and Haughton & Khandker (2009). Vietnam
is chosen as a case study because of its impressive achievement in poverty reduction
(Cord 2007, Klump 2007) and the availability of detailed data on both consumption
and risks. The case study approach in this thesis is appropriate because cross-country
data may hide the heterogeneity of the impact (Ravallion 2001). Also, it is impossible
for a cross-country study to capture the heterogeneity of socio-demographic factors
across countries (Bourguignon 2002).
1.3 Objectives, research questions and method-
ologies
In general, this thesis aims to contribute to the vulnerability literature and provide
a complete set of vulnerability assessments for the purpose of targeted intervention4.
As far as I know, the thesis is the first study to provide the vulnerability assessment
with relatively individual thresholds rather than the poverty line, which has been
commonly used in previous studies. In addition, the thesis is the first to decompose
sources of vulnerability in the case of Vietnam. Finally, yet importantly, the thesis is
the first research in the literature to estimate the impact of health insurance coverage
on vulnerability. The specific aims in each study are as follows:
Household vulnerability as expected poverty in Vietnam
Here, the thesis aims to adopt the reference line proposed by Dutta et al. (2011)
to improve Chaudhuri’s measure of vulnerability. Then the study examines the
association between household vulnerability and the probability of being poor; and
finally this study evaluates the role of ex ante vulnerability on movement into and
4According to Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003b), a complete vulnerability assessment should
answer five crucial questions: 1) what is the extent of vulnerability; 2) who is vulnerable; 3) what
are the sources of vulnerability; 4) how do households respond to shocks; and 5) what gaps between
risks and risk management mechanism?.
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out of poverty during the sample periods. Research questions answered in this study
are as follows:
• What is the extent of vulnerability?
• Who are the vulnerable?
• What is the link between vulnerability and dynamic poverty?
The econometrics method has been applied to address these questions. First, I adopt
the 3-steps Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) with an ordinary least squares
(OLS) procedure to measure vulnerability, and therefore to answer the first questions.
Then I apply the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve to compare the
poverty predictive power between Dutta et al.’s measure and Chaudhuri’s measure.
For the second question, a probit model is used to estimate whether a household’s per
capita consumption expenditure is below the poverty line, conditioned on a vector
of household and commune characteristics. Finally, I employ a multinomial logit
model to answer whether the vulnerability traps households into poverty (for the
already poor) or increases the likelihood of falling into poverty (for the non-poor).
Household vulnerability as low expected utility and responses to risks in
rural Vietnam
The aim of this section is to estimate the vulnerability as low utility and to distin-
guish the sources of vulnerability. Then the study examines the household?s behav-
ior when coping with shocks, and finally evaluates the effectiveness of the insurance
mechanism. In particular, the following research questions are discussed:
• What are the sources of vulnerability?
• How do households respond to shocks?
• What are the gaps between risks and risk management mechanisms?
For the first question, a two-way error component model is employed with a panel
data. To reduce the simultaneous bias in the regression, the instrumental variable
(IV) technique is applied at this step. To address the second question, the multi-
variate probit model is utilized due to the fact that households can choose various
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coping instruments simultaneously when they confront shocks, and the model allows
for a correlation among choices. The IV technique with panel data is used again to
measure the effectiveness of existing insurance schemes on consumption and answer
the third question.
Risk aversion and the impact of health insurance on household vulnera-
bility: New evidence from rural Vietnam
This section of the thesis aims to shed light on the impact of health insurance
coverage on household vulnerability. The outcomes of interest are the probability of
falling into poverty (VEP) and the magnitude of utility loss (VEU). There is only
one research question, i.e.,
• Does health insurance coverage reduce household vulnerability?
To address this question, the propensity score-matching method is employed to con-
struct treatment and control groups. Risk aversion is calculated and used as an
important explanatory variable for health insurance enrollment. The random effect
estimator is used to check the robustness of the matching method because some
explanatory variables are time-invariant or have minimal within-unit variation.
1.4 Thesis structure
The thesis has five chapters, as follows:
Chapter 1: General introduction
This chapter reviews facts and development literature, and then introduces the need
for vulnerability assessments. This section continues to provide research motivations
for each of the studies in the thesis. Objectives, research questions, methodologies
and a thesis outline are also provided in this chapter.
Chapter 2: Household vulnerability as expected poverty in Vietnam
This chapter begins by reviewing the literature on vulnerability to poverty, including
the definition, the measures and empirical results. It then provides an overview of
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the poverty situation in Vietnam, particularly poverty trends and coping strategies.
Empirical strategies, including data description and econometric specifications, are
discussed in the subsequent section, followed by the results and findings. The final
section presents policy implications and concluding remarks.
Chapter 3: Household vulnerability as low expected utility and responses to risks
in rural Vietnam
The chapter starts with a literature review focusing on concepts of vulnerability as
low expected utility and the results of previous studies. The chapter then goes on to
briefly summarize an overview of risk and coping strategies in Vietnam. Description
of the data and an overview of analytical framework used in the empirical analysis are
presented subsequently. The next section discusses the results, and the conclusion
with policy implications is the last section.
Chapter 4: Risk aversion and the impact of health insurance on household vulner-
ability: New evidence from rural Vietnam
The chapter commences by reviewing studies on the topic of vulnerability and health
insurance impact. Then it provides an overview of health insurance schemes in
Vietnam. The next two sections are dedicated to data description and analytical
framework. The results are presented together with discussion, and the last section
concludes the chapter.
Chapter 5: General conclusion
This chapter summarizes the main findings of the thesis, provides policy implications,
identifies the contributions to the literature, and finally suggests directions for future
research.
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Chapter 2
Household vulnerability as
expected poverty in Vietnam
2.1 Introduction
When development economists decide to explore the lives of the poor, they find it
hard to ignore the term ‘vulnerability’. That explains why there have been a large
number of attempts to conceptualize and empirically investigate vulnerability since
1990, when the World Bank started to focus on poverty in developing countries.
Vulnerability in development microeconomics is distinguished from poverty in the
sense that there are households who are non-poor but vulnerable, and one that
are poor but non-vulnerable. However, as a measure of well-being, vulnerability is
more enticing since it takes into account not only varying levels of consumption,
but also the flexibility of households to react to covariate and idiosyncratic shocks.
In fact, economists have interpreted the concept of vulnerability to poverty from
different viewpoints. As a result, the empirical studies on the topic are diverse, and a
distinction in those studies can be made based on the approach they adopt. Also, for
developing countries, the precise assessment of vulnerability is more difficult because
of the limited availability of panel data that are necessary to trace the well-being of
households over time.
This study points to the need for designing poverty alleviation policies in Vietnam.
There is concern that the speed of poverty reduction has slowed down, and also that
it is no longer linked to economic growth. It is suggested to shift the policy focus
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from static indicators of poverty to vulnerability and resilience of different groups
preceded by unexpected shocks and policy changes. To do this, it is necessary to
identify the vulnerable and to know the extent of the vulnerability. Moreover, it is
essential to study the link between dynamic poverty and vulnerability, which has
rarely been done in previous studies.
In this paper, the concept we use is the most common definition of vulnerability,
which is ‘Vulnerability as Expected Poverty’ (VEP). We analyze Vulnerability as Ex-
pected Poverty in Vietnam using a data set extracted from three consecutive surveys
from 2002 to 2006. Specifically, we attempt to (i) estimate household vulnerability
in Vietnam, (ii) compare the predictive ability of different indicators of vulnerability
(iii) examine the association between household vulnerability and the probability of
being poor, and finally (iv) investigate the role of ex ante vulnerability on poverty
shift during the sample periods. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first
to adopt the reference line in a vulnerability measure, along with cross-sectional
data. This study also makes improvements to the specification in the models used
in previous studies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the literature on
vulnerability to poverty, including the definition, the measures and some empirical
results. Section 3 provides an overview of the poverty situation in Vietnam, par-
ticularly poverty trends and coping strategies. Empirical strategies, including data
description and econometric specifications, are discussed in Section 4, while Section
5 presents the results and findings. The final section offers policy implications and
concluding remarks.
2.2 Literature review
Concepts of vulnerability
The concept of vulnerability is interpreted in various ways in different contexts. In
economics, the vulnerability concept emerges from the poverty concept. From the
traditional view of poverty, as reflected in World Development Report 1990, the
notion of poverty consists of material deprivation and low attainment in education
and health (World Bank 1990). Later, the term ‘vulnerability’ was introduced when
examining the relationship between poverty and uncertainty of income (Morduch
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1994). Since then, the term ‘vulnerability’ is often used to extend the traditional
concept of poverty. While poverty measurement is based on fixed standards such
as income or expenditure during a short period of time, vulnerability broadens the
poverty notion by including the potential risk of adverse shocks such as income
loss, bad health (idiosyncratic risks) and natural disasters (covariate risks). For
example, in the work of Glewwe & Hall (1998) and Cunningham & Maloney (2000),
vulnerability is defined as exposure to negative shocks to welfare. Other definitions
are “the probability or risk today of being in poverty or to fall into deeper poverty
in the future” (World Bank 1990) and “the ex ante risk that a household will, if
currently non-poor, fall below the poverty line, or if currently poor, will remain in
poverty” (Chaudhuri 2003).
However, vulnerability and poverty are highly correlated as “two sides of the same
coin”. While the observed poverty status is an ex post concept, the predicted vul-
nerability is an ex ante concept. If we can predict the probability of poverty for
households, given various sets of characteristics, we then have the estimates of vul-
nerability of these households (Chaudhuri 2003). Recently, since policy concern has
shifted from static indicators of poverty to dynamic poverty, and toward the vul-
nerability of various policy target groups due to uncertainty (such as policy change,
income and weather shocks, health shocks), vulnerability is considered a more appro-
priate measure of welfare compared to poverty indicators (Jha et al. 2010). In terms
of development microeconomics, vulnerability is widely evaluated at the individual
or household level. Occasionally, this concept is also measured by aggregating over
these units of observation (Hoddinott & Quisumbing 2003b).
According to Chaudhuri (2003), there are four major reasons why an analysis of
vulnerability to poverty is necessary and desirable. First, vulnerability assessment
supports forward-looking anti-poverty interventions. Along with the static approach
to well-being, vulnerability assessment reveals some potential paths to improve well-
being in the future. Second, a focus on vulnerability to poverty operates as an ex
ante poverty prevention intervention which differs from ex post poverty alleviation
interventions. Third, vulnerability analysis helps to expose the sources and forms
of risks households suffer. This in turn supports appropriate designs of safety net
programs designed to lower or alleviate risk, and hence poverty. And last but not
least, risk and uncertainty about the future negatively affect current well-being.
Therefore, vulnerability is an intrinsic aspect of well-being.
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Measuring vulnerability as expected poverty
In an excellent summary of risk and vulnerability, Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003b)
classify approaches to assessing vulnerability into three methods according to their
distinct definitions: vulnerability as expected poverty (VEP), vulnerability as low
expected utility (VEU), and vulnerability as uninsured exposure to risk (VER).
These approaches all predict changes in welfare, but with different measurements of
welfare. The VEP and VEU differ in the definition of welfare used: VEP regards
consumption as welfare, while VEU uses utility which is derived from consumption.
While VEP and VEU commonly use a benchmark welfare indicator (z) and estimate
the probability of falling below this benchmark (p), VER evaluates whether down-
side risks or observed shocks result in welfare loss. In other words, VER assesses the
household’s ability to smooth, or insure, consumption when facing income shocks
while maintaining a minimum level of assets. In this case, household vulnerability
is equivalent to household consumption volatility. “Household vulnerability is mea-
sured by the conditional covariance between changes in household consumption and
changes in income, subject to an asset constraint”(Jha et al. 2010).
In this paper, we modify the methodology that is used in the VEP estimation1. This
is well known through the work of Chaudhuri (2003) and summarized in the review
paper by Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003b). Recently, most empirical works have
been derived from these papers; so they present similar reviews on methodology,
such as those of Imai et al. (2011) and Jha et al. (2010). The review of methodology
in this paper draws on these.
Vulnerability as Expected Poverty (VEP) is a vulnerability measure first proposed
and applied to Indonesian household data by Chaudhuri (2003). In that study, the
authors define vulnerability as the likelihood that a household will fall into poverty in
the next period. Household consumption is used as a measure of household welfare.
Thus, vulnerability takes the form:
Vit = Pr(ci,t+1 ≤ z), (2.1)
where vulnerability of household i at time t (Vit) is the likelihood that the household
consumption at time t+ 1 (ci,t+1) will be lower than the poverty line (z).
1The methodology of VEU estimation from Ligon & Schechter (2003) is used in Chapter 3.
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Since the concept of vulnerability is strongly connected to concepts of poverty, a
number of studies have conceptualized and empirically investigated vulnerability to
poverty. Among early studies are the work of Pritchett et al. (2000), Christiaensen
& Boisvert (2000), and Chaudhuri (2003). In these papers, vulnerability is defined
as the probability of falling below the poverty line in the future, and household con-
sumption is used to reflect household welfare. The time period varies from one to
three consecutive years in the future. Later papers of Kamanou & Morduch (2002),
Ligon & Schechter (2003) and Christiaensen & Subbarao (2005) modify this frame-
work to take into account the depth of the loss, but their time period is restricted to
only one year ahead. For instance, Ligon & Schechter (2003) suggest a specific util-
ity function and define vulnerability as the difference between utility derived from
expected consumption and utility obtained from a certain level of consumption. In
fact, the authors account for individual risk preferences through their choice of the
utility function. Based on these works, Calvo & Dercon (2005) propose a new mea-
sure of vulnerability that is sensitive to the size of the loss. These expected poverty
measures always include the poor in the vulnerable and, as a result, the factors that
determine poverty and vulnerability are rather similar.
Other efforts suggest that vulnerability should be measured using the variations
around a certain level of income that is completely different from the poverty line.
For example, deviations from the permanent income line, according to Morduch
(2004), are a measure of vulnerability. In this case, a households inability to smooth
consumption is considered as a component of poverty. Similar studies by Dercon &
Krishnan (2000) and Morduch (2004) have supported this trend. They consider con-
sumption smoothing as a method for risk sharing and the alleviation of vulnerability.
With this method, people who were previously very poor may not be considered vul-
nerable if they have not experienced a large change in their consumption in response
to a shock. This method distinguishes the poor from the vulnerable, however stan-
dard deviations from a given consumption line might not be the correct indicator of
vulnerability (Dutta et al. 2011)2.
Regardless of how vulnerability is interpreted and what measures are used, most em-
pirical studies attempt to address vulnerability in developing countries, especially
in rural areas where household income suddenly fluctuates due to various downside
2For further discussion see Christiaensen & Subbarao (2005) and Dutta et al. (2011).
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risks such as changes in weather, floods, food prices, illness and so on. For exam-
ple, Dercon et al. (2005) examine vulnerability to various types of shocks in rural
Ethiopia. They define shocks as adverse events that lead to a loss of household
income, a reduction in consumption and/or a loss of productive assets. Their study
finds that drought and illness have seriously affected households there as they are
associated with lower levels of per capita consumption. They also highlight that the
impact of certain shocks depends on a household’s characteristics such as gender of
head, schooling of head, and landholding.
Christiaensen & Subbarao (2005) estimate vulnerability as expected poverty in rural
Kenya and find that “households in arid areas, who experience large rainfall volatil-
ity, appear more vulnerable than those in non-arid areas, where malaria emerges as a
key risk factor. Idiosyncratic shocks also cause non-negligible consumption volatility.
Possession of cattle and sheep/goats appears ineffective in protecting consumption
against covariate shocks, though sheep/goats help reduce the effect of idiosyncratic
shocks, especially in arid zones.”
Taking advantage of two data sets, one of which is based on the ICRISAT panel sur-
veys and the other comes from Gautam (1991), Gaiha & Imai (2008) apply all VEP,
VEU and VER to measure vulnerability in rural India. Gaiha and Imai decompose
household vulnerability into poverty, covariate risks, and idiosyncratic risks. Accord-
ing to the authors, idiosyncratic risks represent the largest share, preceding poverty
and covariate risks. The landless and the small farmers are seriously vulnerable
despite some degree of risk-sharing.
Another empirical work on poverty and vulnerability has been done in Bangladesh.
Azam & Imai (2009) apply Chaudhuri’s method (VEP) for a cross-sectional dataset
and find that poverty is not the same as vulnerability, as a substantial share of those
currently above the poverty line are highly vulnerable to poverty in the future. The
study shows that agricultural households and those without education are likely to
be the most vulnerable. The impact of geographical diversity on vulnerability is
significant.
Using cross section data in Ghana, Novignon (2010) uses a three-step Feasible Gen-
eralized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation technique to evaluate vulnerability to
poverty and to measure the impact of household socioeconomic status on expected
future consumption and variations in future consumption. His results indicate that
around 56 per cent of households in Ghana are vulnerable to poverty, compared
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to 28 per cent of observed poverty. Household characteristics such as health status,
household size, gender of head and education attainments considerably affect vulner-
ability. Unexpectedly, urban households are more vulnerable than rural households,
with 61 per cent and 25 per cent of population respectively.
Jha et al. (2012) use panel data to investigate poverty and vulnerability to poverty
in rural India. They conclude that economic growth is good for poverty reduction.
They show that the chronic poverty is relatively small but the incidence of transient
poverty is high, reflecting the importance of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks.
Similar to Dercon et al. (2005), in this study, expected factors such as age, gender of
head, education and landholding influence vulnerability. Furthermore, governance
factors such as attendance at public meetings and identity-based voting significantly
contribute to vulnerability.
There are a number of studies exploring both poverty dynamic and vulnerability
in Vietnam. One of the interesting papers is that of Giang & Pfau (2009). They
compare household average per capita expenditure to the poverty line and then use
the probit model to determine factors that affect the probability of being poor for
Vietnamese elderly. Their results show that some factors such as age, marital status,
region and remittance receipts, significantly impact poverty in both urban and rural
sectors. Others such as gender, ethnicity, and household composition and size, have
different impacts in urban and rural areas. However, in this paper, the influence
of living arrangements and household head characteristics is insignificant. While
the measure in this paper is fit for the cross-section data from Vietnam Household
Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) 2004, it is an ex post measure rather than an ex
ante measure which is more appropriate for the vulnerability concepts.
An outstanding effort to explore vulnerability in Vietnam comes from the project
“Impact of Shocks on the Vulnerability to Poverty: Consequences for Development of
Emerging Southeast Asian Economies” by the German Research Foundation with its
many contributing authors (Klasen & Waibel 2010). This project carried out a panel
survey of about 4400 households in three provinces in Thailand and Vietnam in 2007
and 2008 (Hardeweg & Waibel 2009). A number of papers have been written using
this data set. They separately explore the impact of certain events such as food price
shocks, agricultural diversification and financial shock to vulnerability and household
responses. Other papers have used this data set to test a new method for comparing
vulnerability over time and space (Hardeweg et al. 2013). One disadvantage of
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these studies lies in the coverage of the data set. In Vietnam, data is collected in
three provinces located in central Vietnam where households’ living conditions are
completely different to the North and the South. Therefore, the results of these
studies cannot be generalized to over sixty provinces in Vietnam.
Povel (2010) suggests a new measure of vulnerability called vulnerability to down-
side risk. He chooses the current level of wellbeing of a household as the relevant
benchmark rather than the poverty line. Then the author applies the method of
Calvo & Dercon (2007) to examine vulnerability in Vietnam using data from DFG
project. The results show that consumption smoothing abilities and the probability
of undergoing a difficult event differ considerably between different wealth groups.
As a result, the relation between initial wealth and vulnerability to downside risk
is highly non-linear. The author also demonstrates that while moderately, but not
extremely, poor households are relatively vulnerable to extreme poverty, they are
less vulnerable to downside risk than any other group of households.
Imai et al. (2011) apply the measure VEP proposed by Chaudhuri et al. (2002) and
Chaudhuri (2003) for panel data constructed from the Vietnam Household Living
Standard Survey (VHLSS) in 2002 and 2004. Their analyses indicate that, in most
situations, vulnerability in 2002 becomes poverty in 2004. Vulnerability of the poor
tends to prolong their poverty and it leads a proportion of the non-poor into poverty.
They also find that landholding, education attainment and access to infrastructure
are highly correlated with both poverty and vulnerability, but these relationships
vary greatly among ethnic groups and locations. Imai et al’s study is the first to
examine empirically the links between vulnerability and poverty traps in Vietnam.
From the approach the authors apply, the poor are a subset of the vulnerable and
that explains why there is still some overlap between the determinants of poverty and
vulnerability. However, by using only VEP measure, the authors cannot distinguish
sources of risk. They also ignore the impact of agricultural jobs and regional differ-
ences on households’ consumption3. Moreover, they do not mention the predictive
power of the vulnerability measure to the actual poverty4.
3The impact of these two characteristics were reported in World Bank (2003a).
4In a non-published version of the research, the authors noticed the predictive power but there
was no analytical framework for that and then the results were ambiguous.
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2.3 Overview of the poverty situation in Vietnam
Vietnam is a developing country and has attained remarkable progress in reducing
poverty and promoting prosperity over the last two decades (World Bank 2011,
2013). Originating from thorough political and economic reform (Doi Moi) in 1986,
the level of GDP per capita has significantly increased from below $100 in 1986 to
$1,130 by the end of 2010. The Vietnamese economy is four times larger than it was
in the early 1990s. As a result, the poverty headcount has fallen from 58 per cent
in the early 1990s to 14.2 per cent in 20105. Similar trends are discernible using
international standards of $1.25 and $2 person/day and most indicators of welfare
such as education and health have improved. To date, Vietnam has achieved, and
in some cases surpassed, many criteria of the Millennium Development Goals (See
more in Table 2.1)
However, the task of poverty reduction is far from complete and the road ahead is
challenging in some respects. The poverty line, as used in the early 1990s, is very
low by the international standards and the methods used to monitor poverty are
outdated. Vietnam still has a high proportion of near-poor households who easily
fall back into poverty as a consequence of both covariate shocks and idiosyncratic
shocks. The remaining poor are more difficult to reach, especially the ethnic minority
households. They still face difficult situations such as isolation, limited assets, low
levels of educational attainment, and poor health status.
Economic growth now has less impact on poverty reduction than it did in the past.
Inequality in income and opportunities are increasing, amplified by disparities be-
tween urban and rural areas as well as disparities across different socioeconomic
groups. While poorer areas are not well connected to markets, urbanization contin-
ues to force a number of workers from these areas to migrate to the cities to work
in informal sectors which are unstable and lack benefits.
5Based on the new poverty line applied to the 2010 VHLSS (VND 653,000/person/month),
the poverty rate in 2010 is 20.7%. However, using official urban and rural poverty lines (VND
500,000/person/month and VND 400,000/person/month, respectively), the poverty rate is 14.2%.
The General Statistical Office and World Bank (GSO-WB) poverty rate is considerably higher
in rural areas, partly because of disparities between official poverty lines and the new GSO-WB
poverty line, but also because of disparities between the methodological approaches (World Bank
2013). According to GSO, the poverty rate fell from 58% in 1993 to 37.4% in 1998, 28.9% in 2002,
16% in 2004 and 14.5% in 2008.
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Table 2.1: Progress in reducing incidence, depth and severity of poverty in Vietnam 1993-2010
The GSO-WB poverty line $1.25/day 2005 PPP line $2.00/day 2005 PPP line
Incidence Depth Severity Incidence Depth Severity Incidence Depth Severity
(Headcount (Poverty (Squared) (Headcount (Poverty (Squared) (Headcount (Poverty (Squared)
rate,%) gap,%) gap,%) rate,%) gap,%) gap,%) rate,%) gap,%) gap,%)
1993 58.1 18.5 7.9 63.7 23.6 11.0 85.7 43.5 25.7
1998 37.4 9.5 3.6 49.7 15.1 6.0 78.2 34.2 18.0
2002 28.9 7.0 2.4 40.1 11.2 4.1 68.7 28.0 14.1
2004 19.5 4.7 1.7 21.5 5.4 2.0 50.3 17.1 7.8
2006 15.9 3.8 1.4 16.8 4.2 1.5 42.4 13.9 6.2
2008 14.5 3.5 1.2 11.8 2.8 1.0 34.5 10.3 4.3
2010 20.7 5.9 2.4 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Source: VASS, 2010 for 1993-2008 GSO-WB headcount estimates, POVCALNET for 1993-2008 US$1.25 and US$2.00
headcount estimates. Statistics for 2010 calculated by the World Bank using the comprehensive consumption aggregate.
Notes: World Bank poverty estimates using international poverty lines for Vietnam in 2010 have not yet been published.
Back in the mid-1980s, it was estimated that seven out of every ten Vietnamese
were poor. Starting from 1986, the incidence of poverty in Vietnam has been rapidly
reduced as a result of the economic reform. The headcount poverty dropped consid-
erably from 58 per cent in 1993 to 16 per cent in 2006. This achievement included
improvement in other indicators of human development such as school enrollment,
malnutrition, access to infrastructure (public health centers, clean water and elec-
tricity) and ownership of durable goods (radios, television, bicycles).
Nevertheless, a large proportion of the Vietnamese population was still living close to
the poverty line. Therefore, the gains in poverty reduction remained fragile because
poverty estimates are very sensitive to the choice of poverty line. For example, for
1998, if the poverty line is raised by 10 per cent, the headcount poverty rises to
45 per cent. If the poverty line is reduced by 10 per cent, the poverty rate falls to
29 per cent. Until 1998, nearly one-half of the rural population was still poor and
therefore 90 per cent of the poor resided in rural areas in 1998 (World Bank 2001).
Poverty has decreased in all 7 regions of Vietnam, but at different rates. Hence, in
2002, there were still three regions showing a high incidence of poverty, with poverty
rates of 44% (Northern Uplands), 52% (Central Highlands) and 44% (North Central
Coast) (World Bank 2003a). This is a result of many regional constraints (such
as the difficult physical environment) which restrict agricultural development and
confine access to infrastructure.
In general, poor households in Vietnam share common characteristics. First, they
are mostly farmers with low levels of educational attainment. In 1998, approximately
80 per cent of the poor worked in agriculture. Second, poor households have small
landholdings, and other households that can make a living from the land find it hard
to have stable jobs off the farm. Third, households with more children and fewer
workers are disproportionately poor, and are particularly vulnerable to health and
education costs. Fourth, poor households are more vulnerable to seasonal adversity
as well as household-specific (idiosyncratic) and community-wide (covariate) shocks.
The fact that they suffer from bad fluctuations in income or abrupt demands for
expenditure can easily lead them into poverty. Also, they may be socially or phys-
ically isolated. In particular, these factors are frequently found in ethnic minority
groups and as a consequence the level of poverty in these groups is more serious
compared to the majority of the population. In terms of vulnerability, the Poverty
Participation Assessments (PPAs) in Vietnam have highlighted two other groups:
unregistered migrants in urban areas and children.
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Factors that make households slip into poverty also contribute to households’ vul-
nerability. For instance, households in rural areas with income dependent on farm
activities are most vulnerable. In the Mekong Delta, landless households are con-
sidered as particularly vulnerable because the demand for day labor is seasonal and
rarely adequate. Also, physical isolation has a close relationship with vulnerability
because difficult access to markets gives households less incentive to diversify their
livelihood. In urban areas, households who depend heavily on informal sector work
often encounter problems relating to unexpected expenditure; unsurprisingly, having
a regular income is one of the important determinants of wellbeing.
2.4 Data
Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS)
Data for this study are drawn from the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys
(VHLSS). These nationally representative surveys have been conducted every two
years since 2000 by the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam, with technical
assistance from the World Bank. These surveys consist of two parts: a household
survey and a commune survey. The household survey collects very detailed infor-
mation on households, such as demography, education, employment and labor force
participation, income, expenditure, health, housing, durable goods, fixed assets and
participation in poverty programs. The commune survey collects basic information
on demography, socioeconomic characteristics, and the infrastructure of communes.
They are cross-sectional data but it is possible to build a panel dataset due to the
overlap of samples.
Procedure for collecting data
In these surveys, a method of stratified random cluster sampling is applied to ensure
the household samples are representative for national, rural and urban, and regional
levels. The sample of households in the series of VHLSS from 2002 to 2006 is selected
from a master sample which was randomly chosen from the enumeration areas (EA)
of the 1999 Population Census. The sampling procedure can be briefly described in
three stages. First, 2300 rural communes and 700 urban wards were selected as the
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primary sampling units (PSU). Second, three EAs of the 1999 Population Census
were selected from each PSUs. Finally, in each EA, 20 households in rural EAs and
10 households in urban EAs were selected.
In the VHLSS series, the sample is revolved from year to year. For two consecutive
surveys, 50 per cent of the households selected from the EAs in a half of the PSUs
from the previous survey are re-surveyed in the next survey. The other 50 per cent
of households are chosen from new EAs in the remaining half of the PSUs. The 50
per cent overlap between the two surveys allows for a household panel.
In this study, we first use three surveys from 2002 to 2006 as cross-sectional data.
Then we build two separate panels 2002-2004 and 2004-2006. We also construct a
panel data set including information from all three surveys from 2002 to 2006. The
household sample in the 2000 and 2010 surveys came from other master samples;
therefore, we cannot use them to construct a panel data set.
Panel data with VHLSS
The survey of VHLSS 2002 was conducted between May and November of 2002. In
the final release of this survey, 29,530 households were surveyed for both income
and expenditure. Similar to VHLSS 2002, the survey of VHLSS 2004 was imple-
mented between May and November of 2004. Both income and expenditure of 9,189
households were collected. There were two additional new modules in the 2004
questionnaires but this does not affect the core modules.
In VHLSS 2006, two expanded modules in the 2004 questionnaires were dropped and
two other commune sections were added in order to collect information on schools
and healthcare services. The number of households in the final release remains at
9,189.
Due to the inconsistency in household identification across surveys, a panel of only
3931 households is constructed between VHLSS 2002 and VHLSS 2004. Similarly,
a panel of 4,193 households is built across the VHLSS 2004 and VHLSS 2006. Ulti-
mately, three waves of VHLSS from 2002 to 2006 allow for a panel of 1844 households.
The data structure of VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006 is presented in Table A.1 and the
statistical summary of variables is presented in Table A.2, A.3 and A.4 of Appendix
A.
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As can be seen in Table A.2, A.3 and A.4, during 2002-2006, household consumption
increased since the log of expenditure slightly increases. The age of head continuously
increases while the female share fluctuates and the dependent share decreases. The
mean of the samples shows that levels of education attainment fluctuates over three
surveys, except that the mean of the technical school category has consecutively
risen. It is important to notice that landholding rises during 2002-2004 but falls
during 2004-2006. This reflects changes in economic policies and a shift in the role
of land in household living. Households in the samples tend to leave rural areas, as
evidenced by the gradual increase in the value of the urban variable across surveys.
Last, but not least, household access to electricity and market improves considerably.
Data issues
The use of the household panel data might raises concerns about the sample attri-
tion. When households with certain characteristics leave the panel, the panel data
are incomplete and biases emerge. If the attrition rate of vulnerable households and
non-vulnerable households is considerately different, attrition becomes particularly
problematic. Either households who leave the survey may be among the most vul-
nerable, or they may be less vulnerable as migration can be an effective way to cope
with risks. Without follow-up surveys, it is impractical to identify the exact nature
of biases. However, in the case of Vietnam, several previous studies using VLSS and
VHLSS have proven that the attrition rate is rather low and random (e.g. Baulch &
Masset (2003) and Gu¨nther & Harttgen (2009) for VLSS; Roelen (2010) for VHLSS).
Another potential problem with VHLSS is the changing household composition and
size (Kamanou & Morduch 2002). The changes are generally less sharp for the non-
poor. The changes are partly attributed to family splits and to migration, some
of which was motivated by the economic forces. Births and the arrival of relatives
and others both contribute to change in household composition. When household
size changes, then per capita income or consumption may vary. However, this is not
considered a shock, as it is the result of a deliberate household choice. This problem
is also addressed in Pincus & Sender (2008). Thus there is a caveat on interpreting
our result and there might be some resultant underestimation of vulnerability in our
analysis.
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2.5 Analytical framework and methodology
Measuring vulnerability as expected poverty
We start our estimation of vulnerability to poverty with an assumption about a con-
sumption generating process. According to economic literature, the major part of
household consumption is determined by wealth, uncertainty about future income
and assets, and the households coping strategy in response to risks. In turn, these
factors are determined by a variety of observable household characteristics and the
surrounding economic environment (Deaton 1992, Browning & Lusardi 1996, Chaud-
huri 2003, Dercon 2005). Therefore, assuming that consumption is log normally
distributed and that the log-consumption is normally distributed, we start with a
reduced-form of the consumption function, written as follows (based on Chaudhuri
et al. (2002), Christiaensen & Subbarao (2005), Minot & Baulch (2005); Justino
et al. (2008); Jha et al. (2009); Cuong et al. (2010); Nguyen & Winters (2011), and
Imai et al. (2011)):
lnci = α + βXi + ei, (2.2)
where: ci is per capita consumption expenditure on food and non-food items for
household i (real value from data sets); and Xi represents a vector of observable
household characteristics and commune characteristics. In this study, these charac-
teristics are:
- Age of head of the household (years),
- Share of female members in total household members (%),
- Share of household members under 15 years or above 65 years in total household
members (%),
- Whether the household head is married or not (dummy variable: 1 for married
and 0 otherwise),
- Whether the highest level of education of household members (using five dum-
mies to represent the five levels of education: primary school, lower secondary
school, upper secondary school, technical school, and college or university),
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- Whether the household is purely agricultural (dummy variable: 1 for household
having income from only agriculture and 0 for a household having at least one
source of income from the non-agricultural sector),
- Total land area owned by household members (10,000m2),
- Whether the household is located in rural areas or urban areas (dummy vari-
able: 1 for rural and 0 for urban),
- Whether the household is located in inland delta, coastal area, hills, low moun-
tains, high mountains (using four separate dummy variables),
- Whether the household is located in Red River Delta (Region 1), North West
(Region 2), South West (Region 3), North Central Coast (Region 4), South
Central Coast (Region 5), Central Highland (Region 6), South East (Region
7), Mekong Delta (Region 8) (7 dummy variables are used),
- Whether the household belongs to a commune with a power supply (dummy
variable: 1 for yes and 0 otherwise),
- Average distance to road, water transportation, passenger pick-up point, com-
mune headquarters, commune centre, post office, telephone service provider,
daily market and weekly market (km)
β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and ei is the mean-zero disturbance
term that captures idiosyncratic shocks that lead to different levels of per capita
consumption.
Chaudhuri et al. (2002) and Chaudhuri (2003) acknowledge that the error term (ei) is
not the same for all households (heteroskedasticity). Therefore, we adopt the three-
step Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) technique proposed by Amemiya
(1977).
Firstly, we estimate Equation 2.2 by employing the ordinary least squares (OLS)
technique. Next we predict the residuals from the regression and regress the pre-
dicted residuals on the same covariates included in the specification of the consump-
tion process. Then we have the error variance estimating process as follows:
ê2i,OLS = ρ+ δ̂Xi + ηi. (2.3)
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The prediction of Equation 2.3 is used to weight the previous equation, thus leading
to the transformed version:
ê2i
ê2i,OLS
=
ρ
ê2i,OLS
+
δ̂Xi
ê2i,OLS
+
ηi
ê2i,OLS
. (2.4)
According to Chaudhuri (2003), the OLS estimation of Equation 2.4 generates an
asymptotically FGLS estimate, δFGLS, and thus e2i is a consistent estimate of the
variance of the idiosyncratic component of household consumption. Having obtained
an efficient estimate of the variance as the predicted value of Equation 2.4, (δ̂2i,FGLS),
we now take the square root and transform Equation 2.2 as follows:
lnci
δ̂i,FGLS
=
α
δ̂i,FGLS
+
βXi
δ̂i,FGLS
+
ei
δ̂i,FGLS
. (2.5)
An OLS estimation of Equation 2.5 generates a consistent and asymptotically effi-
cient estimate of αFGLS, βFGLS. Once we obtain these estimates, it is possible to
predict both the expected log consumption and its variance:
Ê[lnCi|Xi] = αFGLS + βFGLSXi, (2.6)
V̂ [lnCi|Xi] = ρFGLS + δFGLSXi. (2.7)
Chaudhuri (2003) assumes that lnci is normally distributed. Then the estimated
probability that a household will be poor in the future (for example, at time t + 1)
is given by:
v̂i,Chaudhuri = P̂ r(lnci < lnz|Xi) = Φ
 lnz − Ê[lnCi|Xi]√
V̂ [lnCi|Xi]
 , (2.8)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative function of the standard normal and z is the actual
poverty line6. This approach is an ex ante vulnerability measure because it provides
the probability of being poor at time t+ 1 for a household with a given distribution
of consumption at time t. Cross-sectional data can be used in this case.
6The poverty lines in this study are calculated from the VHLSS and released by the GSO and
the WB. The poverty line measure takes account of the regional price differences and monthly price
changes over the survey periods. The poverty lines are 1917, 2077 and 2566 thousand VND/per-
son/year for the years of 2002, 2004 and 2006, respectively.
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As for policy implications, the comparison between estimated vulnerability and actu-
ally observed poverty is essential. This reflects the ability to predict poverty through
estimated vulnerability. According to Zhang & Wan (2009), the accuracy of this pre-
diction will vary depending on: first, the vulnerability threshold is suggested setting
at 50 per cent to increase predictive power; second, using past weighted average
income is preferable to using regression when calculating permanent income7; and
third, the choice of the poverty line also affects the predictive ability.
Therefore, we decide to set the vulnerability line at 50 per cent. This is a reasonable
choice because many other studies use this threshold. Unfortunately, there is not
enough past income with the available dataset. We therefore continue deriving future
income from regressions.
However, there are some assumptions that must be invoked in order to accurately
interpret the vulnerability results (Hoddinott & Quisumbing 2003b). First, this ap-
proach assumes that the cross-sectional variation of consumption across households
is a good proxy for the time-series variation of consumption of the household. There-
fore, this measure requires a large sample in which some households experience a
normal or good time while others are exposed to negative shocks. Second, this mea-
sure also assumes that the structure of the economy is fairly stable over time and, for
that reason, variation in future consumption comes from only the uncertainty about
the idiosyncratic shocks, ei. Therefore, this measure is least likely to reflect unex-
pected large negative shocks when using cross-sectional date for a normal year. Also,
it is assumed that all households observed in the cross-section receive draws from the
same distribution of consumption changes (a homogeneity assumption). Moreover,
by using the standard deviation as a measure of vulnerability, this measure weights
negative shocks the same as possitve shocks (Kamanou & Morduch 2002).
Reference line as a poverty threshold
Having taken great interest in measuring vulnerability, Dutta et al. (2011) contradict
the common findings that “the set of the poor will always be a subset within the
broader set of the vulnerable” and “the factors determining poverty and vulnerability
7According to Friedman (1957, 1963) and Mansuri & Healy (2001), “the permanent expenditure
is a good estimator of the mean of future expenditure”. Also, Chaudhuri et al. (2002) and McCul-
loch & Calandrino (2003) indicate that “the mean and standard deviation of observed income or
consumption are unbiased estimates of their future counterparts” (Zhang & Wan 2009).
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are quite similar.” The authors emphasize that “individuals may be vulnerable if they
are unable to maintain in the future a certain minimum standard of living which
may differ from the poverty line.” Therefore, they suggest a reference line which
is composed of the individual’s current standard of living and the poverty line for
each individual8. The reference line is the minimum living standard that individuals
should maintain in the future to be considered as non-vulnerable. Vulnerability is
defined as the shortfall from the reference line.
The reference line R(z, yt) reflects the fact that individuals consider both their cur-
rent living standard (yt) and the poverty line when estimating vulnerability. There
are two possible scenarios in the Dutta paper. First, the reference line and the stan-
dard of living are positively correlated. This is because an individual with a higher
current standard of living might want to maintain a similar level standard of living
in the future and any deviation from that level is considered as vulnerable. This
idea has been proven in an empirical study of Evason (1985) in which the category
Protestant (with higher average income) is more likely to report loss due to unem-
ployment compared to the category Catholic (with lower average income)9. In the
second senario, the reference line and the standard of living are negatively correlated.
This is because a higher living standard today would reduce the minimum income
needed in the future, implying a lower vulnerability. This idea derived from a work
of Sen (1981) in the context of the Bangladesh famine in 1974. In that contribution,
Sen (1981) finds that landless laborers were the worst affected during the famine.
When yt and R(z, yt) are positively correlated, the function form of the reference
line is:
R(z, yt) = z
1−αyαt , (2.9)
and when yt and R(z, yt) are negatively correlated, the function form of the reference
line is:
R(z, yt) = z
1+α/yαt , (2.10)
With 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. When α = 0, the measure becomes the standard expected FGT
poverty index. When α = 1, the measure is completely dependent on current and
future income.
8This idea is raised in Foster (1998).
9For more details see Evason (1985).
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A study of Celidoni (2013) demonstrates that the vulnerability measure proposed
by Dutta et al. (2011) will give the best signal of poverty. We then modify the
method of Chaudhuri et al. (2002) by replacing the poverty line with the reference
line derived by Dutta et al. (2011), and we have the VEP index for Dutta et al’s
measure:
v̂i,Dutta = P̂ r(lnci < lnR|Xi) = Φ
 lnR− Ê[lnCi|Xi]√
V̂ [lnCi|Xi]
 , (2.11)
where R is the reference line derived from the Equation (2.9) or (2.10).
Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC)
To compare the predictive powers of Chaudhuri’s and Dutta’s measures, we apply
the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, initially used in the field of
engineering and disease diagnosis to analyze the extent to which a given signal can act
as an indicator for an underlying condition. Madden (2011) is one of several authors
using this approach to measure the degree of overlap between different dimensions
of poverty.
In this study, the underlying condition is income poverty in time t + 1 while the
vulnerability indexes, estimated on information up to time t, are the symptom of
poverty. To draw the ROC curve, we first partition households in the sample into
categories of poor and non-poor, using the actual poverty line. We then assess the
degree to which the vulnerable and non-vulnerable households would produce the
same partition of the poverty status.
When households are both vulnerable and poor, they are called true positive (TP );
and when households are classified as both non-vulnerable and non-poor, they are
called true negative (TN). Those identified as vulnerable but non-poor in time t+1,
are false positive (FP ), while false negative (FN) includes households who are non-
vulnerable, but are poor in income. The TP rate, TP/(TP + FN), is called the
sensitivity of the signal while the TN rate, TN/(TN +FP ), is known as specificity.
The FP rate is one minus the TN rate and is 1− TN/(TN + FP ) (Figure 2.1).
The ROC curve is created by graphing the TP rate (on the vertical axis) against
the FP rate (on the horizontal axis) for all possible values of the vulnerability
threshold. The higher the sensitivity and the specificity, the nearer will be the curve
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Figure 2.1: The ROC curve.
to the point (0,1) in Figure 110. That means vulnerability can provide a better signal
of poverty. To compare two indicators, an estimation of the area under the ROC
curve is commonly used and presented as an index.
Determinant of poverty
Once we have estimated the probability of falling into, or remaining in, poverty, we
extend the analysis by assessing the determinants of poverty. In this case, a pro-
bit model11 is employed to estimate whether a household’s per capita consumption
expenditure is below the poverty line, conditioned on a vector of household and
commune characteristics.
Pr(Pi = 1) = Φ(Xiψ
′), (2.12)
where Pi = 1 if lnci < lnz and Pi = 0 otherwise. Then we can address the association
between household vulnerability in earlier years and the probability of being poor in
later years by adding VEP in earlier years in the regression for later years. In our
analysis, we use the 2002 VEP for the 2004 regression, the 2004 VEP for the 2006
regression, and then add both VEP 2002 and VEP 2004 into the 2006 regression.
10When the curve lies below the 450 line, then it is effectively acting as a contra-indicator.
11According to Gujarati (2011), there is no compelling reason to choose a probit model over a
logit model in practice. Probit and logit models generally give similar results.
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The vulnerability index is the index generated from Dutta et als measure which
provides a better prediction of falling into poverty.
Role of vulnerability on poverty shift across time
We expand our analysis by using a multinomial logit model (MLM)12 to examine
poverty transition over the period 2002-2006. In this way, we try to answer whether
the vulnerability traps households into poverty (for the already poor), or increases
the likelihood of falling into poverty (for the non-poor).
We use two separate panel data of the periods 2002-2004 and 2004-2006 for this task.
With each period, there are four situations of poverty transition. For example, in
2002-2004:
P1 = those who were poor in both 2002 and 2004,
P2 = those who were poor in 2002, but non-poor in 2004,
P3 = those who were non-poor in 2002; but poor in 2004,
P4 = those who were non-poor in both 2002 and 2004.
In 2004-2006:
P1 = those who were poor in both 2004 and 2006,
P2 = those who were poor in 2004, but non-poor in 2006,
P3 = those who were non-poor in 2004, but poor in 2006,
P4 = those who were non-poor in both 2004 and 2006.
The multinomial logit model is written as:
Pr(Pi = j) =
e(Xiλj+τkV̂ EPi)∑4
k=1 e
(Xiλj+τkV̂ EPi)
, j = 1, 2, 3, 4. (2.13)
12In practice, multinomial logit models are more frequently used than multinomial probit models
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The common practice in an MLM is to choose one category as the base case and
set its coefficient values to zero. So we choose the fourth category (non-poor in all
periods) and set λj = 0 and τk = 0; we thus obtain the following estimates of the
probabilities for the four categories:
Pr(Pi = j) =
e(Xiλj+τkV̂ EPi)
1 +
∑4
k=1 e
(Xiλj+τkV̂ EPi)
, j = 1, 2, 3, (2.14)
Pr(Pi = j) =
1
1 +
∑4
k=1 e
(Xiλj+τkV̂ EPi)
, j = 4. (2.15)
Similarly, we employ a panel dataset created from three consecutive surveys of 2002,
2004, 2006 to examine the role of vulnerability to poverty shift from 2002 to 2006.
We define four situations of poverty transition as follows:
P1 = those who were poor in both 2002, 2004 and 2006,
P2 = those who were non-poor in at least one year (except for whom belong
to category P3),
P3 = those who were non-poor in 2002; but poor in 2004 and 2006. This is
the case of falling into poverty and remaining there,
P4 = those who were non-poor in all three surveys.
2.6 Econometric results and discussion
Measuring vulnerability
The results of the consumption function are presented in Table 2.2, where the regres-
sion results for Equations 2.6 and 2.7 are shown continuously for surveys in 2002,
2004 and 2006. In general, the signs of the estimated coefficients are as expected,
reflecting their effects on consumption as in the literature.
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Table 2.2: Estimates of Vulnerability as Expected Poverty in Vietnam 2002,
2004, 2006
2002 2004 2006
Variable Log(Cons) Variance Log(Cons) Variance Log(Cons) Variance
headage -0.015 -0.019 -0.013 -0.004 -0.009 0.019
(-11.28)*** (-2.62)** (-4.69)*** (-0.25) (-3.04)** (1.23)
headage2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(12.94)*** (3.82)*** (5.95)*** (1.07) (3.94)*** (-0.53)
femaleshare -0.992 -1.452 -0.873 -0.894 -0.932 -0.821
(-18.75)*** (-4.85)*** (-7.95)*** (-1.37) (-8.45)*** (-1.36)
femaleshare2 0.938 1.375 0.879 0.996 0.884 0.894
(19.30)*** (4.99)*** (8.65)*** (1.64) (8.80)*** (1.62)
dependshare -0.378 -0.094 -0.411 0.043 -0.362 0.042
(-30.95)*** (-1.43) (-16.55)*** (0.30) (-14.64)*** (0.31)
married 0.013 -0.057 0.040 -0.076 0.024 0.105
(1.67) (-1.30) (2.42)* (-0.78) (1.50) (1.23)
primary 0.041 -0.064 0.056 -0.132 0.030 -0.125
(4.38)*** (-1.27) (2.72)** (-1.07) (1.42) (-1.05)
lowersecond 0.142 -0.096 0.149 -0.119 0.127 -0.384
(14.74)*** (-1.85) (7.20)*** (-0.96) (6.10)*** (-3.29)**
uppersecond 0.291 0.018 0.272 0.034 0.269 -0.277
(26.71)*** (0.30) (11.62)*** (0.25) (11.58)*** (-2.14)*
techschool 0.440 0.092 0.404 0.036 0.403 -0.157
(33.67)*** (1.29) (16.39)*** (0.25) (16.55)*** (-1.15)
highedu 0.698 0.178 0.579 0.095 0.593 -0.115
(48.44)*** (2.18)* (17.87)*** (0.50) (17.95)*** (-0.62)
agrhh -0.143 -0.043 -0.127 0.041 -0.127 -0.110
(-24.40)*** (-1.39) (-11.44)*** (0.64) (-11.26)*** (-1.83)
totalland 0.042 0.032 0.052 0.002 0.044 -0.014
(12.86)*** (1.94) (8.69)*** (0.06) (8.16)*** (-0.50)
totalland2 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(-6.48)*** (0.74) (-6.33)*** (0.13) (-5.34)*** (0.12)
urban 0.428 0.434 0.414 0.073 0.791 0.342
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2 – continued from previous page
2002 2004 2006
Variable Log(Cons) Variance Log(Cons) Variance Log(Cons) Variance
(56.90)*** (10.10)*** (3.73)*** (0.12) (2.92)** (0.21)
inland -0.019 -0.127 0.000 -0.165 0.005 -0.182
(-1.90) (-2.24)* (0.02) (-1.32) (0.24) (-1.54)
hill -0.102 -0.222 0.016 -0.016 0.016 -0.031
(-7.42)*** (-3.01)** (0.57) (-0.10) (0.54) (-0.19)
lowmountain -0.155 -0.251 -0.078 -0.026 -0.093 -0.266
(-12.36)*** (-3.74)*** (-3.03)** (-0.17) (-3.63)*** (-1.91)
highmountain -0.237 -0.245 -0.218 0.192 -0.261 -0.144
(-16.06)*** (-3.13)** (-7.37)*** (1.10) (-8.85)*** (-0.89)
region2 0.012 -0.117 -0.037 0.071 -0.044 0.202
(1.16) (-2.16)* (-1.70) (0.57) (-2.03)* (1.77)
region3 -0.119 0.240 -0.207 0.471 -0.226 0.177
(-6.92)*** (2.69)** (-6.72)*** (2.62)** (-7.37)*** (1.11)
region4 -0.116 -0.017 -0.160 0.464 -0.170 0.192
(-12.51)*** (-0.34) (-8.72)*** (4.47)*** (-9.10)*** (1.91)
region5 -0.015 -0.070 -0.047 0.013 -0.018 -0.109
(-1.47) (-1.31) (-2.30)* (0.12) (-0.88) (-1.05)
region6 -0.027 0.316 0.039 0.224 0.139 0.513
(-1.74) (3.82)*** (1.26) (1.21) (4.47)*** (2.98)**
region7 0.255 0.271 0.222 0.595 0.220 0.402
(25.39)*** (4.82)*** (10.55)*** (4.95)*** (9.80)*** (3.21)**
region8 0.068 0.093 0.056 0.297 0.110 0.200
(8.19)*** (2.08)* (3.47)*** (3.24)** (6.68)*** (2.29)*
electricity 0.086 -0.077 0.059 0.206 0.077 0.156
(6.89)*** (-1.23) (2.03)* (1.25) (2.20)* (0.88)
distanceavg -0.004 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.006 -0.003
(-5.62)*** (-2.89)** (-7.71)*** (-1.26) (-4.54)*** (-0.36)
cons 8.369 -2.258 8.489 -3.451 8.647 -3.584
(206.14)*** (-10.38)*** (95.89)*** (-6.76)*** (95.61)*** (-7.52)***
N 28806 28806 6554 6554 6828 6828
Continued on next page
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Table 2.2 – continued from previous page
2002 2004 2006
Variable Log(Cons) Variance Log(Cons) Variance Log(Cons) Variance
R2 0.470 0.020 0.356 0.019 0.344 0.015
F 911.592 21.283 128.720 4.528 127.538 3.615
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: t statistics in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
As can be seen from Table 2.2, the coefficient of age of household head is negative
and significant in all three years 2002, 2004 and 2006, confirming that a household
with an older head tends to have lower per capita consumption. The pattern is
similar for the share of female members in a household. A household with a higher
share of females has lower per capita consumption, but the marginal effect becomes
smaller as the estimated coefficients are negative, significant and nonlinear.
As expected, in all three surveys when the coefficients of dependency burden are
negative and significant, a household with many old or many young members tends
to have a lower level of consumption. The correlation between the married status
of the household head and household consumption is unclear when the signs of the
estimated coefficients are positive but statistically insignificant.
The estimated coefficients reflecting the highest level of education of household mem-
bers are significantly positive, except for the dummy for primary education in 2006.
Within each survey, the size of these coefficients increases when household members
have a higher level of education. This reflects the fact that a household with a higher
level of education has a higher per capita consumption.
Similar to the household head and female share, total land owned by a household
has a nonlinear relationship with household consumption. The land coefficients
are significantly positive, and show that having more land increases per capita con-
sumption at a diminishing rate. However, agricultural households tend to have lower
consumption, as the dummy coefficients are significant and negative.
At the commune level, the results of regional dummies illustrate the difference among
geographical regions. Compared to households living in Red River Delta (region
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1), households in the South East (region 7) and Mekong Delta (region 8) tend to
have higher consumption, reflecting the fact that economic growth in these regions is
more dynamic. Conversely, households living in the South West (region 3) and North
Central Coast (region 4) have lower consumption per capita. The differences between
Red River Delta (region 1), North West (region 2), South Central Coast (region 5)
and Central Highland (region 6) are ambiguous because the estimated coefficients are
small and mostly insignificant. Within regions, households living in high mountains
are more likely to have a lower per capita consumption. The estimated coefficients
of electricity and distance to market indicate that easier access to a power supply
or market facilities contributes to a higher level of household consumption. From
the estimates of consumption and variance of disturbance term in Table 2.2, we
next adopt Chaudhuri’s measure to calculate each households vulnerability using
Equation (19). As the calculation of poverty and vulnerability are sensitive to the
choice of poverty line and vulnerability threshold, we apply 100%, 120% and 80% of
the poverty line of each year, as defined by the General Statistics Office (GSO).
With Dutta et al’s measure, vulnerability is defined as the shortfall from the refer-
ence line. Hence, after estimating households’ future consumption using the above
regressions, we calculate the reference line which is interpreted as the minimum liv-
ing standard that a household should maintain in the future to be considered not
vulnerable. Next, two functional forms representing two situations where the refer-
ence line and current income are first positively correlated, and secondly negatively
correlated, are used for estimation and comparison13. Since there is no certain α
suggested in the literature when estimating reference lines, we use various values of
α satifying 0 ≤ α ≤ 114. We also choose the poverty line of 100%, 120% and 80% of
the actual poverty line for each year. Assuming that log consumption has a normal
distribution, we estimate the likelihood that a household future consumption is lower
than the reference line using Equation 2.11.
In both cases, households who have an estimated probability higher than a threshold
of 0.5 are considered vulnerable and presented in Table 2.3. As can be seen in
this table, applying the 100% poverty line with Dutta’s measure, we get a mean
13Equations 2.9 and 2.10 proposed by Dutta et al. (2011) satisfy the condition that changes in
current income do not translate to equivalent changes in the reference line.
14Our paper is different to Dutta’s and Celidoni’s papers in two ways. First, we use a regression
to gauge future consumption instead of past income. Second, we estimate vulnerability for cross-
sectional data rather than panel data. Celidoni (2013) uses α=0.5 while we use =0; 0.25; 0.5; 0.75;
1.
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Table 2.3: Actual poverty rate and estimated vulnerability rate (%)
2002 2004 2006
Poverty line 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80%
Actual poverty 23.95 37.12 11.51 18.39 30.34 8.83 16.32 27.40 7.51
rate
Vulnerability rate 13.00 28.55 3.41 9.07 19.28 4.25 6.25 14.82 1.51
of Chaudhuri’s
measure
Vulnerability rate 16.51 32.18 5.11 12.74 24.20 6.03 9.14 19.38 2.84
of Dutta’s
measure (negative)
Source: Author’s calculation from VHLSS 2002, 2004, 2006
vulnerability of 16.51 per cent in 2002, 12.74 per cent in 2004 and 9.14per cent
in 2006. This means, on average, that Vietnamese households had 16.51 per cent
probability of falling into poverty in 2002 and 12.74 per cent in 2004, and this declined
to 9.14 per cent in 2006. Mean vulnerability from Chaudhuri’s measure is slightly
lower than that of Dutta’s measure for all years. From the surveys, actual poverty
rates are 23.95 per cent in 2002, 18.39 per cent in 2004 and 16.32 per cent in 2006.
These different statistics of actual poverty and estimated vulnerability show that
vulnerable households might not simultaneously be poor, and that poor households
are not necessarily vulnerable. These results support a statement of the World Bank
(1997) that “subsistence farmers in remote areas are almost always poor but are not
particularly vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks.”
Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC)
Table 2.4 reports a summary of the area under the ROC curve from two measures
of Chaudhuri (2003) and Dutta et al. (2011). The ROC indexes are always higher
in the Dutta et al measure. For instance, with a 100% poverty line in the period
of 2002-2004, the ROC indexes in the Dutta et al measure are about 0.79 and
0.73, respectively to negative and positive relationship between current income and
reference line while the ROC index in the Chaudhuri measure is only 0.68. The
number 0.79 in Dutta et al measure indicates that vulnerable households, as identifed
by this measure, will have a 0.79 probability of falling into poverty. Apparently, the
vulnerability index proposed by Dutta et al. (2011) is better at predicting poverty
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Table 2.4: Compare predictive power between measure of Chaudhuri and Dutta
(ROC area)
2002-2004 2004-2006
Poverty line 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80%
Chaudhuri 0.6783 0.7094 0.5928 0.6112 0.6600 0.5459
(0.0116) (0.0094) (0.0142) (0.0107) (0.0094) (0.0112)
Dutta 0.7277 0.6694
(Positive, =0) (0.0114) (0.0119)
Dutta 0.7941 0.7618
(Negative, =1) (0.0105) (0.0117)
Source: Author’s calculation. Standard error in brackets.
than Chaudhuri (2003). Therefore, in the next two sections, we use the vulnerability
index generated from Dutta et al’s measure (negative correlation between current
income and reference line, α = 1) for poverty dynamic analysis.
Determinant of poverty
Table 5 reports the results for the probit model used to estimate determinants of
household ex post poverty and impact of vulnerability on poverty. Specifically, the
results are the respective marginal effect of the probit model. Using two panel
datasets for 2002-2004 and 2004-2006, we find that ex ante vulnerability in previous
periods translated to ex post poverty in the subsequent periods. For example, based
on the 100% poverty line, a 1 per cent increase in the ex ante probability of falling
into poverty in 2002 increases the ex post probability of poverty in 2004 by 0.36
per cent. Similarly, a 1 per cent increase in vulnerability in 2004 would increase
the probability of being poor in 2006 by 0.37 per cent. Although the estimated
effects changed across the choice of poverty lines, the coefficients of vulnerability are
strongly significant in all cases.
As expected, a household with an older head, a higher female share or a higher
number of dependents is more likely to be poor in 2002, as the coefficients are
firmly significant. Those coefficients in 2004 and 2006 show similar effects, but the
coefficients of female share in 2004 and 2006 for the case of the 100% poverty line are
not significant. This is probably because of the overlap influence of the vulnerability
variable.
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The education coefficients, which are negative and significant, show that the higher
the level of education, the lower the probability of poverty. Moreover, the probability
of poverty declines as the highest level of education increases. Households with
income only from agricultural activities face a higher probability of being poor.
However, owning more land (regardless of type) tends to reduce the probability
of poverty, as the coefficients are mostly negative and strongly significant. The
commune coefficients confirm that households living in rural or high altitude areas,
with difficult access to electricity and a longer distance to market will have a higher
likelihood of being poor.
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Table 2.5: Determinants of poverty (Probit results, dy/dx)
Whether poor in 2002 Whether poor in 2004 Whether poor in 2006
(Probit results, dy/dx) (probit results with VEP2002, dy/dx) (probit results with VEP2004, dy/dx)
Variable 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80%
VEP 0.363*** 0.531*** 0.144*** 0.366*** 0.580*** 0.153***
(14.23) (18.66) (7.31) (12.29) (17.66) (6.74)
headage 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.004 0.008* 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.000
(6.47) (6.94) (4.20) (1.17) (1.65) (0.91) (1.47) (0.24) (0.04)
headage2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(7.91) (8.54) (5.37) (1.30) (1.87) (0.96) (1.42) (0.22) (0.04)
femaleshare 0.488*** 0.780*** 0.206*** 0.003 0.298 -0.005 0.146 0.274 0.104
(10.07) (12.42) (7.41) (0.03) (1.53) (0.08) (1.22) (1.52) (1.44)
femaleshare2 -0.458*** -0.742*** -0.185*** -0.017 -0.312* -0.048 -0.151 -0.274* -0.086
(10.39) (12.96) (7.35) (0.14) (1.76) (0.75) (1.40) (1.67) (1.36)
dependshare 0.240*** 0.334*** 0.096*** 0.093*** 0.177*** 0.056*** 0.065** 0.096** 0.022
(21.59) (22.91) (14.87) (3.08) (4.00) (3.50) (2.38) (2.29) (1.42)
married -0.023*** -0.034*** -0.010** -0.015 -0.061** -0.009 -0.039** -0.036 -0.003
(3.21) (3.60) (2.37) (0.75) (2.14) (0.82) (2.28) (1.36) (0.35)
primary -0.024*** -0.022** -0.020*** 0.012 -0.030 -0.020** -0.005 0.044 -0.009
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Whether poor in 2002 Whether poor in 2004 Whether poor in 2006
(Probit results, dy/dx) (probit results with VEP2002, dy/dx) (probit results with VEP2004, dy/dx)
Variable 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80%
(3.07) (2.03) (5.20) (0.59) (0.92) (1.98) (0.27) (1.31) (0.88)
lowersecond -0.088*** -0.106*** -0.055*** -0.007 -0.064* -0.027** -0.026 0.012 -0.030***
(10.89) (9.49) (12.48) (0.31) (1.92) (2.39) (1.22) (0.34) (2.70)
uppersecond -0.175*** -0.238*** -0.091*** -0.014 -0.068* -0.050*** -0.081*** -0.011 -0.061***
(17.99) (18.54) (15.71) (0.51) (1.70) (3.30) (3.14) (0.28) (4.12)
techschool -0.285*** -0.391*** -0.126*** -0.084*** -0.192*** -0.060*** -0.116*** -0.105** -0.076***
(20.47) (23.24) (14.44) (2.61) (4.21) (3.40) (3.98) (2.45) (4.32)
highedu -0.372*** -0.526*** -0.180*** -0.124* -0.112 -0.150*** -0.152**
(17.04) (22.31) (10.93) (1.88) (1.64) (2.85) (2.19)
arghh 0.099*** 0.136*** 0.044*** 0.017 0.024 0.024*** 0.014 -0.007 0.012*
(19.10) (20.22) (14.23) (1.22) (1.17) (3.00) (1.07) (0.35) (1.66)
totalland -0.021*** -0.031*** -0.007*** -0.031*** -0.056*** -0.013** -0.017** -0.035*** -0.003
(9.47) (10.34) (5.83) (2.81) (3.58) (1.96) (2.34) (3.08) (0.89)
totalland2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(7.21) (6.91) (4.95) (2.10) (3.17) (0.99) (0.55) (0.64) (0.15)
urban -0.169*** -0.251*** -0.071*** 0.130 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Whether poor in 2002 Whether poor in 2004 Whether poor in 2006
(Probit results, dy/dx) (probit results with VEP2002, dy/dx) (probit results with VEP2004, dy/dx)
Variable 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80%
(20.91) (25.84) (13.79) (1.11) (0.76)
inland 0.012 0.023* 0.006 -0.005 -0.015 -0.003 -0.027 -0.010 -0.029**
(1.25) (1.91) (1.00) (0.18) (0.40) (0.23) (1.12) (0.25) (2.20)
hill 0.036*** 0.050*** 0.020*** -0.057* -0.090* -0.036* -0.023 -0.018 -0.017
(2.79) (3.00) (2.71) (1.65) (1.83) (1.71) (0.73) (0.37) (0.95)
lowmountain 0.077*** 0.103*** 0.039*** 0.020 -0.041 0.015 -0.020 -0.020 -0.005
(6.83) (6.87) (6.11) (0.66) (0.92) (0.91) (0.72) (0.46) (0.34)
highmountain 0.136*** 0.193*** 0.066*** 0.006 0.014 0.027 0.016 0.044 0.011
(10.32) (10.68) (9.12) (0.18) (0.28) (1.52) (0.50) (0.88) (0.70)
region2 -0.013 -0.032** -0.014*** 0.041 0.053 -0.006 0.010 0.013 -0.000
(1.26) (2.40) (2.61) (1.51) (1.41) (0.44) (0.40) (0.35) (0.04)
region3 0.082*** 0.085*** 0.059*** -0.004 0.122** -0.016 0.097** 0.177*** 0.071**
(4.38) (3.61) (5.01) (0.12) (2.05) (1.16) (2.08) (2.76) (2.34)
region4 0.095*** 0.107*** 0.047*** 0.056** 0.102*** 0.042** 0.096*** 0.144*** 0.079***
(9.35) (8.92) (7.28) (2.33) (3.08) (2.37) (3.62) (4.20) (3.94)
region5 -0.012 -0.024* 0.001 0.041 0.001 0.020 -0.022 -0.026 -0.007
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Whether poor in 2002 Whether poor in 2004 Whether poor in 2006
(Probit results, dy/dx) (probit results with VEP2002, dy/dx) (probit results with VEP2004, dy/dx)
Variable 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80%
(1.23) (1.95) (0.10) (1.53) (0.03) (1.12) (1.04) (0.81) (0.58)
region6 0.024 -0.016 0.024*** -0.017 0.004 -0.006 -0.038 -0.068* -0.006
(1.59) (0.81) (2.75) (0.65) (0.09) (0.41) (1.64) (1.76) (0.47)
region7 -0.096*** -0.180*** -0.030*** 0.004 0.025 -0.017 -0.001 -0.038 -0.007
(11.99) (16.69) (6.52) (0.14) (0.66) (1.33) (0.06) (1.09) (0.57)
region8 -0.044*** -0.086*** -0.014*** 0.023 0.069** 0.000 -0.027 -0.044* -0.003
(5.94) (8.91) (3.20) (1.12) (2.31) (0.01) (1.56) (1.66) (0.29)
electricity -0.074*** -0.077*** -0.044*** 0.030 -0.038 0.025 0.136*** 0.138** 0.044**
(7.05) (5.00) (8.37) (0.96) (0.79) (1.43) (3.39) (2.28) (2.31)
distanceavg 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.005** 0.009*** 0.002* 0.003* 0.007*** 0.000
(4.97) (7.43) (1.41) (2.53) (2.71) (1.91) (1.94) (2.99) (0.70)
N 28,806 28,806 28,806 2,837 2,837 2,714 2,989 2,989 2,861
Notes: Vulnerability index using Dutta et al’s measure. t statistics in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table 2.6: Summary contribution of ex ante vulnerability to ex post poverty
(Probit model using 3-survey panel data from 2002-2006)
Variable 2002 2002 2004 2002&2004
to 2004 to 2006 to 2006 to 2006
VEP 2002 (100% poverty line) 0.375*** 0.243*** 0.184***
(9.91) (8.05) (6.11)
VEP 2004 (100% poverty line) 0.323*** 0.211***
(7.52) (5.36)
VEP 2002 (120% poverty line) 0.496*** 0.399*** 0.272***
(12.78) (11.54) (7.06)
VEP 2004 (120% poverty line) 0.512*** 0.349***
(10.87) (7.18)
VEP 2002 (80% poverty line) 0.146*** 0.088*** 0.062***
(4.75) (3.93) (3.18)
VEP 2004 (80% poverty line) 0.102*** 0.071***
(3.67) (3.03)
Notes:* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses.
Using the same approach for a longer panel dataset from 2002 to 2006, we find
similar effects of vulnerability on poverty status in the later period (Table 2.6). All
estimated coefficients of vulnerability are positive and significant. Using both the
2002 and 2004 vulnerability indexes for poverty determinant regression in 2006, we
obtain a smaller effect in 2002 and a larger effect in 2004. For example, for the
100% poverty line, the effects are 0.184 and 0.211 respectively. This indicates that
vulnerability may have a larger effect in the short term, and that effect tends to fall
over time.
Role of vulnerability on poverty shift across time
Table 2.7 illustrates the movements in and out of poverty across surveys. In the
panel sample extracted from the surveys of 2002 and 2004, the number of households
escaping out of poverty is larger than the number falling into poverty. In particular,
421 households (around 53 per cent of the poor in 2002) moved out of poverty by
2004. In contrast, only 127 households (nearly 4 per cent of the non-poor in 2002)
had fallen into poverty by 2004. Therefore, headcount poverty declined from 27.4
per cent to 17.3 per cent.
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Table 2.7: Poverty transition matrix between 2002, 2004 and 2006
Status Status in 2004 Status Status in 2006
in 2002 Poor Non-poor Total in 2004 Poor Non-poor Total
Poor 375 421 796 Poor 316 249 565
(12.93) (14.51) (27.44) (10.31) (8.12) (18.43)
Non-poor 127 1,978 2,105 Non-poor 142 2,359 2,501
(4.38) (68.18) (72.56) (4.63) (76.94) (81.57)
Total 502 2,399 2,901 Total 458 2,608 3,066
(17.30) (82.70) (100.00) (14.94) (85.06) (100.00)
Source: Author’s calculation based on the panel households in the sample data. Headcount
ratio in the parentheses
In the panel sample extracted from the surveys of 2004 and 2006, headcount poverty
decreased from 18.7 per cent to 14.94 per cent. A total of 249 households (ap-
proximately 44 per cent of the poor in 2004) had moved out of poverty by 2006.
Conversely, 142 households, which account for 5.7 per cent of the non-poor in 2004,
had fallen into poverty by 2006. In both panel samples, the proportion that moved
into poverty is not large but the actual number of households falling into poverty
from the first sample to the second sample doubled, implying that the contribution
of vulnerability to poverty might be trivial but it had become increasingly impor-
tant. A larger share of transient poverty (around 32 per cent moved both in and
out of poverty in both periods) compared to chronic poverty (around 23 per cent)
raises a concern that, given varying household consumption, the past governments
achievement in poverty reduction could disappear if unexpected risks, both covari-
ate and idiosyncratic, are to occur. According to World Bank (2000), between 1993
and 1998, the chronic poor accounts for 28.6 per cent of the population while the
falling-into poor is about 4.8 per cent and the moving-out-of poor is 27.4 per cent
totally. Compared to those results, chronic poverty in this study (at the period 2002
- 2006) is less serious but the speed of poverty reduction is slower. The effects of
pro-poor programs on the near-poor are uncertain because the probability of falling
into poverty fluctuates across surveys.
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 represent the major results of multinomial logit models used to
examine the impact of vulnerability on poverty transitions across surveys. The base
case is the category of household that is always non-poor in both surveys. Each
table can be divided into three parts which correspond to three levels of the poverty
line (100%, 120% and 80%).
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Three columns in each panel contains two important pieces of information. Firstly,
the coefficient presented in the third column of each panel is interpreted as the
impact of vulnerability on the probability of transition from non-poor status in the
previous survey to poor status in the next survey. Hence, a positive sign in the third
column reveals a higher likelihood of falling into poverty. Secondly, the difference
between the second and the first columns shows the probability of moving out of
poverty relative to the probability of staying in poverty. A negative sign of the
difference between the second column and the first column reflects less likelihood of
moving out of poverty.
From 2002 to 2004, the coefficients of VEP are positive and highly significant in all
columns (Table 2.8). These results in Column 3, which vary from 2.727 to 6.346,
confirm that the higher vulnerability is, the greater the relative probability of falling
into poverty. In addition, that the coefficient differences between the second and the
first columns are negative in all cases suggests that a rise in vulnerability tends to
reduce the relative probability of escaping poverty. The estimation for 2004 and 2006
obtains similar results (Table 2.9). The estimated coefficients for all levels of the
poverty line are significant, except the coefficient of non-poor to poor for the case of
80% poverty line. The signs of third columns are positive and the differences between
the second and the first columns are negative. In general, it could be argued that
a policy alleviating vulnerability should not only prevent a household from slipping
into poverty, but also encourage a household to escape from poverty.
Household characteristics and commune characteristics have slightly different im-
pacts on poverty across the two periods. In the 2002-2004 period, marriage might
help non-poor households not to fall into poverty but if households are already poor,
the effect is insignificant. In contrast, having income from agriculture only increases
the likelihood of slipping into poverty and non-poor households living in South West
(region 3) and North Central Coast (region 4) are more likely to be poor compared
to the Red River Delta (base case). (Table 2.8)
Akin to previous periods, econometric results from the 2004-2006 period shows that
marriage and having more land appear to keep non-poor households from poverty.
Similarly, the education level of household members tends to reduce the probability
of being poor. Also, in this period, if non-poor households live in the South West
(region 3), North Central Coast (region 4), they are more likely to fall into poverty
(Table 2.9).
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Table 2.8: Determinants of change in poverty status during 2002 and 2004 (multinomial logit)
100% Poverty line 120% Poverty line 80% Poverty line
Variable poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→
poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor
VEP 19.263*** 16.173*** 4.675*** 18.403*** 15.615*** 2.727*** 22.942*** 20.167*** 6.346***
(0.935) (0.856) (0.772) (0.836) (0.772) (0.497) (1.582) (1.491) (1.377)
headage -0.090* -0.069 -0.033 -0.109** -0.094* 0.010 0.052 0.087 -0.026
(0.054) (0.044) (0.051) (0.053) (0.048) (0.046) (0.070) (0.056) (0.059)
headage2 0.001* 0.001 0.000 0.001** 0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
femaleshare -9.268*** -5.336*** 2.383 -11.443*** -9.638*** 2.908 -6.550** -4.730** 0.136
(2.242) (1.698) (2.059) (2.169) (1.935) (1.863) (2.754) (1.959) (2.389)
femaleshare2 9.197*** 5.215*** -2.052 10.306*** 8.454*** -2.553 6.012** 4.824*** -1.193
(2.073) (1.586) (1.878) (2.009) (1.809) (1.659) (2.583) (1.807) (2.333)
dependshare -2.613*** -1.914*** 1.013** -3.912*** -3.668*** 0.810* -0.490 0.292 1.902***
(0.565) (0.434) (0.499) (0.553) (0.505) (0.434) (0.724) (0.488) (0.636)
married 0.205 -0.100 -0.631** 0.176 0.213 -0.758*** 0.530 0.375 -0.413
(0.332) (0.256) (0.299) (0.308) (0.279) (0.251) (0.452) (0.329) (0.383)
primary 0.392 0.906** -0.454 0.142 0.724** -0.317 -0.329 0.337 -0.186
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100% Poverty line 120% Poverty line 80% Poverty line
Variable poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→
poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor
(0.386) (0.365) (0.330) (0.351) (0.367) (0.299) (0.389) (0.326) (0.371)
lowersecond 1.071*** 1.717*** -0.544 1.308*** 2.319*** -0.461 -0.415 0.380 -0.300
(0.409) (0.372) (0.349) (0.387) (0.392) (0.318) (0.452) (0.351) (0.398)
uppersecond 1.405*** 1.624*** -1.128** 2.826*** 3.648*** -0.808** -0.395 0.578 -2.237***
(0.500) (0.415) (0.449) (0.481) (0.450) (0.378) (0.670) (0.403) (0.810)
techschool 0.857 1.487*** -0.997 3.349*** 3.880*** -1.428** -15.032 -0.443 -19.502
(1.110) (0.548) (0.626) (0.707) (0.546) (0.602) (963.011) (0.795) (706.363)
highedu -11.033 0.996 -14.583 4.171*** 3.337*** -2.085** -14.409 -0.657 -15.619
(462.942) (0.706) (717.773) (0.799) (0.654) (1.060) (1,585.101) (1.066) (1,818.00)
arghh -1.537*** -1.279*** 0.539** -2.287*** -2.392*** 0.248 0.338 -0.117 0.477
(0.271) (0.205) (0.223) (0.279) (0.258) (0.204) (0.417) (0.221) (0.293)
totalland 0.321*** 0.323** -0.126 0.369** 0.563*** 0.066 0.052 0.066 -0.177
(0.120) (0.128) (0.127) (0.160) (0.151) (0.098) (0.180) (0.109) (0.174)
totalland2 -0.007 -0.013 0.003 -0.012 -0.034** -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.012
(0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012)
urban -10.176 -12.785 1.484 6.268*** -7.361 -11.225 -13.769 -14.572 -14.451
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100% Poverty line 120% Poverty line 80% Poverty line
Variable poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→
poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor
(1,596.09) (1,387.67) (1.204) (1.707) (251.275) (324.669) (4,509.080) (4,060.50) (5,418.30)
inland -0.305 0.011 -0.449 0.337 0.567 0.033 -0.983* -0.414 -0.122
(0.435) (0.334) (0.350) (0.449) (0.414) (0.355) (0.561) (0.372) (0.477)
hill -1.379** -0.990** -0.826 -2.116*** -1.434** -1.031* -1.898** -0.677 -0.882
(0.635) (0.475) (0.538) (0.633) (0.581) (0.537) (0.949) (0.565) (0.842)
lowmountain -1.470*** -1.546*** 0.094 -2.371*** -2.146*** -0.250 -0.670 -0.537 0.395
(0.547) (0.453) (0.415) (0.564) (0.538) (0.437) (0.665) (0.467) (0.539)
highmountain -4.085*** -4.134*** -0.908 -3.740*** -3.849*** -0.456 -2.883*** -2.530*** 0.301
(0.720) (0.649) (0.603) (0.668) (0.659) (0.599) (0.861) (0.693) (0.636)
region2 0.413 0.438 0.691 -0.422 -0.377 0.928** -0.347 0.670 -0.060
(0.476) (0.374) (0.445) (0.459) (0.425) (0.390) (0.749) (0.430) (0.540)
region3 -4.431*** -4.157*** -1.412* -1.770*** -2.195*** -0.398 -4.669*** -3.399*** -0.885
(0.761) (0.707) (0.829) (0.647) (0.658) (0.769) (1.040) (0.847) (0.785)
region4 -1.184*** -1.412*** 1.019*** -1.479*** -1.934*** 0.929*** 0.250 0.120 1.071**
(0.426) (0.347) (0.386) (0.405) (0.380) (0.344) (0.626) (0.376) (0.434)
region5 -0.136 -0.530 0.475 -0.743* -0.570 0.202 0.486 -0.254 0.305
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100% Poverty line 120% Poverty line 80% Poverty line
Variable poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→
poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor
(0.442) (0.326) (0.436) (0.418) (0.366) (0.384) (0.717) (0.474) (0.528)
region6 -2.594*** -2.390*** -0.383 -1.178* -1.034* -0.730 -1.928** -1.425* -0.057
(0.703) (0.646) (0.694) (0.630) (0.628) (0.719) (0.944) (0.752) (0.666)
region7 -0.812 0.449 0.210 1.289*** 1.422*** 0.194 0.626 0.342 -1.893*
(0.641) (0.299) (0.455) (0.432) (0.317) (0.382) (0.785) (0.418) (1.077)
region8 0.348 -0.026 0.410 0.696** 0.420 0.259 0.856 0.611* -0.485
(0.354) (0.244) (0.380) (0.317) (0.264) (0.303) (0.587) (0.316) (0.500)
electricity -0.043 0.044 -0.589 -0.031 0.072 0.370 -0.055 0.268 -0.791*
(0.470) (0.444) (0.427) (0.444) (0.449) (0.508) (0.552) (0.475) (0.431)
distanceavg -0.048 -0.030 0.020 -0.011 -0.054 0.003 -0.041 -0.013 0.067**
(0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.045) (0.038) (0.034)
N 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901 2,901
Notes: Base line case is ‘non-poor’ in both surveys. Robust t statistics in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table 2.9: Determinants of change in poverty status during 2004 and 2006 (multinomial logit)
100% Poverty line 120% Poverty line 80% Poverty line
Variable poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→
poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor
VEP 21.845*** 18.470*** 4.150*** 17.159*** 14.096*** 2.498*** 27.930*** 25.393*** 4.426
(1.364) (1.308) (1.192) (0.839) (0.780) (0.633) (2.557) (2.512) (3.112)
headage 0.070 0.123** 0.018 -0.009 0.038 -0.014 0.031 0.094 0.019
(0.069) (0.059) (0.050) (0.059) (0.054) (0.042) (0.081) (0.069) (0.063)
headage2 -0.001 -0.001** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
femaleshare -3.482 -2.845* 3.021 -5.567*** -3.760** 0.371 -2.438 -3.601 4.091
(2.194) (1.682) (1.900) (1.952) (1.694) (1.575) (3.089) (2.223) (2.663)
femaleshare2 2.727 2.360 -3.284* 5.320*** 3.860** -0.429 2.186 3.202 -3.391
(2.002) (1.551) (1.714) (1.800) (1.550) (1.447) (2.804) (2.050) (2.278)
dependshare -1.018* -0.123 0.528 -2.378*** -1.815*** 0.384 0.108 0.726 0.715
(0.590) (0.451) (0.426) (0.531) (0.457) (0.365) (0.744) (0.575) (0.564)
married -0.847*** -0.301 -0.517* -0.492* -0.245 -0.036 -0.256 -0.164 -0.777**
(0.321) (0.262) (0.280) (0.294) (0.259) (0.255) (0.462) (0.357) (0.333)
primary 0.612 0.889** -0.676** 0.594 1.171*** 0.225 0.852* 0.667 -0.118
Continued on next page
Table 2.9 – continued from previous page
100% Poverty line 120% Poverty line 80% Poverty line
Variable poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→
poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor
(0.430) (0.386) (0.291) (0.399) (0.400) (0.284) (0.488) (0.436) (0.360)
lowersecond 0.831* 0.946** -0.992*** 1.318*** 1.684*** -0.315 0.206 0.723 -0.890**
(0.445) (0.393) (0.296) (0.413) (0.406) (0.292) (0.529) (0.452) (0.392)
uppersecond 0.354 0.747* -2.083*** 1.695*** 1.905*** -1.076*** -1.666* -0.084 -1.542***
(0.565) (0.438) (0.431) (0.481) (0.443) (0.354) (0.966) (0.603) (0.572)
techschool 0.818 0.808* -1.896*** 2.301*** 1.923*** -1.353*** -0.260 0.561 -1.425**
(0.588) (0.472) (0.454) (0.506) (0.470) (0.392) (0.790) (0.584) (0.620)
highedu -11.677 -12.724 -14.914 -9.925 1.480** -14.056 -12.873 -13.123 -14.588
(328.140) (371.328) (467.327) (190.555) (0.598) (288.975) (604.777) (621.683) (747.564)
arghh -0.510* -0.154 0.259 -1.586*** -1.321*** 0.039 0.153 0.708** 0.395
(0.284) (0.200) (0.205) (0.261) (0.226) (0.173) (0.391) (0.286) (0.276)
totalland 0.398*** -0.063 -0.235* 0.572*** 0.220 -0.098 0.588*** -0.104 -0.346*
(0.148) (0.138) (0.139) (0.206) (0.142) (0.149) (0.174) (0.163) (0.187)
totalland2 -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
inland -0.201 -0.095 -0.617* 0.395 0.620 -0.336 -0.158 0.155 -0.994**
Continued on next page
Table 2.9 – continued from previous page
100% Poverty line 120% Poverty line 80% Poverty line
Variable poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→
poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor
(0.470) (0.363) (0.345) (0.438) (0.394) (0.303) (0.634) (0.581) (0.431)
hill -0.725 0.403 -0.805* 0.438 0.660 -0.484 -1.428 0.009 -1.482**
(0.676) (0.445) (0.469) (0.549) (0.484) (0.398) (1.164) (0.762) (0.709)
lowmountain -0.928 -0.420 -0.424 -1.121** -0.837* -0.429 0.058 0.627 -0.527
(0.566) (0.456) (0.417) (0.549) (0.505) (0.373) (0.685) (0.635) (0.509)
highmountain -3.748*** -3.348*** -0.184 -3.119*** -3.053*** -0.266 -1.057 -0.248 -0.358
(0.725) (0.650) (0.483) (0.662) (0.629) (0.452) (0.765) (0.710) (0.573)
region2 0.060 0.076 0.252 0.192 0.340 0.484 0.473 1.203** 0.713
(0.510) (0.388) (0.399) (0.438) (0.384) (0.326) (0.718) (0.538) (0.599)
region3 0.508 0.168 1.230** 1.589** 1.479** 1.955*** 1.341* 1.338** 2.218***
(0.712) (0.634) (0.519) (0.662) (0.643) (0.470) (0.802) (0.676) (0.659)
region4 1.193*** 0.566* 0.860*** 1.387*** 0.931*** 0.972*** 2.210*** 1.459*** 1.564***
(0.385) (0.294) (0.316) (0.324) (0.279) (0.257) (0.583) (0.462) (0.476)
region5 -0.184 -0.068 -0.557 -0.121 0.102 -0.294 -0.038 0.170 -0.827
(0.492) (0.360) (0.459) (0.403) (0.332) (0.338) (0.754) (0.611) (0.825)
region6 -0.171 0.208 -0.835 -0.330 0.349 -0.434 -0.122 0.663 0.839
Continued on next page
Table 2.9 – continued from previous page
100% Poverty line 120% Poverty line 80% Poverty line
Variable poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→ poor→ poor→ non-poor→
poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor poor non-poor poor
(0.784) (0.706) (0.659) (0.669) (0.640) (0.521) (0.869) (0.712) (0.708)
region7 -0.534 -0.270 0.135 -0.908* -0.464 -0.307 -0.161 -0.487 -0.314
(0.617) (0.415) (0.403) (0.492) (0.393) (0.343) (0.857) (0.780) (0.739)
region8 -0.584 0.361 -0.390 -0.205 0.343 -0.428 -1.115 0.913* 0.150
(0.442) (0.284) (0.341) (0.343) (0.264) (0.267) (0.819) (0.475) (0.516)
electricity 3.688*** 2.391*** 0.631 3.033*** 2.107*** 0.774 2.627*** 1.898** 0.568
(0.837) (0.802) (0.557) (0.570) (0.573) (0.515) (0.884) (0.811) (0.583)
distanceavg -0.107** -0.093** 0.089*** -0.121*** -0.152*** 0.018 -0.248*** -0.223*** 0.027
(0.044) (0.042) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038) (0.031) (0.058) (0.055) (0.037)
N 2,989 2,989 2,989 2,989 2,989 2,989 2,989 2,989 2,989
Notes: Base line case is ‘non-poor’ in both surveys. Robust t statistics in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
2.7 Policy implication and conclusion
Vulnerability is distinct from poverty. Vulnerability is considered an ex ante measure.
Therefore, understanding vulnerability is important for poverty alleviation policies
in understanding the causes for the poor retaining that status, and the non-poor
falling into poverty.
Using two panel data extracted from the Vietnam Household Living Standard Sur-
veys in 2002, 2004 and 2006, this paper analyzes vulnerability as expected poverty
in Vietnam. We firstly measure household vulnerability in Vietnam across three
separate surveys from 2002 to 2006. Then we examine the determinants of ex post
poverty as well as ex ante vulnerability, and finally we evaluate the role of ex ante
vulnerability on movement into/out of poverty during the sample periods.
Our main findings are that, (i) Vulnerability estimation using the reference line is
more appropriate than using the actual poverty line for poverty prediction in the
case of Vietnam; (ii) ex ante vulnerability in previous periods can translate to ex
post poverty in subsequent periods, though both vulnerability and the incidence of
poverty tend to fall over time; (iii) vulnerability of the poor is likely trap them in
poverty; and (iv) vulnerability of the non-poor can propel them into poverty.
In line with previous research, this sudy confirms the close connection between ex
ante vulnerability and ex post poverty. Therefore, this study suggests that targeted
interventions for poverty reduction in Vietnam should take account of household
vulnerability because poverty based on static indicators are likely to be ineffective
if covariate and idiosyncratic shocks considerably affect household living standards.
Since the vulnerable may not be the same group as the poor, the interventions should
differ to ensure the non-poor do not fall into poverty and the poor can find a way
to get out of poverty. In addition, our study proves that easier access to a power
supply or market facilities contributes to a higher level of household consumption.
Hence, pro-poor policies should focus on the infrastructure use of households and be
integrated with the migration policies.
In the next study, we will measure vulnerability as low expected utility (VEU) so
that we can have a clearer view of negative shocks affecting household consumption
and their coping strategies. This information is also essential for poverty alleviation
policies.
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Chapter 3
Household vulnerability as low
expected utility and responses to
risks in rural Vietnam
3.1 Introduction
Households around the world are confronted with different types of negative shocks
or risks. These risks can be idiosyncratic, and happen to individuals or households –
for example illness, death, or a family member’s loss of income. They might also be
covariate, occurring in entire communities and regions, such as natural disasters or
variations in commodity prices. In developing countries where formal insurance and
access to credit are often absent or limited, risks or adverse shocks cause a devastat-
ing impact on households. Therefore, an important strand of development economics
studies risks and their outcomes in developing countries. The term ‘vulnerability’ in
the literature has emerged from this context and has been associated with interest
in measuring vulnerability. For the purpose of intervention policies which aim to
improve household’s welfare, a full set of five crucial questions related to vulnerabil-
ity should be assessed: 1) what is the extent of vulnerability? 2) who is vulnerable?
3) what are the sources of vulnerability? 4) how do households respond to shocks?
and 5) what are the gaps between risks and risk management mechanisms? (Hod-
dinott & Quisumbing 2003b). However, very few studies to date have attempts to
address all these issues in a single study. Therefore, household welfare under risks
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has probably not been depicted comprehensively and there is real need for further
studies integrating both vulnerability estimation and coping strategy analysis.
Vietnam is a developing country with a high need for vulnerability assessment, due
to its high potential risks and the inadequacy of its social safety nets. The country’s
relatively high growth rates have been followed by a high level of income inequality.
Unemployment insurance commenced in 2009, but few people have benefited from
because of the bureaucratic procedures. In addition, few households have access to
the formal credit market as a consequence of asymmetric information on the finan-
cial market. Commercial banks favor giving commercial loans over personal loans.
Credit cards are usually only for high and stable income individuals. Also, house-
holds in some regions frequently suffer from droughts, floods and tropical storms.
Consequently, household consumption levels vary considerably and sadly, low-income
households are more likely to fall into, or stay in, poverty. That is why it is necessary
to have studies which include both vulnerability assessment and coping strategies in
response to negative shocks.
This study responds to a gap in literature and the need for anti-poverty policies in
the Vietnam context. We first adopt the approach of Ligon & Schechter (2003) to
measure vulnerability as low expected utility (VEU). One advantage of this approach
is that we can distinguish sources of vulnerability. Second, we apply the multivariate
probit model to investigate household response to shocks. Finally, we look into
the effectiveness of the existing risk management mechanism. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper is the first analysis using the data set from Vietnam Access
to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) to estimate vulnerability as low expected
utility (VEU) in Vietnam. Also, this is the first work that combines vulnerability
estimations, sources of vulnerability and responses to risks in a single paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is a literature review focusing
on concepts of vulnerability and previous studies. Section 3 briefly summarizes an
overview of risk and coping strategies in Vietnam. Section 4 describes the data and
analytical framework used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the results,
and the conclusion with policy implications is the last section.
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3.2 Literature review
Concepts of vulnerability
The concept of vulnerability is interpreted in various ways in different contexts. In
economics, the concept of vulnerability emerges from that of poverty. From the
traditional view of poverty as reflected in World Development Report 1990, the
notion of poverty consists of material deprivation and low achievement in education
and health (World Bank 1990). Later, the term ‘vulnerability’ is mentioned when
examining the relationship between poverty and uncertainty of income (Morduch
1994). Since then, ‘vulnerability’ is often used to extend the traditional concept of
poverty. While poverty measurement is based on fixed standards such as income
or expenditure during a short period of time, vulnerability broadens the poverty
notion by including the potential risk of adverse shocks such as income loss, bad
health (idiosyncratic risks) and natural disasters (covariate risks). For example, in
the work of Glewwe & Hall (1998) and Cunningham & Maloney (2000), vulnerability
is defined as exposure to negative shocks to welfare. It is also defined as “the
probability or risk today of being in poverty or to fall into deeper poverty in the
future” (World Bank 2001) or “the ex-ante risk that a household will, if currently
non-poor, fall below the poverty line, or if currently poor, will remain in poverty”
(Chaudhuri 2003).
In an excellent summary of risk and vulnerability, Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003b)
classify approaches to assessing vulnerability into three methods according to their
distinct definitions: vulnerability as expected poverty (VEP); vulnerability as low
expected utility (VEU); and vulnerability as uninsured exposure to risk (VER). All
three methods predict changes in welfare, but with different welfare measurements.
The difference between VEP and VEU lies in their definitions of welfare: in VEP
consumption is regarded as welfare, while VEU uses utility derived from consump-
tion. While VEP and VEU commonly use a benchmark for a welfare indicator (z )
and estimate the probability of falling below this benchmark (p), VER evaluates
whether downside risks or observed shocks result in welfare loss. In other word,
VER assesses the household’s ability to smooth or insure consumption when faced
with income shocks, while maintaining a minimum level of assets.
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In this paper, we employ the methodology that is used in the VEU estimation1.
This is well known through the work of Ligon & Schechter (2003) and summarized
in the review paper of Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003b)2. Surprisingly, there are
few studies using the VEU approach, and the major reason being that researchers do
not have panel data of the quality required for this approach. Following is summary
of a selection of influential empirical works.
VEU in previous studies
The VEU measure is merely the difference between the utility a household would
derive from consuming some particular bundle with certainty and the household’s
expected utility of consumption. With this measure, vulnerability can be decom-
posed into distinct components such as poverty, covariate risk, idiosyncratic risk,
and unexplained risk plus measurement error. Unfortunately, there are few empiri-
cal works that apply or modify the VEU method in order to measure vulnerability,
and the mixed results across studies largely depend on the duration of the panel
data sets and the actual environments at the time of the surveys.
Ligon & Schechter (2003) apply their own method with a data set from Bulgaria
which includes 2,287 households in a monthly panel data conducted over one year.
They choose food spending as the measure of consumption and find that the welfare
of the average Bulgarian household is 11 per cent less than it would be if there was
no inequality, and an additional 3 per cent less than it would be if there was no
aggregate risk. Idiosyncratic risk originating from observed sources such as income
shocks, unemployment incidence, changes in pensions is significant, but not impor-
tant, in terms of magnitude. Later, Ligon & Schechter (2004) conduct Monte Carlo
experiments with both Vietnamese and Bulgarian data sets to compare the perfor-
mance of different vulnerability measures and suggest that when the environment is
stationary and consumption spending is measured without error, the most appro-
priate estimator is one suggested by Chaudhuri (2003). The authors also suggest
that if the vulnerability measure is sensitive to risk, but consumption is measured
with error, the estimator recommended by Ligon & Schechter (2003) often obtains
1The methodology of VEP estimation from Chaudhuri (2003) is adopted in Chapter 2 of the
thesis.
2Recently, most empirical works have been derived from these papers, so they have presented
similar reviews on methodology (Jadotte 2011, Jha et al. 2010, 2013). The review of methodology
in this paper is drawn from the above papers.
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the best results. However, if the distribution of consumption is non-stationary, a
modified estimator proposed by Pritchett et al. (2000) is preferable. This finding
confirms our choices of vulnerability estimators as we use the VEU approach of Ligon
& Schechter (2003) to complement the VEP approach of Chaudhuri (2003).
A study by Ersado (2006) analyses rural vulnerability in Serbia using panel data
for the period 2002-2003 and finds that risk contributes 30 per cent of household
vulnerability, while poverty accounts for 70 per cent. Households and regions where
agriculture is the main activities and the major source of income are more likely to be
at risk of vulnerability than those with a higher income share from non-agricultural
sources. The author also determines that vulnerability to poverty and risk is consid-
erably linked with durable asset ownership and access to communications services.
The study confirms the association between vulnerability and weather shocks and
topography in rural Serbia.
Gaiha & Imai (2008) apply VEU for a panel of 183 households to measure vulnera-
bility in rural India. They decompose household vulnerability into poverty, covariate
risks, and idiosyncratic risks. According to the authors, idiosyncratic risks represent
the largest share (37%), ahead of poverty (35%) and covariate risks (22%). The land-
less and small farmers are seriously vulnerable, despite some degree of risk-sharing.
However, a study by Jha et al. (2010) in Tajikistan shows that poverty and inequal-
ity determined 81 per cent of the vulnerability. This paper also finds that household
idiosyncratic risk is moderate and, surprisingly, covariate shocks are favorable and
reduce vulnerability.
One of the rare studies integrating both vulnerability estimation and coping strate-
gies analysis is the interesting work of Jha et al. (2013). The authors use VEU to
measure vulnerability in rural India during the period of 1999-2006, and demon-
strate that poverty and idiosyncratic components account for the largest portion of
household vulnerability. To cope with risks, households depend heavily on informal
instruments such as their own savings, transfers or capital depletion. They also
choose to participate in government programs to alleviate the adverse effect of co-
variate risks. This study highlights that household consumption and income exhibit
correlated variation, implying that existing informal insurance instruments are inad-
equate to sustain household consumption against income shocks. The paper proves
that a coping strategy exploiting government programs has reduced vulnerability
induced by idiosyncratic risks.
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Coping strategies in previous studies
There have been several studies focusing on the effect of a particular shock and
the resultant household coping strategies. One of the interesting illustrations of the
impact of shocks comes from a study of Carter et al. (2007). Figure 3.1 – extracted
from that study – confirms the view that a random event (flood, drought, illness,
a period of unemployment) can have a permanent effect on a household (Calvo &
Dercon 2005, Dercon 2004). Take, for example, a wealthier household w has asset
stock at Abw while a poor household p has asset stock at Abp. If there are no shocks,
asset stocks of both households will follow the dash lines and finally converge. In
the wake of the shock, the rich household and the poor household are left with
asset stocks Asw and Asp, respectively. In this case the asset stock level of the poor
household falls below the poverty trap threshold A. The shock may also reduce the
current income by an amount of ε. Consequently, a poor household with less ability
to cope with the shock will be unable to accumulate assets and thus remain in the
poverty trap, while a wealthier household can recover to the normal path of asset
stock.
Figure 3.1: Assets shocks and poverty traps.
Source:Carter et al. (2007)
Empirical studies have been conducted using various approaches and for various
countries. For example, Carter & Lybbert (2012) show that low-income households
in Burkina Faso smoothed their asset, but not their consumption, in response to
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weather shocks, and then fell into poverty traps. This result is similar to the find-
ings of Kazianga & Udry (2006). They find little evidence of consumption smooth-
ing. The analysis shows that there is almost no mechanism for sharing risk, and
households have to adjust grain stocks in order to smooth out consumption fluctua-
tions. Their research concludes that consumption smoothing in Burkina Faso is far
from complete smoothing. A cross-sectional study of Knight et al. (2015) reveals
that health shocks (death or serious illness) and economic shocks (unexpected price
increments for basic necessities) are among the most common shock types for house-
holds in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. To cope with shocks, most households adopt
behaviour-based coping strategies such as reduced consumption and spending, and
other changes to work or living arrangement while assistance-based and asset-based
strategies are limited. The fact that households are not able to smooth their con-
sumption directly affect children’s nutrition intake and potentially results in their
long term developmenal and eductional progress.
Similar research has been done in Britain (Scott & Walker 2012). The authors ex-
amine the interwar strategies that working-class British households used to smooth
consumption over time, and to guard against negative contingencies such as ill-
ness, unemployment, and death. They find that “households made extensive use
of expenditure-smoothing devices. Families’ reliance on expenditure-smoothing is
shown to be inversely related to household income, while the family life cycle, es-
pecially the years immediately after new household formation.” Other research con-
ducted for a developed country is the work of James et al. (2007). The authors merge
U.S. data from over 20 cross-section surveys based on nearly identically-worded ques-
tionnaires, and collect more than 32,000 working-class families interviewed between
1879 and 1909. They decompose annual income into permanent and transitory
components for each worker in the sample. Their analytical results present strong
evidence that working class American households used their own savings to smooth
consumption in the face of volatile incomes before social insurance.
Gerry & Li (2008) apply a bootstrapped quintile regression to the Russian Longitu-
dinal Monitoring Survey data to investigate how individuals cope with fluctuations
in consumption. Their results indicate that small households residing in urban ar-
eas with married and educated heads are more capable of smoothing consumption.
They show that the labor market is an important channel because it not only allows
households to smooth their consumption but also exposes them to job loss risk. Both
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transfers from relatives or friends, and home production can be viewed as important
coping strategies for the most vulnerable.
Skoufias (2004) uses a panel of households in Bulgaria with monthly data collected in
1994 to investigate the extent to which households are able to smooth their consump-
tion from income fluctuations. This analysis shows that only a part of consumption
is maintained against idiosyncratic risks to income. In most situations, households
choose to adjust their non-food expenditures and to borrow from credit markets.
This study also indicates that inter-household transfers have limited impact on pro-
tecting consumption. Fluctuations in food prices have a larger influence on food
consumption than fluctuations in household income. Similar research was done by
the same author in the context of Russia (Skoufias 2003).
Using a panel data for Indonesia, Gertler & Gruber (2002) demonstrate that major
illness induces significant economic costs, and is associated with the fall in consump-
tion. Similarly, Gertler et al. (2009) prove that micro-financial savings and lending
institutions can help Indonesian families smooth consumption after a major illness.
Jalan & Ravallion (1999) observe, unsurprisingly, that wealthier Chinese households
are better able to insure consumption against income shocks. Studies by Rosenzweig
& Wolpin (1993) and Fafchamps et al. (1998) find that the sale of stocks can help
insure consumption. Empirical results across countries also advocate that house-
holds find it difficult to cope with all income shocks, especially those with low assets
(Harrower & Hoddinott 2004, Skoufias & Quisumbing 2005).
VEU and coping strategies in Vietnam
Only a few papers use VEU to estimate vulnerability in Vietnam, but a number
of studies explore risks and household responses to risks. Unfortunately, there is
no paper combining vulnerability estimation and coping strategies analysis, even
though these two issues are highly correlated.
Tran (2014) uses data in three provinces collected in 2007, 2008 and 2010 in Vietnam
with a discrete time proportional hazard model to examine which household groups
recover quickly from negative shock and the effectiveness of coping strategies on the
recovery. The author demonstrates that natural disasters and crop losses are the
major shocks for rural households but business and health shocks bring more losses
and are harder to recover. Shocks cause more adverse effects on poor households
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because their livelihoods are more dependent on natural conditions, their assets are
more exposed to shocks, and their asset stocks are too small to stay stable when
shocks occur. The author notes that a households physical assets have positive
effects on the recovery, but a households human capital has weak or insignificant
effects on the recovery.
Tuyen (2013) investigates the relationship between farmland loss (due to urban-
ization and industrialization) and households’ livelihood strategies in a sub-urban
district of Hanoi, Vietnam. The results provide evidence that land loss is associated
with a higher probability of adopting a single nonfarm activity, such as informal
paid jobs or household businesses. The adaption helps mitigate their dependence on
farmland and help improve their welfare.
Montalbano & Magrini (2012) estimate vulnerability from trade openness using two
different sets of Vietnamese household surveys (VLSS and VHLSS) in the period of
1992-2008. The empirical results prove that vulnerability to poverty had a decreasing
trend in this period, along with the decreasing trend of poverty. An adjusted VEU
estimation shows that the share of poverty component of vulnerability reduced, but
the share of risks increased, especially in trade related sectors. The authors assert
that trade openness induced vulnerability.
Wainwright & Newman (2011) use household level panel data in three rural provinces
from Vietnam to examine household’s smooth consumption overtime, and how this
depends on the presence of insurance and saving instruments. In general, they find
that households deplete their stock of liquid assets when they are exposed to either
covariate or idiosyncratic income shocks. The ability to cope with covariate shocks
depends on their receipt of public and private transfers. The ability to cope with
insurable idiosyncratic income shocks depends on insurance claims serving to reduce
the disposal of livestock holdings. The authors suggest that household savings in the
form of cash and gold have an important role in consumption smoothing in the event
of idiosyncratic shocks. Borrowing is increased in both covariate and idiosyncratic
shocks, especially for wealthier households. The analysis also confirms the role of
the insurance market and the need to improve the activities of this market.
Hasegawa (2010) examines risk-coping strategies against various types of shocks
using the Vietnamese Household Living Standard Survey in 2002 and 2004. The
results suggest that productive fixed assets such as perennial crops, gardens and
aqua-culture farms are disposed due to medical shocks, while non-productive liquid
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assets such as bicycles, radios/cassettes and furniture are used in coping with income
shocks or food-lack shocks. As the non-productive liquid assets can easily be sold,
they are considered as precautionary savings for income shocks in farm households.
This types of precautionary saving might be encouraged by the lack of financial insti-
tutions in rural areas, distrust of currency and high economic growth. Hence, health
shocks might be more catastrophic than income shocks because loss of productive
assets will seriously ruin a household’s economy in the long run. However, neither
monetary saving nor gold are utilized forms of coping with risks in farm households.
Other studies exploring poverty dynamic and vulnerability in Vietnam include Giang
& Pfau (2009), Povel (2010), Imai et al. (2011) and especially studies from the project
‘Impact of shocks on the vulnerability to poverty: Consequences for development of
emerging Southeast Asian economies’ by the German Research Foundation with its
many contributing authors (Klasen & Waibel 2010).
3.3 Overview of the risks and coping strategies in
Vietnam
This section summarizes the causes and consequences of common idiosyncratic and
covariate shocks in Vietnam. Major information comes from a Vietnam development
report of World Bank (1999). The findings in that report was based on the first
and the second large scale household surveys in Vietnam (VLSS93 and VLSS98)
implemented by the World Bank, as well as Participatory Poverty Assessments across
regions undertaken by Oxfam and Action Aid Vietnam. The actual level of shocks
and their consequences might be different now, but the pattern is very similar.
Idiosyncratic shocks
A chronic illness or death of a household member is one of the most common causes of
households’ extreme hardship. The cost of treatment is relatively much higher for the
poor, especially when they have to go beyond the commune health center to receive
treatment for a serious illness. On average, an individual in the poorest quantile has
to pay 22 per cent of his/her annual nonfood expenditure for one remedial visit to a
public hospital, while the equivalent figure for an individual in the richest quantile
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is only about 5 per cent. The VLSS98 data shows that households in the lowest
quantile spent 30 per cent of their nonfood expenditure on healthcare services and the
opportunity cost due to poor health was around 25 per cent of their annual per capita
consumption expenditure. Newly formed households are particularly vulnerable to
the health problems (World Bank 1999).
The risk of failure can discourage households from investment which could have
expanded the sources of income and reduced vulnerability in the future. In a typical
case, households take a loan to invest in new production activities. However, if the
investment is not successful, households have to compensate for the income deficit
by other means, such as taking another loan, or selling assets, and their wellbeing
would consequently deteriorate. Unfortunately, available options to diversify the
farming activities in rural Vietnam also carry risk of failure: livestock is susceptible
to disease and theft; crops are sensitive to bad weather and vermin; fruit trees and
coffee trees can be ruined by frost in the highland areas; and farming profit can
fluctuate rapidly and wildly, along with market conditions (World Bank 1999).
The risk can be reduced by better extension services and veterinary services. How-
ever, poorer households with less education often find it difficult to approach these
types of services. An analysis of VLSS98 reveals that just only about 9 per cent
of rural households in the lowest quantile reside in a commune with an agricultural
extension agent. The problem is more serious in the case of highland areas which
have limited access to many types of agriculture services (World Bank 1999).
Covariate shocks
In the rural villages of Vietnam, economic shocks and crises occur in two major forms:
Loss of crops as a result of drought, flood, storms, wind damage, landslides and pest
damage; and loss of livestock owing to epidemics. In urban areas, households also
face fluctuations in the labor market (World Bank 1999).
The Vietnam National Committee for the International Decade for Natural Disaster
Reduction (VNCIDNDR) has estimated the respective frequency of floods and ty-
phoons as high and droughts as medium. On average, the Vietnams coast annually
experiences four to six typhoons, which predominantly affect the center and north
of the country (VNCIDNDR 1994). This phenomenon explains the slower growth in
the Central and Northern provinces. An official document in 1992 reported that 62
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per cent of the population and 44 per cent of the country were regularly influenced
by typhoons, with around 250 persons killed each year (Vietnam MWR and UNDP
1992)3
Livestock accounts for an important part of household assets, so livestock death and
disease are considered as main factors leading to poverty. A common report appear
in the Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) in different rural provinces is that:
“when your buffalo dies, it may take you as long as five years for the household to
recover” (Action Aid Vietnam 1999).
The slowdown in national and regional economic growth due to macroeconomic
shocks, seems to have a limited effect on rural households because they earn little
income from the farm. However, urbyan households notice the remittances falling
immediately, and unskilled labor find it harder to have a job due to the cutbacks of
local enterprises (Bond 1999).
Coping strategies
According to the results of the Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPA)4 reported
in World Bank (1999), in general, for poor households the first coping strategy is to
search for help from their family, friends, neighbors. Next, some program from local
communes might be of help. Households’ coping strategies can be arranged in order
such as: borrowing money or food, reducing expenditure (suffering illness at home
or talking children out of school), searching for jobs (even for children), and selling
assets (cattle or land).
Borrowing money or food is one of the most common ways to cope with a sudden
drop in household properties. The borrowing is mainly from the informal sector
because loans from the formal sector are not readily available to the poor and the
procedures are too complicated to make funds available quickly. The easiest way for
poor households to cope in troubled times is to reduce consumption and living with
3In the period from 1971 to 1994, more than six million tons of rice production was lost
due to flood and typhoon damage in Vietnam (Benson, 1997). In five years from 2002-
2006, natural disasters killed 1,700 people and caused losses estimated at VND 75,000 bil-
lion of assets. More on the impact of natural disasters can be found in National Strategy of
Natural Disaster Prevention, Response and Mitigation by 2020, which can be downloaded at
http://www.isgmard.org.vn/NationalPrograms.asp.
4Four provinces chosen to implement PPA were Ho Chi Minh City, Tra Vinh, Ha Tinh, Lao
Cai.
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ill-health. For example, they reduce the number, size and quality of daily meals.
People can also be found to be living with ill-health in order to avoid the cost if
consultations and treatment.
Poor households in Vietnam often shift labor from agricultural tasks to cash-earning
tasks to respond to negative shocks affecting well-being. Day labor is the major
source of cash for poor households, but the demand for labor is seasonal and un-
stable. Poor households have additional incentive to pull children out of school in
order to supplement labor deficiency. Child labor not only results in more cash (by
working for cash or helping adult labor with household chores) but it also reduces
the costs of fees, books, pens as well as other contributions to student insurance and
school construction funds. For primary production laborers in the case where they
cannot find a job, migration to other places is another solution. Households then
immediately reduce food intake and depend largely on the remittances sent back.
In fact, some regions have very high percentages of either temporary or permanent
migrant workers.
Households with livestock or land have to sell these assets in times of hardship. In
urban areas, households tend to sell their houses if they own one. Cash savings have
a trivial role in coping with shocks since the facilities for saving cash are not popular
in rural areas, and thus households habitually keep livestock as a form of saving.
Some very poor households turn to common property as a last resort. For example,
they cut wood from forests to make extra money.
At the same time, the formal safety net has low coverage and is only partly targeted,
while the formal financial sector is underdeveloped so that households cannot save
or borrow money easily. In the case of household specific shocks, the community can
help to some extent, but as poor households frequently reside in poor communities,
the amount of financial assistance from friends, relatives and other informal networks
is very limited. Consequently, households have to depend mainly on their own
resources to cope with unexpected shocks.
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3.4 Data and analytical framework
Vietnam Access to Resources Household Surveys (VARHS)
Data for this empirical analysis is extracted from four waves of Vietnam Access to
Resources Household Survey (VARHS) implemented in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012.
The VARHSs are longitudinal datasets which have been collected biannually by the
University of Copenhagen (Denmark) in collaboration with the Central Institute
of Economic Management (CIEM), the Institute for Labor Studies and Social Af-
fairs (ILSSA), and the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural
Development (IPSARD).
These surveys were conducted in rural areas of 12 provinces5 of Vietnam in the
summer of each year, creating a balanced panel of 2,045 households spread across 161
districts and 456 communes. They were all carried out during the same three-month
period each year to maintain consistency and to facilitate appropriate comparisons
over time. The VARHS investigates several issues relating to access to resources
of Vietnamese rural households as well as the obstacles to improve their livelihood
situation. Together with detailed demographic information on household members,
the surveys contain questions on household assets, savings, credit (both formal and
informal), formal insurance, shocks and risk response, informal safety nets and the
networks of social capital (Wainwright & Newman 2011). There is also various
information on communes where the households were living at the time they were
surveyed.
There are approximately 3,000 households in each survey, of which around 2,000
households were interviewed repeatedly in all four surveys. However, after investi-
gating outliers6, checking missing data and matching household data with commune
5They are evenly distributed throughout Vietnam, in seven out of eight regions, with Ha Tay in
Red River Delta; Lao Cai and Phu Tho in Northeast; Lai Chau and Dien Bien in Northwest; Nghe
An in North Central Coast; Quang Nam and Khanh Hoa in South Central Coast; Dac Lac, Dac
Nong and Lam Dong in Central Highland; and Long An in Mekong River Delta. These provinces
represent the regional climate and geography throughout the country. However, while the sample
is statistically representative at the provincial, it is not so at the national level (Markussen et al.
2012)
6We follow Deaton (1997) to investigate outliers that do not relate to the main body of the data.
Specifically, we drop all households with total income less than or equal to zero. We also eliminate
households with total income higher than 200 thousand VND (2006); 300 (2008); 400 (2010); 500
(2012). These levels are simply too high for even average households in urban areas.
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data, we have a balanced panel containing 1,215 households over four surveys, cre-
ating 4860 observations7. A brief description of the explanatory variables used in
this analysis is provided in Table B.1 of Appendix B.
That the number of households in the panel is much smaller than in a single survey
is a cause for concern for sample attrition or selection bias. Therefore, we check the
presence of attrition bias by comparing the mean of the main variables of dropped
samples with that of the final panel data (Sparrow et al. 2012), or compare the
means of variables between full sample and the panel (Jha et al. 2013) and confirm
that households were randomly excluded from the final panel data set and that this
does not lead to a selection biased problem.
Vulnerability as expected utility (VEU)
Ligon & Schechter (2003) define vulnerability as the variation between the utility
derived from a certainty-equivalent consumption (zce) at and above which the house-
hold would not be considered vulnerable and the expected utility of consumption.
This certainty-equivalent consumption is similar to the poverty line. Consumption
of household (ci) has a distribution that illustrates different states of the world, so
the form of vulnerability measure is given below:
Vi = Ui(zce)− EUi(ci) (3.1)
where Ui is a weakly concave, strictly increasing function. The equation can be
rewritten as:
Vi = [Ui(zce)− Ui(Eci)] + [Ui(Eci)− EUi(ci)] (3.2)
The first bracketed term is the variation between utility at zce and utility at expected
consumption (ci) of household i. The second term captures the risk (both covariate
and idiosyncratic risks) faced by household i. It can be decomposed as shown below:
Vi = [Ui(zce)− Ui(Eci)] [Poverty or inequality]
+[Ui(Eci)− EUi(E(ci|xt))] [Covariate or aggregate risk]
+[EUi(E(ci|xt))− EUi(ci)] [Idiosyncratic risk]
(3.3)
7A large number of households are dropped because we could not match them with commune
data. This is a common issues when matching household data with the spatially referenced data
(Hoddinott & Quisumbing 2003a)
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where E(ci|xt) is the commune expected value of consumption, conditional on a
vector of covariant variables (xt).
The authors take unexplained risk and measurement error out of idiosyncratic risk
and assume that the poverty line (z) is the mean consumption. So Equation 3.3 can
be rewritten as:
Vi = [Ui(zce)− Ui(Eci)] [Poverty or inequality]
+[Ui(Eci)− EUi(E(ci|xt))] [Covariate or aggregate risk]
+[EUi(E(ci|xt))− EUi(ci|xt, xit)] [Idiosyncratic risk]
+[EUi(ci|xt, xit)− EUi(ci)] [Unexplained risk and measurement error]
(3.4)
where E(ci|xt, xit) is the household expected value of consumption, conditional on a
vector of covariant variables (xt) and household’s characteristics (xit).
Ligon & Schechter (2003) normalize the expenditure and income per capita so that
the average expenditure and income per capita over all households in all periods
becomes unity, and therefore z in the above equation equals one. Thus, households
do not have vulnerability if resources are distributed in a way that households receive
the expected consumption expenditure with certainty.
This VEU approach is useful because it reveals the contribution of each major factor
on household vulnerability to poverty. However, it needs a panel data and the result
may be sensitive to the function form of utility and the utility measurement8.
Ligon and Schechter (2003) propose a particular form for utility:
U(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ (3.5)
Where γ is household coefficient on relative risk aversion or household sensitivity to
risk and inequality. From the empirical literature, γ=2 is a good approximation of
this measure.
Components of Equation 3.4 can be estimated by applying restricted least squares
for expected consumption and then substituting each of them into utility function
8Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003b) agrue that the relative components of the decomposition are
not likely to be affected by function even though the results may be.
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3.5:
Ecit =
1
T
T∑
t=1
cit (3.6)
E(cit|X¯t) = αi + ηt (3.7)
E(cit|X¯t, Xit) = αi + ηt + βXit (3.8)
where αi capture the effect of household fixed characteristics; ηt capture the impact
of changes in covariates or aggregates which are the same across households; and β
reflects effects of household characteristics or other observable factors on consump-
tion.
In Equation 3.8, the income variable may be endogenous if it is treated as an ex-
planatory variable for consumption because there may be a feedback relationship
between income and consumption. Therefore, we employ the instrumental variable
(IV) estimation for Equation 3.8 in which income is perceived as an endogenous
variable.
Choice of coping strategies to respond to risks
Once we have estimated and decomposed vulnerability, we extend the analysis by
investigating household response to shocks. For that purpose, the multivariate pro-
bit model is utilized due to the fact that households can choose various coping
instruments simultaneously when they confront shocks, and the model allows for a
correlation among choices.
According to Cappellari & Jenkins (2003), the multivariate probit model can be
described as below:
R∗im = βmXim + εim (3.9)
where εim, m = 1,...,M are error terms distributed as multivariate normal, each
with a mean zero, and variance-covariance matrix V , where V has values of 1 on
the leading diagonal and correlations ρjk = ρkj as off diagonal elements (Cappellari
& Jenkins 2003). Next, Rim represents outcomes for M different choices of coping
strategies at the same point in time. Thus, Rim = 1 if R
∗
im > 0, and 0 otherwise.
And Xim represents a household’s characteristics.
Note that the use of coping strategies depends not only on household characteristics,
but also on the types of risks which a household encounters. Therefore, the model
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includes a vector of dummy variables representing shocks. In the case of Vietnam,
these shocks are: (i) natural disasters (typhoons, droughts), and epidemics (pest
infestation and crop disease); and (ii) health problems (serious illness, injury or
death of household members). Other shocks with a minor incidence include a change
in crop prices or input prices, unemployment, unsuccessful investment, loss of land,
robbery or theft, and family disputes (VARHS data).
The household coping strategies in Vietnam can be classified into six categories: (i)
saving; (ii) program (from government or NGO); (iii) borrow/transfer (from bank or
other, assistance from relative or friend); (iv) capital depletion (sold land, sold asset,
sold livestock); (v) reduced consumption and (vi) other (worked more, took children
out of school, received an insurance payment, postponed investment or payment,
and other)
Effectiveness of existing insurance schemes on consumption
Full insurance implies that household-level consumption should be perfectly corre-
lated with aggregate consumption but uncorrelated with household level changes
in income (Nelson 1994). Theoretically, households can make an effort to choose
their ex ante and ex post responses through formal and informal risk management
instruments. However, the quality of an existing mechanism will determine the size
of consumption smoothing. Hence, to estimate the effectiveness of a current in-
surance mechanism, we examine the extent to which households can smooth their
consumption to cope with shocks by the following specification:
∆lncivt = φ+ γ∆lnyivt + ψ∆(lnyvt) + δXivt + ∆εivt (3.10)
where ∆lncivt and ∆lnyivt represent the growth rate of household consumption and
income respectively; ∆(lnyvt) denotes the growth rate of average community (or
village) income and it is treated as a proxy of covariate shocks (Townsend 1994);
and ∆εivt is a household-specific error term including variations in the unobservable
components of household preferences.
Using this empirical specification, we assume that change in household income is a
proxy for all the idiosyncratic shocks experienced by the household. Under conditions
of complete consumption smoothing, we would expect changes in income have no
effect on consumption. The coefficient on income change γ should therefore be
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zero. Thus, the higher value of γ is evidence of insufficient consumption insurance
against income risks (Harrower & Hoddinott 2004, Skoufias 2003, 2004, Skoufias &
Quisumbing 2005).
The estimate of ψ which has been used in empirical literature indicates whether
partial insurance and risk-sharing takes place among households within the same
community. If the growth rate in average community income has a significant in-
fluence on the growth rate of household consumption (i.e., ψ 6= 0), we can admit
the hypothesis that some risk sharing is present within communities. There is only
food consumption spending in our data sets, but neither total consumption nor
non-food consumption, so we use it as the dependent variable in the empirical es-
timation. In the literature, food consumption is often used as a measure of welfare
in regions where a considerable fraction of the population allocates more than three
quarters of their expenditure for food (Deaton 1997). In such regions, it is antic-
ipated that households maintain their consumption expenditure at a conservative
level. This explains why food expenditure is less likely to be correlated simultane-
ously with income than other parts of consumption expenditure. In Vietnam, an
average household uses up 53 per cent of total expenditure for food (Hoang 2009)
and this high share suggest that households are more likely to maintain their food
consumption against the negative shocks.
3.5 Econometric results and discussion
Vulnerability as expected utility (VEU)
The results of the consumption estimation in Equation 3.7 are presented in Table
3.1. From this table, it is clear that communes with a higher population might have
higher food consumption because there must be more purchasing activities or more
food shops (even small shops). The positive and significant coefficient of a regular
market probably supports this explanation. If a commune has a regular market,
its average food consumption will increase. In contrast, the estimated coefficients of
poverty rate and distance to a bus station are significantly negative. This implies that
if a commune has a higher level of poverty or more difficulty in getting to transport,
it will face a lower than average level of food consumption. Surprisingly, having a
secondary school in the commune might reduce its level of food consumption as the
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Table 3.1: Covariate risk component (Panel random effect)
Variable Per capita food consumption
totalhousehold 0.0000436
(2.26)**
targetcommune 0.0195943
(1.00)
povertyrate -0.5555182
(-6.68)***
regularmarket 0.0760658
(3.07)***
secondaryschool -0.0676216
(-1.65)*
distance2bus -0.0008778
(-5.81)***
cons 0.9691212
(13.08)***
Number of observations 4848
Number of groups 1215
Join significance Wald chi2(6)=164.55
Prob>chi2=0.0000
Hausman test: fixed vs random effect* chi2(6)=24.53
Prob>chi2=0.0004
Notes: p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard error adjusted for 1215
clusters. Robust z statistics in parentheses.
* The Hausman test supports the use of fixed effect regression. However,
according to Clark & Linzer (2014), when the independent variable ex-
hibits only minimal within-unit variation, the random-effects model will
tend to produce superior estimates of β when there are few units or ob-
servations per unit, and when the correlation between the independent
variable and unit effects is relatively low. An increase in efficiency can
offset an increase in bias.
coefficient is significant and negative. In the case of Vietnam, having a primary and
secondary school in a rural commune is nationally common, so the effect of school
on the commune consumption might depend on other types of school which are not
available in the data set.
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Table 3.2 provides the results from the panel IV estimation for Equation 3.8. Since
some explanatory variables are time-invariant we can only use a random effect re-
gression9. In the first stage, total land area owned by a household and per capita
of productive assets (including feed grinding machine, rice milling machine, grain
harvesting machine, tractor and plough) are used as instruments for income. It
is reasonable that these variables firstly affect income, and then indirectly affect
consumption. These instruments for income are also specified in Gaiha & Imai
(2008),Jha et al. (2010) and Jha et al. (2013). The Hansen-Sargan statistic of over-
identification test shown in Table 3.2 indicates that the instruments used in this
situation are valid.
Results in the first stage estimation show strong evidence of a relationship between
productive assets and household income. Similarly, having more land increases
household income as expected. Other household characteristics also contribute to
the level of household income. For example, a household with an older head tends to
have a higher income. The negative sign of the head age squared coefficient implies
that the marginal effect of age on income will reduce as the head becomes older. If
the head is married or any household member has experienced a better education,
then household income tends to increase. However, a household with a higher share
of females or dependents will face a lower level of per capita income. Also, if a
household has income from only agriculture, it might receive a lower income.
As can be seen from Table 3.2, in the second stage, the income coefficient is highly
significant and positive. This result suggests that per capita income largely deter-
mines household food consumption. The marital status of the household head and
the education level of household members affect household food consumption pos-
itively, while having dependents and agriculture as the only source of income are
factors that reduce food consumption. Living in a more populated area contributes
slightly to a higher level of household food consumption. In addition, when house-
holds reside in a commune with a regular market or a short distance to a bus station,
their food consumption may increase.
The results obtained from Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.8 are used to deriveE(cit| ¯(Xt))
and E(cit| ¯(Xt), Xit). We then calculate the mean of normalized food consumption
to obtain Ecit as shown in Equation 3.6. Finally, we use the utility function 3.5 to
9The random effect regression has been used previously to calculate VEU in Gaiha & Imai
(2008) and Jha et al. (2010).
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Table 3.2: Idiosyncratic risk component (Panel random effect IV model)
Variable First stage Second stage
(pc income) (pc consumption)
ntotalincome 0.3308974
(7.61)***
headage 0.0217744 0.0097173
(2.78)*** (1.56)
married 0.2259467 0.1453146
(6.31)*** (4.80)***
headage2 -0.000179 -0.0000767
(-2.52)** (-1.36)
femaleshare -0.156438 -0.0601291
(-2.29)** (-1.10)
dependshare -0.2691709 -0.1019256
(-4.79)*** (-2.21)**
highestedu 0.1140928 0.0557627
(8.58)*** (4.86)***
agrhh -0.0959593 -0.1819714
(-3.35)*** (-8.13)***
totalhousehold 0.0000172 0.0000368
(1.17) (3.19)***
targetcommune 0.0977055 -0.003703
(4.05)*** (-0.19)
povertyrate -1.344953 -0.1215578
(-15.02)*** (-1.33)
regularmarket 0.0275375 0.0451281
(1.02) (2.13)**
secondaryschool -0.1165961 -0.0167442
(-2.89)*** (-0.52)
distance2bus -0.0010388 -0.0004843
(-5.26)*** (-3.03)***
totalland 0.0894654
(14.73)***
productiveasset 0.9205927
(9.02)***
cons 0.3520787 0.1937129
(1.50) (1.04)
Number of observations 4841 4841
Join significance Wald chi(15)=984 Wald chi2(14)=639.16
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Hausman test: fixed vs random effect Wald chi2(11)=23.07
Prob>chi2=0.0173
Sargan-Hansen test for Chi2(1)=0.667
over-identification restriction Prob>chi2=0.4141
Notes: p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses.
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Table 3.3: Decomposition of average vulnerability
VEU Poverty Covariate risk Idiosyncratic risk Unexplained risk
0.7141 0.2566 -0.1883 0.3591 0.2864
Source: Author’s calculation from VARHS 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012.
estimate four components of Equation 3.4. Household VEU is the sum of four sep-
arate components. The aggregate VEU and its components are presented in Table
3.3. The estimate of average VEU (0.7141) is our estimate of the vulnerability of
all households. This implies that the utility of the average household in our sample
is approximately 71 per cent less than the hypothetical situation in which resources
could be redistributed so as to eliminate all inequality and risk in consumption. This
level of utility vulnerability is lower than the estimation of Gaiha & Imai (2008)
which is 0.7476, but much higher than the estimation of Ligon & Schechter (2003)
and Jha et al. (2013) which are around 0.1972 and 0.3016, respectively. The most
serious shocks that contribute to household vulnerability are idiosyncratic shocks
(approximately 50 per cent). However, the negative sign of the aggregate risk com-
ponent indicates that economic growth cancels out the negative covariate shocks and
even reduces the vulnerability. We may argue that the utility loss would be more
serious if there had been less economic growth in rural Vietnam during the period
of 2006-2012.
Choice of coping strategies to respond to risks
Table 3.4 reports the results for the multivariate probit model used to investigate
the choice of household coping strategy. The independent variable is the household’s
choice of coping strategy. The explained variables in the model are the same as in
Table 3.2. The Huber-White sandwich estimator is used to overcome heteroskedas-
ticity. The likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that the correlation among
choices is zero, and therefore confirms that the use of the multivariate probit model
is more efficient than separate probit estimations for each choice of coping strategies.
Vietnamese rural households facing natural disasters and health problems tend to
withdraw money from their own savings because the estimated coefficients are signif-
icantly positive. Similar results show that households depend even more heavily on
programs of government or non-governmental organizations to recover from health
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problems and natural disasters such as floods, droughts and typhoons. Only the
health problem coefficient has a significantly positive impact on the act of borrow-
ing money from others. Health problems, including serious illness, injury or death of
a household member, probably seem to be a legitimate reason for asking money from
relatives or friends. Households rarely sell assets such as land and livestock to cope
with negative shocks. The probability of this strategy is even affected negatively by
natural disasters and other shocks such as increasing food prices, investment loss,
land loss or crime. This is probably because these types of shocks deteriorate house-
hold assets. The probability of reducing consumption increases in the case of natural
disasters or other shocks, but it decreases if households suffer livestock disease and
health problems. Other coping instruments such as taking children out of school and
forcing them to work, or postponing investment, are used frequently. Unfortunately,
these types of coping instruments, along with food consumption reduction, can be
considered as sorts of capital depletion. Therefore, they might generate a negative
long term effect on household welfare which is similar to the consequences of capital
depletion.
When households suffered from natural disasters they use various types of coping
strategies, with the exception of borrowing money, but they tend to depend on sub-
sidy programs to recover. Assistance from friends and relatives is rare and difficult
because others may be experiencing the same hardships. Evidence of limited use of
money borrowing as a coping strategy also shows the ineffectiveness of the financial
system in rural Vietnam. With health problems, households use almost all the cop-
ing strategies they have, but the most often used instrument comes from relatives
and friends. This fact also implies that health problems may be one of the most
serious shocks to households in rural Vietnam. With other types of shock, reducing
consumption seems to be the only way available for households to manage their risks.
Effectiveness of existing insurance schemes on consumption
Table 3.5 provides the estimate for the measure of insurance in which the instrumen-
tal variable (IV) technique is used. In this case, the variation of household income
is considered as endogenous and is represented by the productive asset and the ratio
of working members on total household members. The average community income
is the mean income of all households living in the same commune. The upper panel
of Table 3.5 presents the results of the first stage estimation of IV estimation and
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Table 3.4: Multivariate probit model: Household coping strategy (shock variables: total number)
HH coping Saving Program Borrow Capital Reduce Others
strategies or Transfer depletion consumption
Natural 0.1829 0.7094 0.0888 -0.3252 0.1744 0.1017
disaster (3.92)*** (7.45)*** (1.58) (-4.89)*** (4.68)*** (1.83)*
Livestock -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0004 0.0015 -0.0049 0.0098
diseases (-0.62) (-0.26) (-0.14) (0.41) (-2.29)** (3.38)***
Health 0.3787 0.5333 1.0847 0.00002 -0.2909 0.7430
problem (6.21)*** (4.26)*** (17.86)*** (0.00) (-5.54)*** (11.53)***
Other -0.1319 -0.1872 -0.0854 -0.3759 0.3479 0.0717
shocks (-2.21)** (-1.09) (-1.20) (-4.60)*** (7.98)*** (1.12)
Observation 6886
Wald chi2(102) 1351.94
Prob >chi2 0.0000
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses.
the lower panel shows the second stage estimation. The results of the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test for endogeneity and over-identification test endorse the application of
the IV estimation and instrumental variables.
As discussed earlier, under the condition of complete consumption insurance we
would expect changes in income to have no effect on consumption. Therefore, the
coefficient on income changes should be zero, after controlling for covariate shocks
(Skoufias 2003). Table 3.5 shows that the coefficient, or elasticity of changes in con-
sumption given income shocks, while statistically significant, is 0.59. That means
household income shocks are considerably covariate with household consumption,
suggesting that even though households depend heavily on informal risk coping
strategies, those instruments employed by households are not effective enough.
According to Deaton (1997), Ravallion & Chaudhuri (1997) and Skoufias & Quisumb-
ing (2005), in a completely autarkical world, where pooling of resources and risk
sharing does not exist, the growth rate of the average community income should
have no influence on the growth rate of household consumption. In contrast, if some
risk sharing is found within communities, the coefficient of the growth rate of aver-
age community income would be non-zero and statistically significant. Our results
show that the negative and significant coefficient estimate (-0.44) in the variation of
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average community income indicates that there is no risk sharing mechanism within
communities. These results confirm the previous findings of Eozenou (2008).
3.6 Policy implications and conclusion
Vulnerability as an ex ante estimation of poverty is generated by various shocks.
Therefore, understanding sources of vulnerability, the existing coping strategies and
the effectiveness of the current insurance system are desirable for poverty allevi-
ation policies. Using a unique panel data set extracted from Vietnam Access to
Resources Household Surveys (VARHS) in 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012, this paper
has analyzed vulnerability as low expected utility and response to shocks of rural
households in Vietnam. We first adopted the approach of Ligon & Schechter (2003)
to measure vulnerability as low expected utility (VEU) and then decomposed the
sources of vulnerability. Second, we applied the multivariate probit model to inves-
tigate household responses to shocks. Finally, we looked into the effectiveness of the
existing risk management mechanism.
Our main findings are that, (i) the utility of the average household is 71 per cent less
than the hypothetical situation without any risk or inequality in consumption, and
idiosyncratic shocks contribute 50 per cent of the loss; (ii) to overcome the negative
impact of shocks, most households depend on informal coping strategies such as food
consumption reduction, savings withdrawal, taking children out of school or capital
depletion. Households can have assistance through transfer from relatives or friends
in the case of having health problems. Borrowing money from formal institutions
is limited, while subsidies from the government or NGOs are available only in cases
of natural disaster; and (iii) household consumption and household income exhibit
highly correlated variation, implying that existing informal insurance schemes are
not effective enough.
This study provides evidence of the need for designing strong safety nets in rural Viet-
nam. The limited availability of government programs as a coping strategy suggests
an expansion of this type of formal assistance would reduce household vulnerability.
Also, formal financial institutions located in rural areas should be encouraged. The
impact of participation in social groups on access to credit need to be examined
so that we can discover an effective mechanism to reduce the negative impacts of
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Table 3.5: Measure of consumption insurance (IV estimation)
First stage Second stage
(∆pc income) (∆pc food consumption)
∆pcincome 0.5900
(2.89)***
∆comincome 0.7219 -0.4421
(30.68)*** (-2.92)***
headage -0.0053 -0.0004
(-0.74) (-0.04)
married -0.0485 0.0318
(-1.52) (0.79)
headage2 0.00002 0.00001
(0.35) (0.18)
femaleshare -0.0434 0.0912
(-0.71) (1.18)
dependshare -0.0312 -0.0510
(-0.58) (-0.75)
highestedu -0.0037 0.0174
(-0.31) (1.17)
agrhh -0.0428 -0.0921
(-1.67)* (-2.89)***
totalhousehold -0.00003 0.00001
(-2.35)** (0.79)
targetcommune 0.0296 -0.0170
(1.36) (-0.61)
povertyrate -0.5175 0.4089
(-5.93)*** (2.72)***
regularmarket -0.0442 0.0042
(-1.81)* (0.13)
secondaryschool 0.0277 -0.0386
(0.75) (-0.83)
distance2bus -0.0005 0.0005
(-0.69) (0.60)
productiveasset 0.3007
(3.32)***
laborshare 0.2476
(5.00)***
cons 0.3337 0.0565
(1.55) (0.20)
Number of observations 3623 3623
Join significance Wald chi(16)=1099 Wald chi2(14)=32.26
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0059
Hausman test: fixed vs random effect
Sargan-Hansen test Chi2(1)=0.458
for overidentification restriction
Prob>chi2=0.4987
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses.
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shocks. In addition, targeted interventions should take into account the household
idiosyncratic shocks which seriously affect household vulnerability. Health problems
as a special form of shocks seem to be the overriding concern of rural households as
they try various coping strategies. This finding suggests that social health insurance
for rural households would improve their utility. Ultimately, intervention programs
should find ways to reduce capital depletion in rural households. This would not
only help households to overcome their hardships in the short run, but would also
sustain their welfare in the long run.
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Chapter 4
Risk aversion and the impact of
health insurance on household
vulnerability: New evidence from
rural Vietnam
4.1 Introduction
One of the worst shocks to households is a serious illness of one of its members. This
has a negative and significant effect on consumption and income. Illness raises two
important economic costs: the cost of medical care and income loss due to reduced
labor supply. The unpredictable nature of these two costs makes households unable
to smooth their consumption over periods of major illness. This is particularly true
in developing countries where few individuals have health insurance. In addition,
households in developing countries find it difficult to access the formal credit market.
Therefore, they have to rely on informal coping mechanisms such as drawing on
savings, selling assets, transfers from other families or social support networks. Low-
income households who cannot use these channels to smooth their consumption
are more likely to fall into a poverty trap. In other words, the burden of health
care pushes individuals experiencing illness into poverty or forces them into deeper
poverty.
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There are a huge number of studies investigating the impact of health insurance
on health status, health service use or out-of-pocket payment. Scholars have also
conducted several studies that focus on the relationship between health insurance
coverage and ex-post poverty. Recently, some studies have examined the impact
of money transfers such as microfinance and remittance on ex-ante vulnerability.
However, there is no study for any country that measures the impact of health
insurance coverage on household vulnerability. This paper attempts to fill this gap
in the empirical literature and in this case health insurance has been considered as
one of the crucial strategies for coping with vulnerability arising from idiosyncratic
shocks. In this sense, this paper is the first to investigate the role of health insurance
in mitigating vulnerability1.
Using the propensity score matching method and data from Vietnam Access to
Resources Household Surveys (VARHS) during 2010-2012, we investigate whether
having health insurance coverage has any impact on the probability of falling into
poverty (VEP) and the magnitude of utility loss (VEU). In particular, households
risk preference has been taken into account when measuring health insurance de-
mand. Our estimates show that health insurance helps rural households in Vietnam
reduce the idiosyncratic component of utility loss by 81 per cent. In addition, health
insurance helps rural households in Vietnam reduce the probability of becoming poor
by about 19 per cent. In addition, the reverse effect of the risk aversion on health
insurance enrollment implies not only a potential ‘rigidity’ effect on health insurance
demand but also deficiencies in the health insurance market. Therefore, the study
suggests implications for both demand side and supply side of the health insurance
market so that the government is able to reach its goal of universal health insurance
coverage.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews studies on the
topic of vulnerability and health insurance impact. Section 3 provides an overview of
health insurance schemes in Vietnam. Section 4 and Section 5 are dedicated to data
description and analytical framework, respectively. Section 6 discusses the results
and the last section concludes the paper.
1“Research into alternative health care financing strategies and related mechanisms for coping
with the direct and indirect costs of illness is urgently required to inform the development of ap-
propriate social policies to improve access to essential health services and break the vicious cycle
between illness and poverty.” (McIntyre et al. 2006)
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4.2 Literature review
Concepts of vulnerability
The concept of vulnerability is interpreted in various ways in different contexts. In
economics, the concept of vulnerability emerges from that of poverty. From the
traditional view of poverty as reflected in World Development Report 1990, the
notion of poverty consists of material deprivation and low achievement in education
and health (World Bank 1990). Later, the term ‘vulnerability’ is mentioned when
examining the relationship between poverty and uncertainty of income (Morduch
1994). Since then, ‘vulnerability’ is often used to extend the traditional concept of
poverty. While poverty measurement is based on fixed standards such as income
or expenditure during a short period of time, vulnerability broadens the poverty
notion by including the potential risk of adverse shocks such as income loss, bad
health (idiosyncratic risks) and natural disasters (covariate risks). For example, in
the work of Glewwe & Hall (1998) and Cunningham & Maloney (2000), vulnerability
is defined as exposure to negative shocks to welfare. It is also defined as “the
probability or risk today of being in poverty or to fall into deeper poverty in the
future” (World Bank 2001) or “the ex-ante risk that a household will, if currently
non-poor, fall below the poverty line, or if currently poor, will remain in poverty”
(Chaudhuri 2003).
In an excellent summary of risk and vulnerability, Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003b)
classify approaches to assessing vulnerability into three methods according to their
distinct definitions: vulnerability as expected poverty (VEP); vulnerability as low
expected utility (VEU); and vulnerability as uninsured exposure to risk (VER). All
three methods predict changes in welfare, but with different welfare measurements.
The difference between VEP and VEU lies in their definitions of welfare: in VEP
consumption is regarded as welfare, while VEU uses utility derived from consump-
tion. While VEP and VEU commonly use a benchmark for a welfare indicator (z )
and estimate the probability of falling below this benchmark (p), VER evaluates
whether downside risks or observed shocks result in welfare loss. In other word,
VER assesses the household’s ability to smooth or insure consumption when faced
with income shocks, while maintaining a minimum level of assets.
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Health insurance and household vulnerability
The relationship between health insurance coverage and household vulnerability
emerges from the impact of health shocks on poverty and vulnerability. Illness,
a major part of idiosyncratic shocks, can push non-poor household into poverty, or
poor households into extreme poverty (Calvo & Dercon 2005, Carter et al. 2007,
Dercon 2004)2. According to World Bank (2003b), illness pushes households into
poverty, through lost wages, high spending for catastrophic illness, and repeated
treatment for other illnesses. Moreover, health shocks are not only one of the most
sizable, but also one of the least predictable shocks (Gertler & Gruber 2002)3. Al-
though several empirical studies show that households are able to fully or partially
insure themselves against production shocks and weather shocks, they are less able
to cope with health shocks (Fafchamps & Lund 2003). With production shocks,
households tend to choose less risky activities and with weather shocks, households
try to learn and understand them in order to deal with them to some extent. How-
ever, this is not the case with health shocks which are likely to make households
more vulnerable than other types of shocks (Duflo 2005).
Most studies on health problems and health insurance impact focus on financial
loss and healthcare service usage while other papers measure the impact of health
insurance on household poverty status. For instance, McIntyre et al. (2006) finds
that health care payments place a considerable stress on households in low- and
middle- income countries. The burden of health care payments pushes individuals
experiencing illness into poverty or forces them into deeper poverty.
One of the main strategies adopted by many agricultural families who face high costs
of health care is to sell livestock. Another strategy is using intra-household labor
substitution to compensate for labor lost. Also, inter-household transfers of resources
might take a small role (Sauerborn et al. 1996). Similarly, a study for Russia shows
2The authors show that a random event (e.g. a flood, a drought, an illness, an unemployment
spell) can have a permanent effect for households, pushing them into poverty.
3Using a panel data for Indonesia, Gertler & Gruber (2002) demonstrate that major illness
induces significant economic costs and is associated with a fall in consumption. Similarly, Gertler
et al. (2009) prove that micro-financial saving and lending institutions can help Indonesian fami-
lies smooth consumption after a major illness. Moreover, Jalan & Ravallion (1999) observe that
wealthier Chinese households are better able to insure consumption against income shocks. Studies
of Rosenzweig & Wolpin (1993) and Fafchamps et al. (1998) present that sale of stocks can help
insure consumption. Empirical results across countries also advocate that households find difficult
to cope with all income shocks, especially those with low assets (Harrower & Hoddinott 2004,
Skoufias & Quisumbing 2005).
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that chronic diseases resulted in higher levels of household healthcare expenditure in
Russia and productivity losses are significantly attributed to reduced labor supply
and reduced household labor income. The authors find that households in Russia
depend on informal coping mechanisms in the face of chronic diseases, irrespective
of insurance cover (Abegunde & Stanciole 2008).
Another piece of research shows that about 25.9 per cent of households in forty low-
and middle-income countries borrow money or sell items to pay for health care. The
health shocks are more severe among the poorest households and in countries with
less health insurance. Healthcare systems in developing countries have been failing
to insure families against the financial risks of seeking health care (Kruk et al. 2009).
Literature on health shocks has proved the importance of health insurance. For
example, a study for India highlights the fact that community-based health insurance
schemes in India can protect poor households from the unpredictable risk of medical
expenses (Kent 2002). Another study using an Indonesian panel data set suggests
that public insurance or subsidies for medical care may improve household welfare
by providing consumption insurance (Gertler & Gruber 2002).
However, there is currently no study investigating the impact of health insurance
on household vulnerability. Some attempts has been made to examine the measure
the impact of microfinance on vulnerability or household consumption over time
(Khandker 1998, Morduch 1999, Zaman 1999). A study of Swain & Floro (2012)
indicate that vulnerability of members of the Indian Self Help Group (SHG) is not
significantly higher than in non-SHG members, although the SHG members expe-
rience a high incidence of poverty. Nevertheless, the SHG members for more than
one year face significantly reduced vulnerability. Another study by Puhazhendi &
Badatya (2002) suggests that microfinance allows consumption smoothing and helps
households mitigate the negative effects of shocks.
Health insurance impact in Vietnam
A large number of studies using Vietnam data have been conducted to look at the
incidence of out-of-pocket for health care as well as the effects of health insurance
on various types of household spending. For example, Wagstaff & Doorslaer (2003),
using the data set of 1993-1998, find that 80 per cent of health spending in Vietnam
was paid out-of-pocket in 1998. The out-of-pocket spending is mainly non-hospital
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expenditure rather than inpatient care expenses. This primarily forces poor house-
holds to become poorer rather than leading non-poor households into poverty. Later,
Wagstaff (2007) shows that the incomes of urban households are more vulnerable to
health shocks than rural households. The author suggests that transfers from rela-
tives, friends or neighbors partially offset income losses and extra medical spending,
even among insured households. The paper also finds that households with a health
shock consume less food, but spend more on items such as housing and electricity.
Nguyen (2010) reviews Vietnam’s policies on health services and provides an assess-
ment of public health facilities and the access of people to health care services in
Vietnam. He finds that the poor and ethnic minorities are most likely to be enrolled
in health insurance than other groups of people. Health insurance helps to boost
health services utilization and reduces out-of-pocket spending of the insured. The
density of medical staff is also positively associated with outpatient health services
utilization. Nevertheless, the quality of health services and the access to health
services continue to be limited in impoverished and isolated areas (Nguyen 2010).
Chaudhuri & Roy (2008) use data drawn from the 199293 and 199798 Vietnam Living
Standard Surveys (VLSS) and the 2002 Vietnam Household and Living Standards
Survey (VHLSS) to estimate the probability that an individual will seek treatment
and the determinants of out-of-pocket payments. They show that the rich are more
able to use health insurance effectively with low out-of-pocket payments than are
those with lower incomes. In contrast, the poor suffer higher out-of-pocket payments
and are thus discouraged from seeking treatments until their ailment become serious.
When pro-poor policies are instituted, the healthcare inequality becomes less serious
(Chaudhuri & Roy 2008). Further, the insured patients, especially those at lower
income levels, are more likely to use outpatient facilities and public providers (Jowett
et al. 2004).
In a study on how households in Vietnam cope with health care expenses, Kim
et al. (2011) examine a rural commune in Hanoi and show that households of all
income levels borrow to finance treatment costs but the poor and near-poor are
more heavily dependent. The likelihood of reducing food consumption to pay for
extremely high-cost treatment versus low-cost treatment increases most for the poor
in both inpatient and outpatient contexts. Decreased funding and increased costs
of health care rendered Dai Dong’s population vulnerable to the consequences of
detrimental coping strategies such as debt and food reduction (Kim et al. 2011).
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Thanh et al. (2010) indicate that Vietnam’s health care funds for the poor (HCFP)
significantly reduces the health care expenditure (HCE) as a percentage of total
expenditure, and increases the use of the local public health care among the poor.
However, the impact of HCFP on the use of the higher levels of public health care
and the use of go-to-pharmacies are not significant (Thanh et al. 2010). Sepehri
et al. (2006) use Vietnam Living Standard Surveys 1993 and 1998 to show that
health insurance reduces out-of-pocket expenditure by around 36 per cent to 45 per
cent. Sepehri et al. (2011) find that insurance reduces out-of-pocket expenditures
more for those enrollees using district and higher level public health facilities than
those using commune health centers. Compared to the uninsured patients using
district hospitals, compulsory and voluntary insurance schemes reduce out-of-pocket
expenditure by 40 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively. However, for contacts at
the commune health centers, both the compulsory health scheme and the voluntary
health insurance scheme have little influence on out-of-pocket spending, while the
HCFP reduces out-of-pocket spending by about 15 per cent.
In summary, the evaluation methods used in these studies are propensity score
matching (PSM), double difference and triple difference methods. Authors try to
eliminate any biases in the estimated insurance coefficient arising from the unobserv-
able factors that are correlated with both insurance status variable and the outcomes
of interest. Most studies find a limited impact of insurance on out-of-pocket pay-
ments, with the exception of Jowett et al. (2003) on a voluntary program in Hai
Phong. The differences impact of health insurance among studies are attributed to
differences in methods and target groups and the outcomes of interest. For examples,
both Bales et al. (2007) and Wagstaff (2007) use data from VHLSS 2002 and 2004
to estimate impacts of free health insurance on the poor. They find a significant
positive impact of the program on the reduction of out-of-pocket health care spend-
ing. However, while Wagstaff (2007) finds a positive impact of the health insurance
on health care utilization, Bales et al. (2007) does not. This might be the reason
why Wagstaff re-conducted the research using different methods in 2010. This time,
the results suggest that the HCFP has had no impact on use of services, but has
substantially reduced out-of-pocket spending (Wagstaff 2010).
Unfortunately, there is no paper measuring the impact of health insurance cover-
age on household vulnerability even though there are a number of studies exploring
risks and household responses to risks in Vietnam. These studies include Hasegawa
(2010), Klasen & Waibel (2010), Imai et al. (2011), Wainwright & Newman (2011),
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Montalbano & Magrini (2012), and Tuyen (2013). Therefore, this study will con-
tribute to the empirical literature by filling this gap.
Choice under risk and health insurance demand
According to Phelps (2013), people seem to dislike risk and prefer a less risky situa-
tion to a more risky situation, other things being equal. They are thus risk averse and
are willing to pay for insurance in order to eliminate the chance of really risky losses.
Therefore, a household’s purchase of health insurance in this study is regarded as a
choice under risk and uncertainty, partially reflecting the households risk preference.
This section summarizes the literature on risk preference as the framework for risk
aversion measures used in this study.
Since Bernoulli (1954) provided the foundations for the concepts of expected util-
ity and risk aversion, individual risk preference has become a fundamental building
block of a huge range of economic theory (Isaac & James 2000). A comprehensive
review of choice under risk theories can be seen in Starmer (2000). In general, they
are classified into two major groups: expected utility theory and non-expected util-
ity theory. Therefore, risk preference or risk aversion which is derived from theory
can be estimated in two different ways. First, the conventional way to estimate risk
aversion comes primarily from an idea of expected utility theory that assumes indi-
viduals optimize their preference function when they make choices among prospects
(or uncertain outcomes). The studies following this concept include Von Neumann &
Morgenstern (1944); Friedman & Savage (1948); and Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970).
Among empirical studies are the works of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965), who
employed a concave utility function U to derive formal measures of absolute risk
aversion. Second, the prospect theory provides another framework to calculate risk
aversion. This theory assumes that individuals make their choices by decision heuris-
tics, or rules, under particular conditions. In other words, problem context is an
important determinant of choice-rule selection. Two of the most widely discussed
studies are Kahneman & Tversky (1979) and Tversky & Kahneman (1992). The
studies of Ga¨chter et al. (2010) and Abdellaoui (2000) are two empirical studies that
follow this path.
The relationship between individuals’ risk preference and health insurance demand
has been investigated in Friedman (1974), Bleichrodt & Pinto (2000, 2002) and
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Barseghyan et al. (2013)4. In addition, the relationship of risk preference and other
aspects of health choice has been studied in Nightingale & Grant (1988), Nightingale
(1988), Richardson (1994), Bleichrodt & Gafni (1996), Bridges (2003), Picone et al.
(2004), Lusk & Coble (2005), Zhang & Rashad (2008), Andersen et al. (2008), and
Einav et al. (2010). These studies explain why we choose to add a risk aversion
index into the probit model for estimating health insurance coverage.
4.3 Overview of the health insurance system in
Vietnam
Health insurance system in Vietnam
After 1986, when the government launched economic reforms, the healthcare system
in Vietnam was transformed from a centralized one of free universal access to a
user-pay system. The pharmaceutical industry was also privatized. Out-of-pocket
spending on health care went up rapidly. It reached 71 per cent of health spending
(mostly on drugs) in 1993 and 80 per cent in 1998, creating a huge burden for ill
households, especially the poor (Wagstaff & Lieberman 2009).
In 1993, Vietnam introduced a compulsory health insurance (CHI) program, which
was initially aimed at the formal sector worker. A voluntary health insurance scheme
was later added to cover the self-employed, informal sector employees, and depen-
dents of CHI members. Later, all employees in the formal sectors were required to
enroll, rather than only those in large institutions.
In the early 2000s, other important changes in health insurance were introduced:
copayments were scrapped and the benefit package made more generous, and the
insurer was permitted to contract with private providers. The health sector was
decentralized and much of the revenue was raised locally. Some hospitals were given
greater autonomy. In 2002, the insurance system was reformed. The central gov-
ernment launched the Health Care Fund for the Poor (HCFP) program, to provide
4The relationship between an individuals’ economic behaviour and risk aversion has been inves-
tigated in many empirical studies. For example, Bowman et al. (1999), Heidhues & Ko˝szegi (2008)
with consumption behaviour; financial markets (Benartzi & Thaler 1995, Odean 1998, Haigh &
List 2005); trade policy (Tovar 2009); labor supply (Camerer et al. 1997, Goette et al. 2004, Fehr
et al. 2007).
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insurance coverage for the poor and other disadvantaged groups. Later, the gov-
ernment continued to expand coverage through a decree called Decision 139, which
asked local governments to provide free health care to the poor, ethnic minority
households living in the remote areas and households living in communes officially
classified as “special poor”5. However, service provision proved to be poor due to
the troublesome application process, limited funds, and lack of public awareness of
the scheme itself. Households still suffered from high out-of-pocket spending.
In 2008, the government enacted the Health Insurance Law that became effective in
2009. It is an attempt to make health financing systems more equitable and increase
health insurance coverage to the entire population. Under the provision of the Law,
children under 6 years old and the near poor are included in the compulsory group.
Later in 2010, students and pupils (who are previously in the voluntary group)
were included. Moreover, farmers, workers in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and salt
production sectors were targeted to be included in 2012 (Matsushima & Yamada
2014).
According to JAHR (2013), the share of household OOP payment in total health
spending in Vietnam is considerably higher than the WHO recommendation (30-
40%)6. Households without health insurance cards, households in rural areas and
poor households have lower OOP spending on health care, but higher catastrophic
spending and impoverishment because of health spending. Since 2010, in Vietnam
the OOP payment share and the proportion of population facing poverty as a result
of unexpected health spending have steadily declined in comparison with previous
years. The health insurance benefits and the volume of medical services reimbursed
by insurance have both expanded over time. That results has their roots from some
recent social and health policies, and particularly, the Law on Health Insurance that
commenced in 2009.
5In October 2002, Vietnam’s government introduced a new health care fund program for the
poor through Decision 139. This decision mandated all provincial governments to provide free
health care to three groups: households defined as poor according to official government poverty
standards introduced in November 2000; all households regardless of their own assessed income
living in communes covered by a program set up as a result of another policy known as Decision
135 dating from 1998, which provides support and services to especially disadvantaged communes;
and ethnic minorities living in the province of Thai Nguyen and the six mountainous provinces
designated by Decision 186 as facing special difficulties.
6Household out-of-pocket payment rangesfrom 8.3 to 11.0% of household capacity to pay and
about 4.6 to 6.0% of total household expenditure. There were 3.9 to 5.7% of households, or around
1 million households encountering catastrophic spending and 2.5 to 4.1% of households, or around
600,000 households confronting poverty because of unexpected health spending during 2002 – 2010.
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Vietnam has a goal of universal health insurance, and many policies on health insur-
ance have been circulated and effectively executed (Somanathan 2014). The Joint
Annual Health Review (JAHR 2013) shows that the government completely subsi-
dizes health insurance premiums for approximately above 27 million people under
social assistance schemes, including the poor and children under age 6; and it has
unceasingly expanded benefit packages and raised health insurance premium subsi-
dies for the near poor, pupils and students. In 2012, around 59.31 million people had
a health insurance card, representing for 66.8% of the population7. In some remoted
areas with a large number of poor and ethnic people, the coverage ratio was above
75%. Hospital utilization reimbursed by insurance reached 2.02 visits per person
while inpatient visits were about 15.6 out of every 100 people in the population.
The most important financing source for health care is the health insurance fund.
In 2012, this fund reimbursed facilities for medical services worth about 33,419 bil-
lion VND (1.7 billion USD). This fund has also contributed to improving the health
service delivery network, the range of pharmaceutical benefits and the amount of
technical services available at health care facilities (JAHR 2013).
Health Insurance schemes
Currently, Vietnam has two insurance schemes: a compulsory health insurance and a
voluntary scheme. The compulsory scheme initially included two groups: (a) formal
workers (both state and private sectors) and civil servants; and (b) retirees, de-
pendents of military and police officers, members of Parliament, Communist Party
officials, war heroes, and meritorious people. This scheme later included children
younger than 6 years, and from 2003, also covered the poor, ethnic minority house-
holds living in the remote areas, and households living in communes officially clas-
sified as “special poor”. Since 2010, students in schools, colleges and universities,
who used to be in the voluntary insurance group, have also been included. From
2012, the near poor, farmers, workers in the sectors of agriculture, forestry, fisheries,
and salt producers have been targeted for inclusion. Voluntary health insurance is
intended for the remaining population.
Since 1992, the health insurance coverage rate has increased considerably. In 1993,
only 5.4 per cent of the total population were covered. The figure in 2010 was
around 60 per cent, but by 2012, the figure had grown to 66.8 per cent. Around
7The uninsured are largely the near poor and rural inhabitants.
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60 per cent of the insured have been completely or partially financed by the state
budget (Matsushima & Yamada 2014, JAHR 2013). However, as can be seen in
Table 4.1, Vietnam health insurance policies faced difficulties in reaching those non-
poor workers and their families in the informal sector, who belong to the voluntary
group. Using the statistics in 2010, the enrollment rate was only 53.4 per cent for the
private enterprises. While most of the poor and the recipients of social allowance were
covered, about 20 per cent of children under 6 years old remained uninsured despite
the fact that their enrolment costs were fully paid by the state budget. Similarly,
the enrollment rate for the near poor was just 11.38 per cent, although this targeted
group was eligible for at least 50 per cent of subsidies from the government. More
importantly, the coverage for the unemployed remained zero. Therefore, there were
still many vulnerable people left without health insurance (Matsushima & Yamada
2014).
Health insurance premiums and subsidies
According to the Health Insurance Law 2008, the contribution rate for most groups
is 4.5 per cent8 of the monthly minimum salary9 or the monthly contract salary
depending on their sources of income (Matsushima & Yamada 2014). In 2010, the
premium was about 380,000 VND per person per year. The government subsidized
100 per cent of premiums for the very poor and for children under 6 years of age,
and subsidizes at least 50 per cent of the premium for the near poor and at least
30 per cent of premiums for students. For the formal sector workers, employers
contributed 3 per cent of the minimum salary and the employees paid 1.5 per cent.
The voluntary group paid 4.5 per cent of the minimum salary but the premium rate
could reduce to 3 per cent of the minimum salary if the enrollees were dependents
of salaried workers or civil servants (Tien et al. 2011)10.
Benefits
Patients can select the community health center or district hospital they prefer to be
treated within the given options by the government (JAHR 2009). The insurance is
8In the period 1992-2009, this figure is 3% (Tien et al. 2011)
9The minimum salary is determined by the government and serves as a reference for many
other calculation, especially payments from the state budget. In 2009, the minimum salary level is
equivalent to US$ 35. In case of health insurance, minimum salary is used to calculate the premium
of the poor, the near poor, children under 6, the meritorious people, students
10More detail in Table 3 of Tien et al. (2011)
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Table 4.1: Breakdown of the insured population in 2010
Target groups Target Covered Percent
populations people covered
(thousand) (thousand) (%)
Total 85,666 51,903 59.64
Compulsory groups 67,114 47,176 70.29
Employees of enterprises and other companies 11,911 6,361 53.40
Civil servants 3,142 3,142 100.00
Foreign students 3 3 100.00
Part-time officers at commune level 182 0 0.00
Pensioners 920 920 100.00
Recipients of social allowances 1,305 1,254 96.09
Unemployed people 80 0 0.00
Local authorities 41 40 97.56
Meritorious people 2,113 2,113 100.00
Veterans 374 350 93.58
Members of national assembly and peoples council 123 119 96.75
Privileged social groups 843 384 45.55
The poor 13,945 13,511 96.89
Dependents of meritorious people 869 0 0.00
Dependents of army and police officers 1,281 297 23.19
Children under 6 10,103 8,183 81.00
Near poor people 6,081 692 11.38
Students and pupils 13,798 9,807 71.08
Voluntary groups 18,552 3,917 21.11
Relatives of employees 6,820 0 0.00
Farmers, self-employees, members of cooperatives 11,732 3,917 33.39
Source: VSS (2011) cited in Tien et al. (2011).
valid when the insured utilize medical care servicesat the community health center or
district hospital where they are registered officially, or at higher-level health facilities
to which they are transfered. In the case of an emergency, the treatment will be
given for free at any health facilities. However, if the insured wish to use services
at unregistered health facilities, they must pay the hospital directly, and claim for
the out-of-pocket payment later at their place of residence. The insured can opt for
private clinics and receive limited benefit from the health insurance scheme.
When the insured utilize health care services at the registered health facilities, dif-
ferent benefits apply depending on the category of the insured. Some insured groups
can receive free medical consultation and treatment but others have to pay parts
of the bill as the co-payment system has been commenced from January 2010. The
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Table 4.2: Benefits for basic medical services
100% medical consultation and 95% of medical consultation and 80% of
treatment costs treatment costs the cost
– Specialized technical officers – Persons on pension or monthly – Other
– Specialized technical working capacity loss allowance categories
non-commissioned officers – People on monthly social welfare of the
– Professional officers allowance as prescribed by law insured
– Professional non-commissioned – Poor household members, ethnic
officers of the People’s Public minorities living in areas with
security difficult or exceptionally difficult
– Meritorious persons socio-economic conditions
– Children under 6 – Other categories of the insured
Source: VSS (2010) cited in Matsushima & Yamada (2014).
level of the costs covered by the SHI depends on the group with a variation of 100%
- 95% - 80% of the total health expenditure (For details of the groups see Table 4.2).
People who are not covered for 100 per cent must pay the balance directly to the
hospital (VSS 2010).
In 2013, the co-payment paid by the insured was 14.76 per cent of the total health
insurance-covered medical care cost nationwide. The out-of-pocket payment ac-
counts for almost 60 per cent of the total health expenditure. The Government of
Vietnam wants to take progressive steps to reduce out-of-pocket payments made by
patients to under 40 per cent by 2015 (Rousseau 2014). Health insurance also covers
for technologically advanced medical services including dialysis, transplants, certain
types of cancer treatments and cardiovascular operations etc. However, there is a
ceiling which is defined as 40 months of minimum salary (VSS 2010, Tien et al.
2011). In 2012, the minimum salary is between VND 1.4 million to 2 million de-
pending on residential area. The ceiling is equivalent to US$ 2,682.8 to US$ 3,838.8
(US$=VND 20,865.50) and therefore the technologically advanced treatment could
result in extremely high out-of-pocket expenditure (Matsushima & Yamada 2014).
Providers
Health care providers are both public and non-public. Prior to November 2011, all
public providers were automatically approved to participate in social health insur-
ance, while private providers needed certification and permission. The private sector
has grown steadily during the recent years, but mainly provides outpatient health
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services and is still much smaller than the public sector, especially for inpatient
treatment (World Health Organization, 2009)11. In 2014, Vietnam Social Security
(VSS) contracted with 1,627 public establishments and 484 private ones (Rousseau
2014). Thus, the uninsured prefer private health care services to public health ser-
vices. Estimation from the 2006 VHLSS reveals that the ratio of the number of
outpatient contacts in private hospitals to the total number of outpatient contacts
was 43% for people without health insurance while this figure is only 23% for people
having voluntary health insurance. Due to the fact that the public health facili-
ties provide inpatient treatments dominantly, the ratio of private inpatient contacts
to the total inpatient contacts was just about 1.2% and 3.6% for the insured and
uninsured people, respectively (Nguyen 2012).
4.4 Data
Vietnam Access to Resources Household Surveys (VARHS)
Data for this empirical analysis is extracted from two waves of Vietnam Access to
Resources Household Survey (VARHS) implemented in 2010 and 2012. The VARHSs
are longitudinal datasets that have been biannually conducted by the University
of Copenhagen (Denmark) in collaboration with the Centre Institute of Economic
Management (CIEM), the Institute for Labor Studies and Social Affairs (ILSSA),
and the Institute of Policy and Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development
(IPSARD).
These surveys were carried out in rural areas of 12 provinces12 of Vietnam in the
summer of each year, producing a balanced panel of 2,045 households spread over 161
districts and 456 communes. They all were conducted during the same three-month
11There has been significant growth in the number of private hospitals in Vietnam since the
Government of Vietnam allowed private investment in the health sector. The number of private
hospitals more than doubled between 2004 and 2008 to reach 82 by 2008. However, this number
constituted only 7% of total hospitals, and 4.4% of total hospital beds. Private hospitals were
located mainly in urban and wealthy areas (Hort 2011)
12They are evenly distributed throughout Vietnam, in seven out of eight regions, with Ha Tay in
Red River Delta; Lao Cai and Phu Tho in Northeast; Lai Chau and Dien Bien in Northwest; Nghe
An in North Central Coast; Quang Nam and Khanh Hoa in South Central Coast; Dac Lac, Dac
Nong and Lam Dong in Central Highland; and Long An in Mekong River Delta. Therefore, these
provinces can represent the regional climate and geography throughout the country. However, The
sample is statistically representative at the provincial but not at the national level (Markussen
et al. 2012).
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period each year to ensure consistency and facilitate reasonable comparisons across
time. The VARHS investigates issues surrounding Vietnamese rural household’s
access to resources and the constraints that these households face in managing their
livelihoods. Along with detailed demographic information on household members,
the surveys include sections on household assets, savings, credit (both formal and
informal), formal insurance, shocks and risk-coping, informal safety nets and the
structure of social capital (Wainwright & Newman 2011). There is also a variety of
information on communes where households lived at the time they were surveyed.
Health insurance
In Section 9 of the VARHS questionnaires, there are questions about all the types
of insurance that a household held at the time of interview. They include health
insurance (voluntary and compulsory for labor13), free health insurance for the poor
and free health insurance for children under 6 year old. Other types of insurance
consist farmer insurance, fire insurance, life insurance, social insurance, unemploy-
ment insurance, education insurance and vehicle insurance. In this study, we focus
on the impact of health insurance in general (both voluntary and compulsory for
labor) which is essential for universal health insurance policy in Vietnam. However,
other types of insurance are mentioned in the later discussion on the impact of risk
attitude on health insurance demand.
Risk attitudes
In VARHS 2010 and 2012, there are three questions that enable the derivation of risk
aversion for each individual. The first question is a simple unpaid lottery experiment
in which respondents are required to accept or to reject each of six lotteries with
different payoffs. In each lottery, the winning prize is unchanged at VND 6,000 and
the loss varies from VND 2,000 to VND 7,000 (Table 4.3).
That exact question in the questionnaire is:
“You are given the opportunities of playing a game where you have a 50:50
chance of winning or losing (for example, a coin is tossed so that you have
an equal chance of it turning up either heads or tails). In each case choose
whether you would accept or reject the option of playing:”
13There is no way to separate these two types of health insurance.
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Table 4.3: Questionaires about risk preference in VARHS
Lottery Accept Decline
a. You have a 50% chance of losing 2,000 VND and a 50% chance of © ©
winning 6,000 VND
b. You have a 50% chance of losing 3,000 VND and a 50% chance of © ©
winning 6,000 VND
c. You have a 50% chance of losing 4,000 VND and a 50% chance of © ©
winning 6,000 VND
d. You have a 50% chance of losing 5,000 VND and a 50% chance of © ©
winning 6,000 VND
e. You have a 50% chance of losing 6,000 VND and a 50% chance of © ©
winning 6,000 VND
f. You have a 50% chance of losing 7,000 VND and a 50% chance of © ©
winning 6,000 VND
Source: VARHS 2010 and 2012.
The VARHS dataset in 2010 and 2012 also contain information that we can use to
estimate absolute risk aversion. The exact two questions in the VARHS questionnaire
are:
“Consider an imaginary situation where you are given the chance of entering
a state-run lottery where only 10 people can enter and 1 person will win the
prize. How much would you be willing to pay for a 1 in 10 chance of winning
a prize of 2,000,000 VND?”
and,
“How much would you be willing to pay for a 1 in 10 chance of winning a prize
of 20,000,000 VND?”
The answers to these questions are regarded as reservation prices above which house-
holds reject the lottery.
4.5 Analytical framework and methodology
Building on household economics literature and our previous paper on sources of
vulnerability and household coping strategies in Vietnam, we suggest in this article
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that health insurance can help households reduce the accidental financial loss due
to healthcare cost. Households therefore do not have to reduce consumption as an
inevitable coping strategy. In addition, health insurance reduces the probability of
selling productive assets that are necessary to generate future household income. As
well, household members do not have to suffer their illness without medical treatment
due to their difficult financial situation14. This section describes how we measure
vulnerability, risk aversion and finally estimate the impact of health insurance and
risk aversion on vulnerability.
Vulnerability as Expected Poverty (VEP)
Vulnerability as expected poverty is a vulnerability measure which was first proposed
and applied to Indonesian household data by Chaudhuri (2003). This household
vulnerability is defined as the likelihood that a household will fall into poverty in
the next period. VEP can be estimated through the following procedures, beginning
with the consumption function:
lnci = α + βXi + ei (4.1)
where ci is per capita consumption expenditure for household i, Xi reprerents a vec-
tor of observable household characteristics and commune characteristics (e.g. charac-
teristics of head, location, assets, shocks), β is a vector of parameters to be estimated,
and ei is a mean-zero disturbance term that captures idiosyncratic shocks that lead
to different levels of per capita consumption.
The variance of the disturbance term is:
σ2e,i = θXi (4.2)
Chaudhuri et al. (2002) and Chaudhuri (2003) acknowledge that the error term (ei) is
not the same for all households (heteroskedasticity). Therefore, we adopt the three-
step Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) technique proposed by Amemiya
(1977).
14We consider if health insurance affects both idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. Zimmerman
& Carter (2003), Morduch (2004) and Dercon (2005) show that the impact of microfinance on the
latter is likely to be weak.
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Firstly, we estimate Equation 4.2 by employing the ordinary least squares (OLS)
technique. Next we predict the residuals from the regression and regress the pre-
dicted residuals on the same covariates included in the specification of the consump-
tion process. Then we have the error variance estimating process as follows:
ê2i,OLS = ρ+ δ̂Xi + ηi (4.3)
The prediction of Equation 4.3 is used to weight the previous equation, thus leading
to the transformed version:
ê2i
ê2i,OLS
=
ρ
ê2i,OLS
+
δ̂Xi
ê2i,OLS
+
ηi
ê2i,OLS
(4.4)
According to Chaudhuri (2003), the OLS estimation of Equation 4.4 generates an
asymptotically FGLS estimate, δFGLS, and thus e2i is a consistent estimate of the
variance of the idiosyncratic component of household consumption. Having obtained
an efficient estimate of the variance as the predicted value of Equation 4.4, (δ̂2i,FGLS),
we now take the square root and transform Equation 4.1 as follows:
lnci
δ̂i,FGLS
=
α
δ̂i,FGLS
+
βXi
δ̂i,FGLS
+
ei
δ̂i,FGLS
(4.5)
An OLS estimation of Equation 4.5 generates a consistent and asymptotically effi-
cient estimate of αFGLS, βFGLS. Once we obtain these estimates, it is possible to
predict both the expected log consumption and its variance:
Ê[lnCi|Xi] = αFGLS + βFGLSXi (4.6)
V̂ [lnCi|Xi] = ρFGLS + δFGLSXi (4.7)
Chaudhuri (2003) assumes that lnci is normally distributed. Then the estimated
probability that a household will be poor in the future (for example, at time t + 1)
is given by:
v̂i,Chaudhuri = P̂ r(lnci < lnz|Xi) = Φ
 lnz − Ê[lnCi|Xi]√
V̂ [lnCi|Xi]
 (4.8)
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where Φ(.) is the cumulative function of the standard normal and z is the actual
poverty line15.
Unfortunately, household consumption expenditure is not available in the VARHS.
As a result, we decide to use total income as a substitution for household consump-
tion. The poverty lines used in this study are the national poverty line generated
from household income by MOLISA16. Then the vulnerability index is the probability
of falling into poverty according the national standard.
Vulnerability as low Expected Utility (VEU)
Ligon & Schechter (2003) define vulnerability as the variation between the utility
derived from a certainty-equivalent consumption (zce) at and above which the house-
hold would not be considered vulnerable and the expected utility of consumption.
This certainty-equivalent consumption is similar to the poverty line. Consumption
of household (ci) has a distribution that illustrates different states of the world, so
the form of vulnerability measure is given below:
Vi = Ui(zce)− EUi(ci) (4.9)
where Ui is a weakly concave, strictly increasing function. The equation can be
rewritten as:
Vi = [Ui(zce)− Ui(Eci)] + [Ui(Eci)− EUi(ci)] (4.10)
The first bracketed term is the variation between utility at zce and utility at expected
consumption (ci) of household i. The second term captures the risk (both covariate
and idiosyncratic risks) faced by household i. It can be decomposed as shown below:
Vi = [Ui(zce)− Ui(Eci)] [Poverty or inequality]
+[Ui(Eci)− EUi(E(ci|xt))] [Covariate or aggregate risk]
+[EUi(E(ci|xt))− EUi(ci)] [Idiosyncratic risk]
(4.11)
15The poverty lines in this study are calculated from the VHLSS and released by the GSO and
the WB. The poverty line measure takes account of the regional price differences and monthly price
changes over the survey periods. The poverty lines are 1917, 2077 and 2566 thousand VND/per-
son/year for the years of 2002, 2004 and 2006, respectively.
16There are two parallel approaches to poverty measurement in Vietnam using national poverty
lines. The first approach developed and led by the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs
(MOLISA), is based on income and is used primarily for targeting social programs. The second
was developed by the General Statistical Office and the World Bank, is based on consumption and
is used chiefly for monitoring poverty over time.
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where E(ci|xt) is the commune expected value of consumption, conditional on a
vector of covariant variables (xt).
The authors take unexplained risk and measurement error out of idiosyncratic risk
and assume that the poverty line (z) is the mean consumption. So Equation 4.11
can be rewritten as:
Vi = [Ui(zce)− Ui(Eci)] [Poverty or inequality]
+[Ui(Eci)− EUi(E(ci|xt))] [Covariate or aggregate risk]
+[EUi(E(ci|xt))− EUi(ci|xt, xit)] [Idiosyncratic risk]
+[EUi(ci|xt, xit)− EUi(ci)] [Unexplained risk and measurement error]
(4.12)
where E(ci|xt, xit) is the household expected value of consumption, conditional on a
vector of covariant variables (xt) and household’s characteristics (xit).
Ligon & Schechter (2003) normalize the expenditure and income per capita so that
the average expenditure and income per capita over all households in all periods
becomes unity, and therefore z in the above equation equals one. Thus, households
do not have vulnerability if resources are distributed in a way that households receive
the expected consumption expenditure with certainty.
This VEU approach is useful because it reveals the contribution of each major factor
on household vulnerability to poverty. However, it needs a panel data and the result
may be sensitive to the function form of utility and the utility measurement17.
Ligon and Schechter (2003) propose a particular form for utility:
U(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ (4.13)
Where γ is household coefficient on relative risk aversion or household sensitivity to
risk and inequality. From the empirical literature, γ=2 is a good approximation of
this measure.
Components of Equation 4.12 can be estimated by applying restricted least squares
for expected consumption and then substituting each of them into utility function
17Hoddinott & Quisumbing (2003b) agrue that the relative components of the decomposition are
not likely to be affected by function even though the results may be.
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4.13:
Ecit =
1
T
T∑
t=1
cit (4.14)
E(cit|X¯t) = αi + ηt (4.15)
E(cit|X¯t, Xit) = αi + ηt + βXit (4.16)
where αi capture the effect of household fixed characteristics; ηt capture the impact
of changes in covariates or aggregates which are the same across households; and β
reflects effects of household characteristics or other observable factors on consump-
tion.
In Equation 4.16, the income variable may be endogenous if it is treated as an
explanatory variable for consumption because there may be a feedback relationship
between income and consumption. Therefore, we employ the instrumental variable
(IV) estimation for Equation 4.16 in which income is perceived as an endogenous
variable.
Risk aversion calculation
Three questions in the VARHS data enable us to measure individual risk aversion
in two ways. The observed choices of individuals in the lottery enables us to classify
respondents with regard to their level of risk aversion.
First, we derive individual risk aversion from the lottery choice by applying the
cumulative prospect theory of Tversky & Kahneman (1992). According to these
authors, individuals will be indifferent between accepting and rejecting the lottery
if:
w+(0.5).v(G) = w−(0.5)λriskv(L) (4.17)
where G is the gain and L is the loss in a given lottery; v(x) is the utility of the
outcome, x ∈ [G,L]; λrisk is the coefficient of risk aversion in the choice task; w+(0.5)
and w−(0.5) represent the probability weights for the 0.5 chance of gaining G or
losing L, respectively (Ga¨chter et al. 2010). Then we can produce the cumulative
risk aversion by the formula below:
λrisk =
w+(0.5)
w−(0.5)
× v(G)
v(L)
(4.18)
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In this study, we only consider monotonic acceptance decisions (99.47% of respon-
dents in our analytical data show monotonicity). The results of risk aversion esti-
mation are presented in the Table A.4, using a different assumption on probability
weighting and diminishing sensitives for gains and losses. In the model (1), or
the benchmark model, both probability weighting and diminishing sensitivity are
not important. Model (2) assumes the same probability weighting for gains and
losses, or w+(0.5)/w−(0.5) = 1, but allows for diminishing sensitivities for gains and
losses (this study uses the median estimates of Booij & Van de Kuilen (2009) where
α = 0.95 and β = 0.92). Model (3) assumes indifferent diminishing sensitivity but
allows for differences in probability weights for gains and losses. We use the esti-
mates from Abdellaoui (2000) in which w+(0.5) = 0.394 and w−(0.5) = 0.456 for
the median individual, implying w+(0.5)/w−(0.5) = 0.86. This probability weight-
ing difference is one of the largest gaps between gains and losses in the literature,
providing an upper bound for our estimation. Model (4) simultaneously assumes
that both probability weighting and diminishing sensitivities are essential.
We also estimate risk aversion under the expected utility theory by employing the
methods of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965). Following these studies, we assume
that households are initially endowed with income w and have a twice differentiable,
concave utility function U so that U ′(w) > 0 and U”(w) < 0. The prize of the lottery
is defined by z and the probability of winning that prize is α. The maximum price
that an individual is willing to pay for the lottery ticket, or the reservation price, is
λ. Therefore, the initial wealth will become w−λ after purchasing the lottery ticket
and increase to w − λ+ z if he or she wins the prize.
To deduce the value of the Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion A(w) =
−U”(w)/U ′(w), the expected utility theory implies that the utility of wealth w,
without participation in the lottery, is equal to expected utility when participating
at reservation price λ (Hartog et al. 2002):
U(w) = (1− α)U(w − λ) + αU(w − λ+ z) (4.19)
A second order of the Taylor series expansion of U(w− λ) and U(w− λ+ z) around
U(w) gives:
U(w) = U(w) + αzU ′(w)− λU ′′(w) + 0.5U ′′(w)[(1− α)λ2 + α(z − λ)2] (4.20)
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After solving for A(w), we have the Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion
as:
A(w) = −U
′′
U ′
=
αz − λ
0.5λ2 + 0.5αz2 − αλz (4.21)
Risk aversion estimated results are provided in Table C.5 of the Appendix C. We
expect a close relationship between the risk aversions estimated from the two ap-
proaches. The pairwise correlation between risk parameters is calculated and pre-
sented in the Table C.8. Apparently, there is a strong correlation between the risk
parameters calculated by the prospect theory and by expected utility theory. We
also classify households into groups of high, medium and low aversion and summarize
the results in Table C.6 and Table C.7 of the Appendix C.
Propensity score matching
For an accurate estimation of a program impact, panel data with at least one survey
serves as baseline data in which all participants have not yet received the benefit from
the program. In our data, we do not have the true baseline data. Households might
have health insurance in both the 2010 and 2012 surveys. Dropping households who
have health insurance in 2010 then applying the difference-in-difference method to
estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT ) for the year 2012 would
lead to a biased estimate. Therefore, we employ the method of propensity score
matching which has been previously applied by Nguyen (2012).
Let denotes H2010 and H2012 as the binary variables of health insurance in the years
2010 and 2012 respectively. In 2010, Y 20101 and Y
2010
0 denote potential outcomes
with and without health insurance, respectively. Similarly, in 2012, Y 20121 and Y
2012
0
denote outcomes with and without health insurance.
The impact of health insurance on vulnerability can be presented as below:
ATT2012 = E(Y
2012
1 |H2012 = 1)− E(Y 20120 |H2012 = 1) (4.22)
The equation can be rewritten as:
ATT2012 = Pr(H2010 = 1|H2012 = 1)ATT2012a + Pr(H2010 = 0|H2012 = 1)ATT2012b
(4.23)
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where Pr(H2010 = 1|H2012 = 1) and Pr(H2010 = 0|H2012 = 1) are the proportion of
households with and without health insurance in 2010 among households who have
health insurance in 2012. The ATT2012a and ATT2012b are defined as follows:
ATT2012a = E(Y
2012
1 |H2012 = 1, H2010 = 1)− E(Y 20120 |H2012 = 1, H2010 = 1) (4.24)
ATT2012b = E(Y
2012
1 |H2012 = 1, H2010 = 0)− E(Y 20120 |H2012 = 1, H2010 = 0) (4.25)
Here ATT2012a is the average effect of health insurance on people who have health
insurance in both 2010 and 2012, whereas ATT2012b represents the average effect of
health insurance on the newly insured households in 2012. ATT2012a and ATT2012b
will be equal to ATT2012 under an assumption that the enrolment in health insurance
in 2010 is not correlated with the enrolment in health insurance in 2012. If the
assumption does not hold, we need to make other assumption to identify ATT2012.
First, we can write ATT2012 conditional on X as follow:
ATT2012,X = Pr(H2010 = 1|X,H2012 = 1)[E(Y 20121 |X,H2012 = 1, H2010 = 1)
− E(Y 20120 |X,H2012 = 1, H2010 = 1)]
+ Pr(H2010 = 0|X,H2012 = 1)[E(Y 20121 |X,H2012 = 1, H2010 = 0)
− E(Y 20120 |X,H2012 = 1, H2010 = 0)]
(4.26)
ATT2012,X can be seen as the weighted average of the impact of health insurance
on the newly insured households in 2012 and the impact of health insurance on the
insured households in both 2010 and 2012 (conditional on X)
We suggest two identification assumptions as follows:
E(Y 20120 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 1)− E(Y 20120 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 0)
= E(Y 20100 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 1)− E(Y 20100 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 0)
(4.27)
E(Y 20120 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 1)− E(Y 20101 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 1)
= E(Y 20120 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 0)− E(Y 20101 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 0)
(4.28)
The first assumption shows that difference in the non-health-insurance outcome (con-
ditional on X) between households uninsured in both the years and those insured
only in the year 2012 is constant overtime. The second assumption indicates that
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difference between the non-health-insurance outcome in the year 2012 and the health-
insurance outcome in the year 2010 is the same for households insured in both ears
and those insured in 2010 but not in 2012.
Rearrange and then substitute two assumptions (29) and (30) into (28) to get:
ATT2012,X = Pr(H2010 = 1|X,H2012 = 1)×

[E(Y 20121 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 1)
–E(Y 20120 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 0)]
–[E(Y 20101 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 1)
–E(Y 20101 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 0)]

+ Pr(H2010 = 0|X,H2012 = 1)×

[E(Y 20121 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 1)
–E(Y 20120 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 0)]
–[E(Y 20100 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 1)
–E(Y 20100 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 0)]

(4.29)
ATT2012,X is identified because all terms in the equation are observed. We can then
rearrange it as follows:
ATT2012,X =
(
Pr(H2010 = 1|X,H2012 = 1)E(Y 20121 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 1)
+Pr(H2010 = 0|X,H2012 = 1)E(Y 20121 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 1)
)
−
(
Pr(H2010 = 1|X,H2012 = 1)E(Y 20120 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 0)
+Pr(H2010 = 0|X,H2012 = 1)E(Y 20120 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 0)
)
−
(
Pr(H2010 = 1|X,H2012 = 1)E(Y 20101 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 1)
+Pr(H2010 = 0|X,H2012 = 1)E(Y 20100 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 1)
)
−
(
Pr(H2010 = 1|X,H2012 = 1)E(Y 20101 |X,H2010 = 1, H2012 = 0)
+Pr(H2010 = 0|X,H2012 = 1)E(Y 20100 |X,H2010 = 0, H2012 = 0)
)
(4.30)
Conditional on X and H2010, we can express ATT2012 as follows:
ATT2012,X,H2010 = [E(Y
2012
1 |X,H2010, H2012 = 1)− E(Y 20120 |X,H2010, H2012 = 0)]
− [E(Y 2010|X,H2010, H2012 = 1)− E(Y 2010|X,H2010, H2012 = 0)]
(4.31)
Where Y 2010 are the observed outcomes in 2010. This suggests a simple way of
matching. The treatment group includes households who have health insurance in
2012. The control group includes households who do not have health insurance in
2012, but have the observed characteristics (X variables) and health insurance status
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in 2010 (H2010 variable) similar to those of the treatment group. In this case, we
control not only X but also H2010.
Then we employ Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) to match the uninsured and the insured
using the probability of being assigned into the program, which is called the propen-
sity score. In this study, the propensity score is the probability of being insured in
2012 given variables X and H2010. With different estimators, we have different num-
ber of the uninsured who are matched with the insured. In this study, we use kernel
matching estimators. The standard errors are calculated using bootstrap techniques.
The validity of propensity score matching (PSM) depends on two conditions: uncon-
foundedness or conditional independence (or unobserved factors do not affect partic-
ipation) and sizable common support or overlap in propensity score across treatment
and control groups (or enough nonparticipants to match with participants). There-
fore, the PSM estimation is more accurate when only observed characteristics are
believed to affect the enrollment and baseline data with a wide range of preprogram
characteristics are available.
In this paper, data with various characteristics in 2010 are used as the baseline data.
Risk aversion indexes, which possibly affect both health insurance enrollment and
vulnerability, are employed to limit the unobserved selection. The common sup-
port is checked through the propensity score estimation. The difference-in-difference
method is used to control the unobserved time-invariant characteristics. Finally, an
indirect test for potential confounders is provided to confirm the use of PSM.
Model specification for robustness analysis
To check the robustness of the matching method, we treat the data set as a panel
data set (Jones et al. 2013). Then the impact of owning health insurance on the
utility loss of households can be addressed by adopting the following specification:
Vit = α + βHIit + γHSit + δ.RAit + λSit + µit + Ct + εit (4.32)
where: Vit denotes the idiosyncratic vulnerability index which is estimated by vul-
nerability as low expected utility (VEU); i refers to the household; t denotes the
time when data was collected.
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HIit represents the number of health insurance cards that a household has over the
study period. From the data set, households might have health insurance in two
surveys, or they may not have any health insurance in both surveys. They can also
have insurance in only one surveys. Therefore, in this study, we assign this variable
different values. It can be the total health insurance in two surveys, or it can be
a dummy reflecting whether households have health insurance or not in a certain
survey18. β reflects the impact of health insurance coverage on vulnerability.
HSit denotes the health status, and is measured by the total number of days house-
hold members could not work because of illness within the 12 months prior to the
interview.
RAit is the risk aversion index, showing how much a household dislike risk. Both
absolute risk aversion index and cumulative risk aversion index are used.
Sit is used to control for impact of covariate shocks that a household experienced
in the past three years. Those shocks include droughts, floods, epidemics, livestock
diseases, and other shocks.
Xit is the vector of baseline characteristics of households at the time of interview.
They include household per capita income, asset, head age, marital status, female
share, dependent share, education, agricultural job.
Ct represents any commune impact. This includes total number of households in the
commune, whether a commune is poor or not, poverty rate, distance to the regular
market, having a secondary school or not, distance to the bus station.
In general, simultaneity bias exists if there is a positive correlation between health
insurance coverage and unobserved factors that lead to changes in the vulnerability
index. For example, sick vulnerable households have more incentive to have health
insurance. In addition, high-income households and risk-averse households might
try to buy health insurance. As a result, we would over-estimate the causal effect
of health insurance on household vulnerability. However, by adding health status,
risk aversion and income into the model, there is a small possibility of causal effects
from correlation between health insurance coverage and household vulnerability and
the simultaneity bias is least likely to present.
18In our sample of VARHS 2012 there are four households that have two voluntary health in-
surances (these account for 0.2% of sample); we decided to treat these households as if they had
only one health insurance. The category representing health insurance therefore defines whether a
household has at least one health insurance.
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Also, the panel data has several observations per individual. The individual’s error
term may have some common components that are present for each period. The
error terms for each individual may show an inter-correlation within the “cluster” of
observations specific to the individual. To relax the usual assumption of zero error
correlation over time for the same individual, we can adjust the estimator using clus-
ter corrected standard errors. This also relaxes the assumption of homoscedasticity
(Adkins & Hill 2011).
Theoretically, this specification can be estimated by fixed effects model, random
effect model, or first difference depending on the assumption of the error term εit.
However, our panel data set has only two waves and households might have health
insurance card in both years. As a result, when we use a dummy to represent the
health insurance enrollment in each year, the fixed effect and first difference method
will treat households who are insured in both year and households who are uninsured
in both years the same. Therefore, the best estimator is in this case is the random
effect estimator although we can also employ the between estimator. For the random
effect estimation to be consistent, we assume that the composite error term εit is
not correlated with any of the explanatory variables included in the model (Gujarati
2011, Jones et al. 2013).
4.6 Econometric results and discussion
Measuring vulnerability as expected poverty (VEP)
The results of the income function are presented in Table 4.4, where the FGLS
regression results for Equations 4.6 and 4.7 are shown for surveys in 2010 and 2012
continuously. In general, the sign of estimated coefficients are as expected, reflecting
their effects on income as in the literature.
As can be seen from Table 4.4, the coefficient of age of household head was positive
and significant in both 2010 and 2012, confirming that a household with an older
head tends to have higher per capita income. A household with a higher share of
females has a lower per capita income, as the estimated coefficients are negative
and significant. As expected, the coefficients of dependency burden are negative
and significant in both surveys, showing that a household with many old or many
young members tends to have lower level of income. The correlation between the
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Table 4.4: Estimates of Vulnerability as Expected Poverty in Vietnam
2002, 2004, 2006
2010 2012
Variable Log(Cons) Variance Log(Cons) Variance
headage 0.017* 0.055* 0.029** 0.019
(1.74) (1.70) (2.52) (0.55)
married 0.042 0.026 0.056 -0.239
(0.80) (0.15) (1.05) (-1.11)
headage2 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0002** -0.0001
(-1.55) (-1.57) (-2.04) (-0.34)
femaleshare -0.249*** 0.149 -0.217** 0.224
(-2.61) (0.52) (-2.45) (0.72)
dependshare -0.651*** -0.048 -0.534*** -0.929***
(-8.57) (-0.19) (-6.27) (-3.60)
highestedu 0.145*** 0.028 0.108*** 0.068
(7.43) (0.50) (5.45) (1.14)
agrhh 0.108** 0.153 0.265*** 0.083
(2.47) (1.35) (5.65) (0.61)
totalhousehold 0.00002 0.0001 -0.000 -0.00004
(0.61) (1.43) (-0.12) (-0.61)
targetcommune 0.088 0.083 0.090* 0.402
(1.64) (0.65) (1.81) (3.08)
povertyrate -1.378*** 0.126 -0.983*** -0.462
(-6.35) (0.21) (-5.83) (-1.38)
regularmarket -0.076 -0.024 -0.106 0.172
(-1.52) (-0.17) (-1.58) (0.97)
secondaryschool 0.153* 0.095 0.093 0.060
(1.71) (0.44) (1.15) (0.33)
distance2bus -0.004** -0.008* -0.002 -0.002**
(-2.25) (-1.91) (-3.26) (-2.31)
cons 8.785*** -4.096*** 8.214*** -2.918**
(28.49) (-4.12) (22.74) (-2.51)
N 1975 1975 1977 1977
R2 0.2195 0.0081 0.1950 0.0228
F 30.46 1.04 20.62 2.99
Prob>F 0.000 0.4076 0.000 0.0003
Note: t statistics in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 4.5: Summary of estimated VEP in 2010
and 2012
VEP 2010 VEP 2012
Observation 1942 1944
Mean 0.1295347 0.2736287
Standard Deviation 0.1911949 0.2527675
Min 0.00000183 0.0009027
Max 0.9881003 0.9997653
Source: Author’s calculation from VARHS 2010
and 2012
marital status of a household head and household income is unclear when the signs
of estimated coefficients are positive, but statistically insignificant. The estimated
coefficients reflecting the highest level of education of household members are signif-
icantly positive, reflecting the fact that a household with a higher level of education
has a higher per capita income. In this study, agricultural households are more likely
to have a higher income as the dummy coefficients are significant and positive. This
might be because all households in this data set are from rural areas. The results
also suggest that households living in communes with higher incidence of poverty or
residing in areas far away from bus station tend to have lower income.
From the estimates of consumption and the variance of disturbance term in Table
4.4, we adopt Chaudhuri’s measure to calculate each household’s vulnerability using
Equation 4.8. Assuming that the log consumption has a normal distribution, we
estimate the likelihood that a household’s future income is lower than the poverty
line. The poverty line used in this study are the national poverty line generated from
household income by MOLISA19. Next, the vulnerability index is the probability of
being poor according to the national standard. A summary of the estimated VEP in
2010 and 2012 is presented in Table 4.5. On average, rural households in Vietnam
had a 12.95 per cent probability of falling into poverty in 2010 and this number
increased to 27.36 per cent in 2012.
19During 2010 - 2012, the MOLISA income poverty line is VND 4.8 million/person/year (equiv-
alent USD 240).
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Measuring vulnerability as low expected utility (VEU)
The consumption estimation for Equation 4.16 is presented in Table 4.6. As can
be seen from this table, communes with a higher population might have higher
food consumption because there must be more purchasing activities or more food
shops. The positive and significant coefficient of the regular market variable probably
supports this explanation. If a commune has a regular market, its average food
consumption will increase. Similarly, communes with a secondary school can be
expected to have a higher level of food consumption, as the coefficient is significant
and positive. In contrast, the estimated coefficients of both the target commune and
poverty rate are significantly negative. These imply that when a commune is one
of the targeted communes or has a higher incidence of poverty, it will experience a
lower average level of food consumption.
Table 4.7 provides the results from the Panel IV estimation for Equation 19. Since
some explanatory variables are time-invariant, we can only use the random effect
regression20. In the first stage, total land area owned by a household, and per capita
of productive assets (including feed grinding machine, rice milling machine, grain
harvesting machine, tractor and plough) are used as instruments for income. It
is reasonable that these variables firstly affect income, and then indirectly affect
consumption. These instruments for income are also specified in Gaiha & Imai
(2008), Jha et al. (2010) and Jha et al. (2013). The Hansen-Sargan statistic of the
over-identification test shown in Table 4.7 indicates that the instruments used in
this situation are valid.
Results in the first stage estimation show strong evidence of a relationship between
productive assets and household income. Similarly, having more land would increase
household income as expected. Other household characteristics also contribute to
the level of household income. For example, households with an older head tend to
have higher incomes. The negative sign of the head age squared coefficient implies
that the marginal effect of age on income will reduce when the head becomes older.
If the head is married or any household member experienced a better education,
then household income tends to increase. However, a household with a higher share
of females or dependents will face a lower level of per capita income. As can be seen
from Table 4.7, in the second stage, the income coefficient is highly significant and
20The random effect regression has been used previously to calculate VEU in (Gaiha & Imai
2008) and (Jha et al. 2010).
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Table 4.6: Covariate risk component (Panel random effect)
Variable Per capita food consumption
totalhousehold 0.0000496
(3.33)***
targetcommune -0.0662523
(-2.96)***
povertyrate -0. 6435118
(-9.22)***
regularmarket 0.0479312
(1.70)*
secondaryschool 0.0818515
(1.86)*
distance2bus -0.0005328
(1.33)
cons 0.908447
(12.16)***
Number of observations 3963
Number of groups 1988
Join significance Wald chi2(6)=250.01
Prob>chi2=0.0000
Hausman test: fixed vs random effect* chi2(6)=24.53*
Prob>chi2 = 0.0004
Notes: p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard error adjusted for 1988
clusters. Robust z statistics in parentheses.
* The Hausman test supports the use of fixed effect regression. However,
according to Clark & Linzer (2014), when the independent variable ex-
hibits only minimal within-unit variation, the random-effects model will
tend to produce superior estimates of β when there are few units or ob-
servations per unit, and when the correlation between the independent
variable and unit effects is relatively low. An increase in efficiency can
offset an increase in bias.
positive. This result suggests that per capita income largely determines household
food consumption. Marital status of the household head and the education levels
of household members both affect household food consumption positively while de-
pendents and agriculture as the only source of income are factors which reduce food
consumption. Living in a more populated area contributes slightly to a higher level
of household food consumption. In addition, if households reside in a commune with
a regular market, their food consumption may increase. As expected, households in
poorer communes and targeted communes have lower food consumption. Surpris-
ingly, distance to a bus station is positively correlated with food consumption.
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Table 4.7: Idiosyncratic risk component (Panel random effect IV model)
Variable First stage Second stage
(pc income) (pc consumption)
ntotalincome 0.3191125
(6.71)***
headage 0.0326934 0.0103375
(4.53)*** (1.59)
married 0.2094052 0.1413307
(5.71)*** (4.13)***
headage2 -0.0002982 -0.0000812
(-4.51)*** (-1.36)
femaleshare -0.2029016 -0.0313423
(-3.00)*** (-0.52)
dependshare -0.1901757 -0.136678
(-3.35)*** (-2.69)***
highestedu 0.0967099 0.0868081
(6.86)*** (6.63)***
agrhh 0.0066595 -0.1872426
(0.25) (-8.02)***
totalhousehold 0.0000121 0.0000405
(0.95) (3.64)***
targetcommune 0.135024 -0.1037634
(5.53)*** (-4.48)***
povertyrate -1.01589 -0.3393418
(-13.44)*** (-4.21)***
regularmarket -0.0011191 0.0565362
(-0.04) (2.12)**
secondaryschool 0.0356218 0.06378
(0.88)*** (1.79)*
distance2bus -0.0017999 0.001261
(-2.81)*** (2.23)**
totalland 0.1040897
(17.11)***
productiveasset 0.4654674
(4.93)***
cons -0.0316537 0.1290584
(-0.14) (0.66)
Number of observations 3952 3952
Join significance Wald chi(15)=884 Wald chi2(14)=663.15
Prob>chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Sargan-Hansen test for Chi2(1)=1.210
over-identification restriction Prob>chi2=0.2713
Notes: p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses.
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Table 4.8: Decomposition of average vulnerability during 2010-2012
VEU Poverty Covariate risk Idiosyncratic risk Unexplained risk
0.7108 0.4314 -0.3410 0.4288 0.1905
Source: Author’s calculation from VARHS 2010 and 2012.
The results obtained from Equation 4.15 and Equation 4.16 are used to derive
E(cit|X¯t) and E(cit|X¯t, Xit). We then calculate the mean of normalized food con-
sumption to obtain Ecit as shown in Equation 4.14. Finally, we use the utility
function 4.13 to estimate four components of Equation 4.12. A household’s VEU is
the sum of four separate components. The aggregate VEU and its components are
presented in Table 4.8. The estimate of the average VEU (0.7108) is our estimate
of the vulnerability of the whole households. This implies that the utility of the
average household is 71 per cent less than the hypothetical situation without any
risk or inequality in consumption. This level of utility vulnerability is lower than the
estimation of Gaiha & Imai (2008) which is 0.7476 but much higher than the esti-
mation of Jha et al. (2013) which is around 0.3016. Idiosyncratic shocks contribute
considerably to the utility loss (approximately 60 per cent). However, the negative
sign of the aggregate risk component indicates that economic growth cancels the
negative covariate shocks and even reduce the vulnerability. We may argue that the
utility loss would be more serious if there had been less economic growth in rural
Vietnam during the period of 2010-2012.
Impact of health insurance on VEU and VEP
To estimate the impact of health insurance on vulnerability, we first calculate the
propensity scores for households covered in the data set. The probit regression is
employed to estimate the propensity score by default21. The dependent variable is
health insurance coverage which is represented by a dummy taking the value of one
for the treatment group and zero for the control group. There are two requirements
for the explanatory variables in order to get an accurate estimation of the propensity
scores. First, the independent variables need to be exogenous to the health insurance
variable used as the dependent variable (Heckman & Vytlacil 1999, Ravallion 2001).
Therefore, we decide to choose explanatory variables from the 2010 VARHS rather
21The Stata command pscore is employed in this study and the probit is used to estimate propen-
sity score by default. The balancing test is also provided. The estimated results are similar with
the Stata command ‘psmatch2 ’ (Table C.1).
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than from the 2012 VARHS. Second, the independent variables should affect both the
vulnerability index and health insurance coverage (Ravallion 2001). In this study,
these variables include health insurance status in 2010, health status, risk aversion,
income, asset, age of household head, marital status of the head, female share of the
household, dependent share of the household, occupation and distance to the nearest
bus station. Other commune variables representing the covariate shocks that might
affect health insurance decision such as drought, flood, epidemic, livestock disease
and other shocks are also added to the regression. They are all for the year 201022.
One might have a concern that compulsory and voluntary health insurance schemes
are treated equivalently in our analysis. However, during the time span of the data,
the difference between the two schemes would be trivial because of certain reasons:
First, the compulsory health insurance scheme in Vietnam is not strictly compulsory
and therefore, the coverage rate of this scheme is not 100 per cent for all groups of
households (Table 4.5). Households who are not fully subsidized in compulsory
groups will go through a decision making process similar to what households in
voluntary groups will do. In addition, the premium is quite small in comparison
with other types of consumption; then although households in compulsory groups
are partly subsidized, the amount of money they have to pay for a health insurance
card is not much different from that of households in voluntary scheme. Also, health
insurance for the poor and health insurance for children under six years of age, who
are compulsorily insured and fully subsidized, are excluded to keep the incentive
gap at the minimal level. For households with labor contract, they are supposed
to receive health insurance card from their employers. But if employers refuse to
provide health insurance illegally and intentionally, employees can choose to stay
or find a better job with health insurance (Monheit & Vistnes 2008). Hence, their
probability of having a health insurance card might depend on their risk preference
or factors representing their negotiating power such as education, age rather than
types of health insurance schemes.
Table 4.9 shows the results of the probit regression on health insurance. As can be
seen from the table, the insured and the uninsured household are statistically differ-
ent in several characteristics. For instance, households who have health insurance
in 2010 are more likely to have health insurance in 2012. Households with a higher
income tend to own at least one health insurance in 2012. Households with higher
22The balancing property is satisfied for 7 blocks with the pscore Stata command.
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proportion of females increase the probability of purchasing health insurance. Sim-
ilarly, households living in an area with a high incidence of epidemics tend to have
health insurance. However, living in a commune with a high incidence of drought
and livestock disease reduce the probability of purchasing health insurance. This
might be because these types of risks do not affect household member’s health sta-
tus. Also, households with agricultural jobs or with a higher dependent share have
less demand on health insurance. In our study, health status defined by the number
of days on sick leave during past 12 month (in survey 2010) does not affect health
insurance status in 2012.
In our paper, it seems that risk aversion indexes (both the cumulative risk aversion
and the absolute risk aversion) do not affect the decision to purchase health insur-
ance because the estimated coefficients are negative and insignificant (Table 4.9)23.
This result contrasts with Condliffe & Fiorentino (2014) where individuals who are
more likely to engage risk behavior are less likely to carry health insurance. There
are four possible reasons for this. First, risk aversion effect in our paper is offset
by ‘rigidity effect’ that individuals are least likely to change their current insurance
plan. Several previous studies have pointed out that individuals tend to appreciate
the value of their current health insurance plan; therefore, they are less likely to
purchase health insurance if they have never bought it before (Costa-Font & Garcia-
Villar 2009, Friedman 1974, Marquis & Holmer 1996)24. In our result, the impact
of health insurance status in 2010 was positive and strongly significant. Therefore,
we have reason to believe that the ‘rigidity effect’ exists. Second, households might
prefer other types of insurance over health insurance because the gain from health
insurance is uncertain and ambiguous (Marquis & Holmer 1996)25. Third, the effect
of individual risk aversion might be stronger for decisions taken in the near future
and then might reduce considerably in next two years (which is the duration between
the two surveys). Once we try to estimate the impact of risk aversion on any type of
insurance coverage, we find the positive and significant effects in the same year but
not significant in the next two years (Table C.3 and Table C.4 in Appendix C)26.
23In Table C.2 in the Appendix C, we classified households into three different groups of risk
attitude and found that households with low risk aversion (i.e. prefer taking risk) are more likely
to have health insurance.
24Thaler (1980) calls this the “endowment effect”; Samuelson & Zeckhauser (1988) call this a
“status quo” bias; and Costa-Font & Garcia-Villar (2009) call this the “captive preference”.
25Vietnamese newspapers note that in Phuong (2013) and Trang (2012).
26However, we cannot deny that simultaneous bias with this specification because independent
variable and dependent variables in the probit model are collected in the same survey.
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Similarly, Bernstein (2009) shows that risk preference does not explain the dispar-
ity in health insurance coverage and any increase in insurance coverage is closely
associated with changes that result in insurance being more affordable and accessi-
ble such as in socio-economic circumstances, incomes, marital status and education.
Four, this might reflect the fact that the market for health insurance is limited and
mainly provided by few state companies. A health insurance purchasing decision is
restrained not only by limited health insurance choices, but also by the complicated
purchasing process. For instance, households are strictly required to enroll all house-
hold members who have a name on the household certificate, despite the fact that
some members had migrated to other places. The complexity for enrolment criteria
and process hinders the increase of the coverage as pointed out in Matsushima &
Yamada (2014).
Table 4.10 reports the health insurance impact on vulnerability using propensity
score matching and the difference-in-difference method. The kernel-matching esti-
mator is applied with a bandwidth of 0.06 for interpretation27. The first and second
columns present the difference between treatment and control groups in 2012 and
2010, respectively. They are estimated components of ATT2012,X,H2010 . Therefore,
the difference-in-difference estimates in the last column are attributed to the health
insurance impact, or ATT2012,X,H2010 . Table 4.10 shows that health insurance cover-
age has significantly reduced household vulnerability. More specifically, the impact
of health insurance on the idiosyncratic component of VEU is -0.35. Now recall that
in the estimates from our whole sample, idiosyncratic component causes around 0.43
(or 43 per cent) of utility loss (Table 4.8). That means health insurance reduces 35
percentage points of utility loss caused by idiosyncratic shocks. In other words, on
average, health insurance helps rural households in Vietnam reduce the idiosyncratic
component of utility loss by 81 per cent. In addition, the impact of health insurance
on the probability of falling into income poverty (VEP) is -0.05 (or -5 per cent).
From our previous estimates in Table 4.5, on average, households in 2012 have a 27
per cent probability of falling into poverty. That means health insurance helps rural
households in Vietnam reduce the probability of being poor by about 19 per cent.
27Bootstrapping for the nearest neighbour matching may not provide accurate standard errors
(Abadie & Imbens 2008) even though the nearest neighbour matching and the kernel matching
yield similar results.
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Table 4.9: Logit regression of health insurance (with risk aversion index)
Cumulative risk aversion index Absolute risk aversion index
insurance20121 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
insurance20101 0.4493*** 0.1096 0.4529*** 0.1093
healthstatus -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0004
riskaversion1 -0.0123 0.0284
abriskaversion1 -0.0716 0.0606
lpcincome 0.2422*** 0.0461 0.2428*** 0.0460
headage 0.0061 0.0196 0.0060 0.0196
married 0.1101 0.0978 0.1111 0.0978
headage2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
femaleshare 0.3939** 0.1867 0.3981** 0.1868
dependshare -0.3992*** 0.1543 -0.4028*** 0.1543
agrhh -0.2118*** 0.0748 -0.2154*** 0.0749
distance2bus -0.0048 0.0030 -0.0047 0.0030
asset -0.0890 0.0590 -0.0881 0.0590
drought -0.0126** 0.0051 -0.0127** 0.0050
flood -0.0016 0.0039 -0.0018 0.0039
epidemic 0.1712* 0.0891 0.1664* 0.0890
livestock -0.0114*** 0.0042 -0.0112*** 0.0042
othershock 0.0197 0.0131 0.0195 0.0131
cons -3.2029*** 0.6870 -3.1893*** 0.6843
Number of obs 1988 Number of obs 1988
LR chi2(17) 195.46 LR chi2(17) 196.65
Prob >chi2 0.0000 Prob >chi2 0.0000
Log likelihood -1100.671 Log likelihood -1100.074
Pseudo R2 0.0815 Pseudo R2 0.0820
Notes: t statistics in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table 4.10: Impact of health insurance on vulnerability
2012 2010 Difference-in-difference
Covariate risk 0.16*** 0.22*** -0.06***
(4.941) (6.976) (-13.338)
Idiosyncratic risk -0.51** -0.16*** -0.35**
(-2.131) (-4.202) (-2.243)
VEP -0.08*** -0.03*** -0.05***
(-9.446) (-4.736) (-7.95)
Notes: pscore-Kernel matching with bandwidth of 0.06
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Robustness analysis
We examine the robustness of the matching method by treating the data set as a
panel data set. The independent variable in the regression is utility loss index due to
idiosyncratic shocks because health problems are classified into idiosyncratic shocks.
Therefore, the regression is an attempt to estimate the effect of health insurance
coverage on idiosyncratic shocks when applicable. The random effect estimator is
used because some explanatory variables are time-invariant or have minimal within-
unit variation28. One example is our key explanatory variable representing health
insurance coverage. Risk aversion index is used as an explanatory variable in addi-
tion to other household characteristics and commune characteristics so that we can
minimize the possible correlation between error term and explanatory variables.
Table 4.11 reports the results for the models used to estimate the impact of health
insurance coverage on household vulnerability. Absolute risk aversion index is used
as an explanatory variable in this case29. Without control variables, the estimated
coefficient of health insurance is -0.26 and significant. This implies health insurance
coverage helps to reduce utility loss by 26 percentage points. Using the between
estimator for panel data, we have larger impact of health insurance at -0.56. If we
add household characteristics and commune characteristics into the regression, the
random effect estimator produces an impact of health insurance of about -0.23 and
the between estimator gives an impact of around -0.49.
Because of the data collection timing, we do not know when households bought
health insurance. It could have been at the beginning or at the end of the year.
Therefore, we assume that the impact of health insurance coverage should be the
impact of total health insurance during the time between the two surveys. Therefore,
in our regression, the explanatory variable becomes the total health insurance that
a household has during 2010 and 2012. The number is the sum of health insurance
they have in the 2010 survey and in the 2012 survey. Dependent variables are the
28P values in Hausman tests ranges from 0.0641 to 0.1145, showing that we cannot reject the
REM at 5%. However, we take the results from the Hausman test with caution for some reasons: 1)
According to Jones et al. (2013), in a finite sample, a standard application of the Hausman test may
not lead to a reliable test statistic. 2) According to Clark & Linzer (2014), when the independent
variable exhibits only minimal within-unit variation, the random-effects model will tend to produce
superior estimates of β when there are few units or observations per unit, and when the correlation
between the independent variable and unit effects is relatively low. An increase in efficiency can
offset an increase in bias even the Hausman test supports the use of fixed effect regression.
29Results with cumulative risk aversion index are also provided in the Table C.9 and C.10 of
Appendix C. Hausman tests favour REM because p-values vary from 0.0771 to 0.1321.
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Table 4.11: Impact of health insurance coverage on idiosyncratic VEU
(health insurance at the time of interview, absolute)
Random Between Random Between
effect variation effect variation
Health insurance -0.261*** -0.558*** -0.231*** -0.486**
(Yes/No at the time (0.043) (0.160) (0.069) (0.167)
of interview)
Absolute risk aversion -0.164* -0.082 -0.129* -0.104
(0.088) (0.165) (0.076) (0.163)
Health status -0.030 -0.009 -0.068 -0.067
(0.032) (0.065) (0.059) (0.066)
Per capita income (log) -0.270*** -0.251*** -0.174*** -0.163**
(0.058) (0.060) (0.045) (0.066)
Household characteristics No No Yes Yes
Commune characteristics No No Yes Yes
N 3952 3952 3952 3952
R2 0.019 0.066
F 9.524 5.991
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
same. As seen in Table 4.12, with the random effect estimator, having a health
insurance will reduce utility loss about -0.21. Similarly, with the between estimator,
the impact of health insurance is about -0.24. Although these results are not exactly
the same as the estimates from the matching method, they reinforce our findings
about the negative and significant impact of health insurance coverage on household
vulnerability.
Although we have captured various factors in our model specification and the difference-
in-difference method helps to eliminate the impact of unobserved time-invariant fac-
tors, there is still a concern about other unobserved variables that might affect both
health insurance enrolment and vulnerability. If this situation exists, our matching
estimators violate the conditional independence or unconfoundedness assumption
(CIA) and may lead to a hidden bias. In this paper, we adopt a sensitivity analysis
proposed by Ichino et al. (2008), building on Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) and Rosen-
baum (1987). They suggest that if the CIA is not satisfied given observables but
it is satisfied if one could observe an additional binary variable (confounder), then
this potential confounder could be simulated in the data and used as an additional
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Table 4.12: Impact of health insurance coverage on idiosyncratic VEU
(total health insurances across surveys, absolute)
Random Between Random Between
effect variation effect variation
Health insurance -0.274*** -0.269*** -0.214*** -0.235**
(Total insurance across surveys) (0.044) (0.080) (0.057) (0.084)
Absolute risk aversion -0.164* -0.082 -0.133* -0.105
(0.088) (0.165) (0.077) (0.163)
Health status -0.029 -0.008 -0.070 -0.066
(0.032) (0.065) (0.059) (0.066)
Per capita income (log) -0.239*** -0.251*** -0.161*** -0.163**
(0.055) (0.060) (0.043) (0.067)
Household characteristics No No Yes Yes
Commune characteristics No No Yes Yes
N 3952 3952 3952 3952
R2 0.018 0.065
F 9.273 5.961
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
covariate in combination with the preferred matching estimator. The comparison
of the estimates obtained with and without matching on the simulated confounder
shows to what extent the baseline results are robust to specific sources of failure of
the CIA, since the distribution of the simulated variable can be constructed to cap-
ture different hypotheses on the nature of potential confounding factors (Nannicini
2007).
In this study, we use two covariates to simulate the confounder namely: young (age
of household head is less than 47, or in the 25th centile of age distribution) and low
education (with no diploma). These covariates are selected to capture the effect
of unobservable factors like ability and experience. If the ATT estimates change
dramatically with respect to these confounders, our results might be not robust. We
employ the kernel matching algorithm with between-imputation standard errors.
Since our outcome variable is continuous, the confounders is stimulated on the basis
of the binary transformation of the outcome along the 75th centile. The results
of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 4.13 and Table 4.14. For both
confounders, the simulated ATT estimated are very close to the baseline estimates.
126
Table 4.13: Simulation-based sensitivity analysis for matching estimators (2010,
confounders: young and low education)
ATT2010 Standard error Outcome effect Selection effect
Young -0.147 0.008 1.623 0.456
Low education -0.154 0.004 3.552 0.582
Notes: Based on the sensitivity analysis with kernel matching algorithm with
between-imputation standard error. The binary transformation of the outcome is
along the 75 centile. Young variable (=1 if age is less than 41 years, or the 25
centile) and low education (=1 if households do not have any certificate). Both
the outcome and the selection effect are odds ratios from logit estimations.
Table 4.14: Simulation-based sensitivity analysis for matching estimators (2012,
confounders: young and low education)
ATT2012 Standard error Outcome effect Selection effect
Young -0.512 0.043 1.206 0.440
Low education -0.508 0.039 2.572 0.565
Notes: Based on the sensitivity analysis with kernel matching algorithm with
between-imputation standard error. The binary transformation of the outcome is
along the 75 centile. Young variable (=1 if age is less than 41 years, or the 25
centile) and low education (=1 if households do not have any certificate). Both
the outcome and the selection effect are odds ratios from logit estimations.
The outcome and selection effect on vulnerability is positive but not very large. The
results confirm a robustness of the matching estimates.
4.7 Policy implication and conclusion
Health shocks are one of the major cause of vulnerability and poverty in Vietnam.
Therefore, the government of Vietnam has endeavored to increase the health insur-
ance enrollment in order to attain its goal of universal health insurance coverage.
This paper is an attempt to provide empirical evidence for an effective health policy
in Vietnam. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first empirical paper
measuring the impact of health insurance coverage on household ex-ante vulnerabil-
ity.
Using the propensity score matching method and data from Vietnam Access to
Resources Household Surveys (VARHS) during 2010-2012, we investigate whether
health insurance coverage has any impact on the probability of falling into poverty
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(VEP) and the magnitude of utility loss (VEU). In particular, household’s risk be-
havior has been taken into account when measuring health insurance demand. Our
estimates show that health insurance helps rural households in Vietnam reduce the
idiosyncratic component of utility loss by 81 per cent. In addition, health insurance
helps rural households in Vietnam reduce the probability of being poor by about 19
per cent.
The study’s findings suggest that the expansion of health insurance enrollment
should be encouraged to reduce household vulnerability. The fact that higher in-
come increase probability of purchasing health insurance suggests that government’s
subsidies for health insurance purchasers will boost the enrollment expansion. How-
ever, the reverse effect of the risk aversion on health insurance enrollment implies
not only a potential ‘rigidity’ effect on health insurance demand but also deficiencies
in health insurance market. Therefore, to expand the breadth of coverage from the
demand side, the government should enrich information, education and communica-
tion about health insurance. Simultaneously, from the supply side, the government
should issue health insurance card along with reduction of unnecessary bureaucracy.
Finally yet importantly, although we have reasons to believe the estimation bias
in this paper is minimal, future studies could improve upon our results if the
data improves in certain regards. First, the two identification assumptions in the
PSM method can be checked. In addition, questionnaires about the household
health insurance coverage can help to differentiate between compulsory and volun-
tary schemes; and questionnaires about risk attitudes should be designed to increase
the payoff and therefore, draw attention to the answers.
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Chapter 5
General Conclusion
Vulnerability is distinct from poverty. Vulnerability is considered an ex ante measure.
Therefore, understanding vulnerability is important for poverty alleviation policies
where it is desirable to know the causes for the poor retaining that status, and
the non-poor falling into poverty. Drawing upon the Vietnam Household Living
Standard Surveys and the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Surveys, this
thesis investigates the association between vulnerability and household welfare in
Vietnam.
5.1 Main findings of the thesis
I begin in Chapter 2 by analyzing vulnerability as expected poverty in Vietnam and
reveal that, (i) vulnerability estimated using the reference line is more appropriate
than when estimated using the actual poverty line for poverty prediction in the
case of Vietnam; (ii) ex ante vulnerability in previous periods might translate to ex
post poverty in the following periods though both vulnerability and the incidence of
poverty tend to fall over time; (iii) the vulnerability of the poor may trap them in
poverty; and (iv) the vulnerability of the non-poor could propel them into poverty.
Further analysis on household vulnerability in Vietnam, Chapter 3 investigates
sources of household vulnerability and responses to risks in rural Vietnam using data
from Vietnam Access to Resources Household Surveys (VARHS). The main findings
are that: (i) the utility of the average household is 71% less than the hypothetical
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situation without any risk or inequality in consumption, and idiosyncratic shocks
contribute 50% of the loss; (ii) households depend heavily on informal coping strate-
gies such as food consumption reduction, savings withdrawal, taking children out of
school, or capital depletion. The opportunity to borrow money from formal institu-
tions is limited, while subsidies from the government or NGOs are available only in
cases of natural disaster; and (iii) household consumption and income exhibit highly
correlated variation, implying that existing informal insurance instruments are less
effective than expected.
Finally, Chapter 4 provides new evidence on the impact of health insurance coverage
on household vulnerability using Vietnam Access to Resources Household Surveys
(VARHS) undertaken during 2010-2012. The outcomes of interest are the probability
of falling into poverty (VEP) and the magnitude of utility loss (VEU). The estimates
show that health insurance coverage helps rural households in Vietnam reduce the
idiosyncratic component of utility loss by 81% and has the added benefit of reducing
the probability of being poor by about 19%. The reverse effect of the risk aversion on
health insurance enrollment implies that not only is there a potential ‘rigidity’ effect
on health insurance demand, but also that there are deficiencies in health insurance
market.
5.2 Policy implications
The findings of this thesis provide insight into poverty reduction policies, which are
not only applicable to Vietnam but also for other developing countries that are striv-
ing for the elimination of poverty. This is the first study to provide evidence that
targeted interventions for poverty reduction in Vietnam should consider taking ac-
count of household vulnerability because poverty measures based on static indicators
are unlikely to be effective if covariate and idiosyncratic shocks have a considerable
effect on household living standards. Since the vulnerable may not be the same
group as the poor, the interventions should be different so that the non-poor do not
fall into poverty, and the poor can find a way to get out of poverty. In addition, pro-
poor policies should focus on the infrastructure use of households and be integrated
with the migration policies.
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The findings of the second study (Chapter 3) provide evidence of the need to design
strong safety nets in rural Vietnam. The limited availability of government pro-
grams as a coping strategy suggests an expansion of this type of formal assistance
would reduce household vulnerability. Also, formal financial institutions located in
rural areas should be encouraged. Ultimately, targeted interventions should take
into account the household idiosyncratic shocks which seriously affect household
vulnerability. Specifically, intervention programs should find ways to reduce capital
depletion in rural households. This would not only help households to overcome
their hardships in the short run, but would also sustain their welfare in the long run.
The third study’s findings (Chapter 4) suggest that the expansion of health insur-
ance enrollment should be encouraged to reduce household vulnerability. The fact
that a higher income increases probability of purchasing health insurance suggests
that government’s subsidies for health insurance purchasers will boost the enroll-
ment expansion. However, the reverse effect of risk aversion on health insurance
enrollment implies that there is not only a potential ‘rigidity’ effect on health in-
surance demand, but also deficiencies in the health insurance market. Therefore, to
expand the breadth of coverage from the demand side, the government should enrich
information, education and communication about health insurance. Simultaneously,
from the supply side, the government should issue health insurance card along with
reduction of unnecessary bureaucracy.
5.3 Contributions to the literature
This thesis has contributed to the improvement of the vulnerability measures and a
better understanding of the relationship between vulnerability and household wel-
fare. In terms of vulnerability measures, this thesis is the first to adopt the reference
line in measures of vulnerability, along with cross-sectional data. In order to gain
an understanding of vulnerability, one chapter in the thesis is the first to decompose
sources of vulnerability in rural Vietnam. Together with other estimations, the thesis
provides a complete set of vulnerability assessments in Vietnam. More importantly,
the third study in this thesis is the first in the literature to investigate the impact
of health insurance coverage on household vulnerability. And finally, this thesis has
been able to improve the specifications for the models used in previous attempts.
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5.4 Future directions for research
Finally yet importantly, although we have provided a complete assessment of vul-
nerability in Vietnam, there are still spaces for future studies. First, with the first
topic in chapter 2, one may have interest in particular groups of household such
as middle-class group or ethnic minority group. So vulnerability analysis for these
groups are necessary and important. In addition, role of participation in social group
as a form of the social capital on household vulnarability are important. Actually,
the VARHS data includes various information using to measure social capital, then
this data is appororiate for further research on social capital in rural Vietnam. I am
myself conducting a separate study on that for the case of Vietnam.
Besides, with the second topic in the chapter 3, we have not known the effectiveness
of household coping strategies one by one although we provided the general analysis
for the existing informal instruments. Therefore, if questions about the household
recovery status are available as in the project of Klasen and Waibel (2010), the
vulnarability analysis will provide a more interesting picture. Another important
topic I wish to add to this study is the impact of households coping strategies on
their childrens development.
Although we have reasons to believe the estimation bias in the study is minimal
in chapter 4, future studies could improve upon our results if the data for anal-
ysis improves in certain regards. First, the two identification assumptions in the
PSM method can be checked. In addition, questionnaires about the household
health insurance coverage can help to differentiate between compulsory and volun-
tary schemes; and questionnaires about risk attitudes should be designed to increase
the payoff and therefore, draw attention to the answers.
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Table A.1: Data sections of VHLSS 2002, 2004 and 2006
VHLSS 2002 VHLSS 2004 VHLSS 2006
Household
Section 1 Household members Household members Household members
Section 2 Education of household members Education of household members Education of household members
Section 3 Health of household members Health and disability of household Health and disability of household
members members
Section 4 Income and employment Income and employment Income and employment
Section 5 Consumption expenditure Consumption expenditure Consumption expenditure
Section 6 Fixed assets and durables Fixed assets and durables Fixed assets and durables
Section 7 Housing Housing Housing
Section 8 Credit and participation in Credit and participation in Credit and participation in
poverty reduction programs poverty reduction programs poverty reduction programs
Section 9 Agriculture, forestry, and
aquaculture activities
Section 10 Business, non-agriculture, non-forestry,
and non-aquaculture activities
Commune
Section 1 Basic characteristics of commune Basic characteristics of commune Basic characteristics of commune
Continued on next page
Table A.1 – continued from previous page
VHLSS 2002 VHLSS 2004 VHLSS 2006
Section 2 Economic situation and assistance Economic situation and assistance Economic situation and assistance
programs programs programs
Section 3 Non-farm employment Non-farm employment Non-farm employment
Section 4 Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture
Section 5 Infrastructure Infrastructure Infrastructure
Section 6 Education Education Education
Section 7 Health Health Health
Section 8 Social issues Social issues Social issues
Note: Base line case is ‘non-poor’ in both surveys. Robust t statistics in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics of VHLSS 2002
2002
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max
lnpcexp2rl Log of per capita household 28806 7.992 0.607 5.785 11.328
expenditure in food
and non-food items
headage Age of head of 28806 47.596 14.309 16.000 107.00
the household
femaleshare Share of number of female 28806 0.512 0.201 0.000 1.000
members in total number
of household members
dependshare Share of household 28806 0.358 0.248 0.000 1.000
members under 15 years or
above 65 years in total
household members
married Whether the household 28806 0.819 0.385 0.000 1.000
head is married or not
primary Whether the highest level 28806 0.241 0.428 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is primary
school or not
lowersecond Whether the highest level 28806 0.320 0.466 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is lower
school or not
uppersecond Whether the highest level 28806 0.171 0.376 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is upper
school or not
techschool Whether the highest level 28806 0.084 0.277 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is technical
Continued on next page
Table A.2 – continued from previous page
2002
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max
school or not
highedu Whether the highest level 28806 0.071 0.256 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is college
or university
arghh Whether main source of income 28806 0.434 0.496 0.000 1.000
is agriculture or not
totalland Total land area owned 28806 0.607 1.479 0.000 93.000
by household members
urban Whether the household is 28806 0.233 0.423 0.000 1.000
located in rural areas (=1) or
urban areas (=0)
inland Whether the household is 28806 0.565 0.496 0.000 1.000
located in inland delta
hill Whether the household is 28806 0.070 0.256 0.000 1.000
located in hills
lowmountain Whether the household is 28806 0.152 0.359 0.000 1.000
located in low mountains
highmountain Whether the household is 28806 0.134 0.341 0.000 1.000
located in high mountains
region1 28806 0.215 0.411 0.000 1.000
region2 28806 0.146 0.353 0.000 1.000
region3 28806 0.034 0.182 0.000 1.000
region4 28806 0.115 0.320 0.000 1.000
region5 28806 0.093 0.290 0.000 1.000
region6 28806 0.058 0.234 0.000 1.000
region7 28806 0.124 0.330 0.000 1.000
region8 28806 0.214 0.410 0.000 1.000
electricity Whether the household 28806 0.936 0.245 0.000 1.000
belongs to the commune
Continued on next page
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2002
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max
with power supply
distanceavg Average distance to road, 28806 2.327 3.687 0.000 37.778
water transportation,
passenger pick-up point,
commune headquarter,
commune centre, post
office, telephone service
provider, daily market
and weekly market (km2)
Source: VHLSS 2002
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics of VHLSS 2004
2004
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max
lnpcexp2rl Log of per capita household 6554 8.078 0.507 6.369 10.438
expenditure in food
and non-food items
headage Age of head of 6554 48.667 14.167 15.000 98.000
the household
femaleshare Share of number of female 6554 0.509 0.194 0.000 1.000
members in total number
of household members
dependshare Share of household 6554 0.352 0.255 0.000 1.000
members under 15 years or
above 65 years in total
household members
married Whether the household 6554 0.828 0.378 0.000 1.000
head is married or not
primary Whether the highest level 6554 0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is primary
school or not
lowersecond Whether the highest level 6554 0.329 0.470 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is lower
school or not
uppersecond Whether the highest level 6554 0.161 0.368 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is upper
school or not
techschool Whether the highest level 6554 0.122 0.327 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is technical
Continued on next page
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2004
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max
school or not
highedu Whether the highest level 6554 0.041 0.198 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is college
or university
arghh Whether main source of income 6554 0.497 0.500 0.000 1.000
is agriculture or not
totalland Total land area owned 6554 0.816 1.619 0.000 37.870
by household members
urban Whether the household is 6554 0.002 0.048 0.000 1.000
located in rural areas (=1) or
urban areas (=0)
inland Whether the household is 6554 0.527 0.499 0.000 1.000
located in inland delta
hill Whether the household is 6554 0.071 0.257 0.000 1.000
located in hills
lowmountain Whether the household is 6554 0.160 0.367 0.000 1.000
located in low mountains
highmountain Whether the household is 6554 0.175 0.380 0.000 1.000
located in high mountains
region1 6554 0.228 0.419 0.000 1.000
region2 6554 0.150 0.357 0.000 1.000
region3 6554 0.055 0.229 0.000 1.000
region4 6554 0.122 0.327 0.000 1.000
region5 6554 0.089 0.284 0.000 1.000
region6 6554 0.062 0.242 0.000 1.000
region7 6554 0.091 0.287 0.000 1.000
region8 6554 0.203 0.402 0.000 1.000
electricity Whether the household 6554 0.962 0.192 0.000 1.000
belongs to the commune
Continued on next page
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2004
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max
with power supply
distanceavg Average distance to road, 6554 2.846 3.398 -1.444 36.833
water transportation,
passenger pick-up point,
commune headquarter,
commune centre, post
office, telephone service
provider, daily market
and weekly market (km2)
Source: VHLSS 2004
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Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics of VHLSS 2006
2006
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max
lnpcexp2rl Log of per capita household 6828 8.345 0.520 6.530 10.619
expenditure in food
and non-food items
headage Age of head of 6828 48.866 13.825 17.000 97.000
the household
femaleshare Share of number of female 6828 0.518 0.196 0.000 1.000
members in total number
of household members
dependshare Share of household 6828 0.331 0.267 0.000 1.000
members under 15 years or
above 65 years in total
household members
married Whether the household 6828 0.829 0.376 0.000 1.000
head is married or not
primary Whether the highest level 6828 0.232 0.422 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is primary
school or not
lowersecond Whether the highest level 6828 0.318 0.466 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is lower
school or not
uppersecond Whether the highest level 6828 0.170 0.376 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is upper
school or not
techschool Whether the highest level 6828 0.135 0.342 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is technical
Continued on next page
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2006
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max
school or not
highedu Whether the highest level 6828 0.040 0.197 0.000 1.000
of education of household
members is college
or university
arghh Whether main source of income 6828 0.472 0.499 0.000 1.000
is agriculture or not
totalland Total land area owned 6828 0.781 1.683 0.000 45.010
by household members
urban Whether the household is 6828 0.000 0.021 0.000 1.000
located in rural areas (=1) or
urban areas (=0)
inland Whether the household is 6828 0.526 0.499 0.000 1.000
located in inland delta
hill Whether the household is 6828 0.070 0.255 0.000 1.000
located in hills
lowmountain Whether the household is 6828 0.174 0.379 0.000 1.000
located in low mountains
highmountain Whether the household is 6828 0.158 0.365 0.000 1.000
located in high mountains
region1 6828 0.223 0.416 0.000 1.000
region2 6828 0.150 0.357 0.000 1.000
region3 6828 0.052 0.222 0.000 1.000
region4 6828 0.125 0.330 0.000 1.000
region5 6828 0.086 0.280 0.000 1.000
region6 6828 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000
region7 6828 0.089 0.285 0.000 1.000
region8 6828 0.215 0.411 0.000 1.000
electricity Whether the household 6828 0.976 0.152 0.000 1.000
belongs to the commune
Continued on next page
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2006
Variable Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max
with power supply
distanceavg Average distance to road, 6828 3.208 4.199 -1.556 43.667
water transportation,
passenger pick-up point,
commune headquarter,
commune centre, post
office, telephone service
provider, daily market
and weekly market (km2)
Source: VHLSS 2006
144
Appendix B
Appendix Chapter 3
145
Table B.1: Summary statistics of variables in VARHS 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012
Variables Definition Obs Mean SD Min Max
lpcincome Log of per capita household income (2006 price) 4860 8.713 0.845 3.178 12.457
lpcfoodconsumption Log of per capita household food consumption (2006 price) 4858 7.346 0.728 3.951 9.379
headage Age of head of the household 4860 51.780 12.639 22 97
married Whether the household head is married or not 4859 0.848 0.359 0 1
femaleshare Share of number of female members in total number of household members 4860 0.502 0.180 0 1
dependshare Share of household members under 15 years or above 65 years 4860 0.278 0.256 0 1
highestedu Highest certificate of household head 4854 1.310 0.881 1 6
arghh Whether the income sources of household is purely from agriculture or not 4860 0.225 0.418 0 1
totalland Total land area owned by household members 4860 0.868 1.974 0 76.621
productiveasset Total number of productive asset 4860 0.043 0.115 0 1.500
laborshare Ratio of working members over total members 4860 0.718 0.235 0 1.250
totalhousehold Total number of households in the commune 4860 1834.98 868.182 314 17767
targetcommune Whether the commune belongs to any list of targeted programs or not 4860 0.512 0.500 0 1
povertyrate Poverty headcount rate of the commune 4860 0.170 0.150 0 0.960
regularmarket Whether the commune has a regular market or not 4848 1.729 0.445 1 2
secondaryschool Whether the commune has a secondary school or not 4850 1.096 0.295 1 2
distance2bus Distance to nearest bus station 4860 26.553 61.755 0 990
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Table C.1: Impact of health insurance on vulnerability (psmatch2 )
2012 2010 Difference-in-difference
Covariate risk 0.14*** 0.20*** -0.06***
(3.42) (4.63) (-7.30)
Idiosyncratic risk -0.49*** -0.14*** -0.35***
(-3.67) (-2.93) (-2.79)
Notes: psmatch2 -Kernel matching with bandwidth of 0.06
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Table C.2: Logit regression of health insurance
(group dummy)
Cumulative risk aversion Absolute risk aversion
group group
insurance20121 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
insurance20101 0.4548*** 0.1095 0.4369*** 0.1100
healthstatus -0.0002 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0004
riskavermed -0.0967 0.0728
riskaverlow 0.3544*** 0.1187
abrisk1med 0.0378 0.0652
abrisk1low 0.7912*** 0.1806
lpcincome 0.2454*** 0.0462 0.2436*** 0.0461
headage 0.0079 0.0196 0.0083 0.0197
married 0.1161 0.0978 0.1166 0.0984
headage2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002
femaleshare 0.3698** 0.1873 0.4365** 0.1880
dependshare -0.3897** 0.1546 -0.4091*** 0.1546
agrhh -0.2007*** 0.0750 -0.2091*** 0.0751
distance2bus -0.0060** 0.0030 -0.0047 0.0030
asset -0.0913 0.0593 -0.0900 0.0594
drought -0.0124** 0.0051 -0.0108** 0.0051
flood -0.0016 0.0039 -0.0026 0.0039
epidemic 0.1797** 0.0890 0.1522* 0.0900
livestock -0.0120*** 0.0043 -0.0121*** 0.0043
othershock 0.0209 0.0131 0.0211 0.0132
cons -3.3036*** 0.6868 -3.3697*** 0.6880
Number of obs 1988 1988
LR chi2(17) 207.61 214.82
Prob >chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Log likelihood -1094.593 -1090.989
Pseudo R2 0.0866 0.0896
Notes: t statistics in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table C.3: Logit regression of health insurance
(Cumulative risk aversion with any type of insurance)
Any insurance in 2010 Any insurance in 2012
insurance20121 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
insurance20101 0.4029** 0.1656
healthstatus -0.0002 0.0006 0.0004 0.0006
riskaversion1 0.1050*** 0.0399 0.0179 0.0360
lpcincome -0.1352** 0.0635 -0.1593*** 0.0572
headage -0.1126*** 0.0331 0.0081 0.0251
married 0.2267* 0.1254 0.1407 0.1203
headage2 0.0009*** 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002
femaleshare 0.1404 0.2579 0.2070 0.2351
dependshare -0.0381 0.2161 0.7460*** 0.2019
agrhh -0.0659 0.1036 -0.0416 0.0932
distance2bus 0.0030 0.0038 0.0122*** 0.0042
asset 0.5673*** 0.1252 0.0428 0.0754
drought 0.0356*** 0.0079 0.0159** 0.0067
flood -0.0060 0.0058 -0.0157*** 0.0049
epidemic 0.0472 0.1358 0.1470 0.1407
livestock 0.0179*** 0.0067 0.0009 0.0054
othershock 0.0702** 0.0338 -0.0090 0.0166
cons 4.7493*** 1.0812 2.0446** 0.8773
Number of obs 1832 1988
LR chi2(17) 146.95 79.63
Prob >chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Log likelihood -497.0802 -624.2814
Pseudo R2 0.1288 0.060
Notes: t statistics in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table C.4: Logit regression of health insurance
(Absolute risk aversion with any type of insurance)
Any insurance in 2010 Any insurance in 2012
insurance20121 Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
insurance20101 0.4116** 0.1659
healthstatus -0.0001 0.0006 0.0005 0.0006
abriskaversion1 0.2542*** 0.0714 -0.1267 0.0869
lpcincome -0.1485** 0.0636 -0.1579*** 0.0573
headage -0.1093*** 0.0331 0.0098 0.0251
married 0.2174* 0.1255 0.1380 0.1203
headage2 0.0009*** 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0002
femaleshare 0.1333 0.2592 0.2261 0.2357
dependshare 0.0058 0.2156 0.7531*** 0.2019
agrhh -0.0605 0.1039 -0.0527 0.0932
distance2bus 0.0015 0.0038 0.0122*** 0.0042
asset 0.5386*** 0.1236 0.0435 0.0756
drought 0.0355*** 0.0079 0.0163** 0.0067
flood -0.0058 0.0058 -0.0164*** 0.0050
epidemic 0.0661 0.1347 0.1496 0.1408
livestock 0.0173*** 0.0067 0.0017 0.0054
othershock 0.0649** 0.0331 -0.0110 0.0166
cons 4.9514*** 1.0811 2.1412** 0.8736
Number of obs 1832 1988
LR chi2(17) 152.27 81.64
Prob >chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Log likelihood -494.4184 -623.2763
Pseudo R2 0.1334 0.0615
Notes: t statistics in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table C.5: Summary of risk aversion in 2010 and 2012
2010 2012
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
riskaversion1 1988 3.2334 1.1089 0.8571 4 3.2097 1.0804 0.8571 4
riskaversion2 1988 3.8019 1.2262 1.1266 4.6477 3.7771 1.1950 1.1266 4.6477
riskaversion3 1988 2.7807 0.9536 0.7371 3.44 2.7603 0.9291 0.7371 3.44
riskaversion4 1988 3.2697 1.0545 0.9688 3.9970 3.2483 1.0277 0.9688 3.9970
abriskaversion1 1988 0.8198 0.4959 -1.6471 1 0.7533 0.1957 0.1110 1
abriskaversion2 1988 0.8756 0.4437 -1.6471 1 0.9533 0.0864 0.2759 1
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Table C.6: Cumulative risk aversion in groups
2010 2012
Cumulative risk aversion Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
high 1,305 65.64 1,214 61.07
medium 542 27.26 638 32.09
low 141 7.09 136 6.84
Total 1,988 100.00 1,988 100.00
Table C.7: Absolute risk aversion in groups
2010 2012
Cumulative risk aversion Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
high 1,154 58.05 108 5.43
medium 776 39.03 1,880 94.57
low 58 2.92
Total 1,988 100.00 1,988 100.00
Table C.8: Pairwise correlation of risk parameters in 2010
Variable riskaver1 riskaver2 riskaver3 riskaver4 abriskaver1 abriskaver2
riskaversion1 1
riskaversion2 1.0000* 1
riskaversion3 1.0000* 1.0000* 1
riskaversion4 1.0000* 1.0000* 1.0000* 1
abriskaversion1 0.3349* 0.3339* 0.3339* 0.3339* 1
abriskaversion2 0.2552* 0.2560* 0.2552* 0.2560* 0.7104* 1
Notes: * Statistically significant at 5 percent.
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Table C.9: Impact of health insurance coverage on idiosyncratic VEU
(total health insurances across surveys, cumulative)
Random Between Random Between
effect variation effect variation
Health insurance -0.273*** -0.269*** -0.213*** -0.235**
(total insurances across surveys) (0.045) (0.080) (0.057) (0.084)
Cumulative risk aversion -0.007 0.011 -0.002 -0.005
(0.026) (0.053) (0.027) (0.054)
Health status -0.029 -0.009 -0.070 -0.066
(0.034) (0.066) (0.061) (0.066)
Per capita income -0.242*** -0.252*** -0.162*** -0.165**
(0.056) (0.060) (0.043) (0.066)
Household characteristics No No Yes Yes
Commune characteristics No No Yes Yes
N 3952 3952 3952 3952
R2 0.018 0.065
F 9.221 5.943
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table C.10: Impact of health insurance coverage on idiosyncratic VEU
(health insurance at the time of interview, cumulative)
Random Between Random Between
effect variation effect variation
Health insurance -0.259*** -0.559*** -0.234*** -0.486**
(Yes/No at the time of interview) (0.043) (0.160) (0.070) (0.167)
Cumulative risk aversion -0.009 0.011 -0.003 -0.005
(0.026) (0.053) (0.027) (0.054)
Health status -0.030 -0.010 -0.068 -0.067
(0.034) (0.066) (0.060) (0.066)
Per capita income -0.272*** -0.251*** -0.175*** -0.165**
(0.058) (0.060) (0.045) (0.066)
Household characteristics No No Yes Yes
Commune characteristics No No Yes Yes
N 3952 3952 3952 3952
R2 0.019 0.065
F 9.472 5.972
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table C.11: Impact of health insurance coverage on idiosyncratic VEU
(health insurance in 2012 and 2010, absolute)
Random Between Random Between
effect variation effect variation
Health insurance 2012 -0.281*** -0.281** -0.238** -0.264**
(0.055) (0.099) (0.074) (0.102)
Health insurance 2010 -0.257*** -0.236 -0.153** -0.164
(0.043) (0.167) (0.049) (0.168)
Absolute risk aversion -0.164* -0.083 -0.134* -0.106
(0.088) (0.165) (0.077) (0.163)
Health status -0.029 -0.007 -0.070 -0.066
(0.032) (0.065) (0.059) (0.066)
Per capita income -0.239*** -0.252*** -0.162*** -0.165**
(0.056) (0.060) (0.044) (0.067)
Household characteristics No No Yes Yes
Commune characteristics No No Yes Yes
N 3952 3952 3952 3952
R2 0.018 0.065
F 7.425 5.721
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table C.12: Risk attitude from different lotteries and implied λrisk= ω∗(6000α/Lossβ), ω=w+(0.5)/w−(0.5)
Implied Implied risk under different assumptions
acceptable of probability weights and diminishing
loss sensitivities for gains and looses
Risk behavior Percent in Thousand
(Lottery choice category) year VND (1) (2) (3) (4)
2010 2012 ω = 1 ω = 1 ω = 0.86 ω = 0.86
α = 1 α = 0.95 α = 1 α = 0.95
β = 1 β = 0.92 β = 1 β = 0.92
1. Reject all lotteries 68.00 61.60 <2 >3 >3.57 >2.58 >3.07
2. Accept lottery a, reject lotteries b to f 3.85 9.63 2 3 3.57 2.58 3.07
3. Accept lotteries a and b, reject lotteries c to f 12.22 11.90 3 2 2.46 1.72 2.11
4. Accept lotteries a to c, reject lotteries d to f 9.40 9.96 4 1.5 1.89 1.29 1.62
5. Accept lotteries a to d, reject lotteries e to f 4.07 4.75 5 1.2 1.54 1.03 1.32
6. Accept lotteries a to e, reject lotteries f 1.66 0.19 6 1 1.30 0.86 1.12
7. Accept all lotteries 0.78 1.97 ≥7 ≥0.86 ≥1.13 ≥0.74 ≥0.97
Notes: The strategy of Ga¨chter et al. (2010) is adopted to choose sensitivity parameter. Parameters on diminishing sensitivity are
extracted from Booij & Van de Kuilen (2009) and parameters on ω are from Abdellaoui (2000). (1) Benchmark parameters: no
probability weighting, and no diminishing sensitivity. (2) No probability weighting, but diminishing sensitivity. (3) Probability
weighting, but no diminishing sensitivity. (4) Probability weighting, and diminishing sensitivity.
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